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Abstract 
 
This study assesses both the social polarisation hypothesis and the role migrants play in this 
process. The manufacturing sector, once a major source of urban employment and consisting 
of a large percentage of skilled and semi-skilled, middle-income jobs has declined while the 
service sector, argued to consist of predominantly either high-skill, high-pay or low-skill, 
low-pay jobs, has grown. Thus, the decline of manufacturing and the growth of the service 
sector are argued to result in a more polarised society (Sassen, 1994). Low-wage, low-skill 
service sector jobs are also argued to attract poorly-educated, unskilled immigrants unable to 
compete in the urban labour market for anything other than low-skill, low-pay jobs. Thus, 
the contention is that immigration contributes to social polarisation by increasing the 
numbers of low-wage workers (Sassen, 1994). However, other scholars hold that the growth 
of an expanded low-wage service sector is only possible in the face of large-scale migration 
of these unskilled workers, and that a strong welfare state can militate against the 
development of a service proletariat (Hamnett, 1994).  
 
Using survey and population census data of the Johannesburg region of South Africa from 
1970 to 2010, it is shown that, when clerical and service and sales jobs are not misclassified 
as low-skill work, the growth in these white-collar, middle-income jobs does not contribute 
to increasing polarisation. Moreover, the numbers of high-skill occupations increased by two 
and half times as many as low-skill jobs, thereby resulting in a trend of increasing 
professionalisation of the employed workforce. Shift-share analysis shows that this 
professionalisation has taken place across all sectors, including the manufacturing sector, 
and was not confined to the service sectors only. In addition, this relatively smaller amount 
of low-skill job growth occurred despite large-scale in-migration and the general condition 
of large numbers of unskilled workers in South Africa. However, economic, and 
consequently, job growth did not match labour force growth. Even without sufficient welfare 
provision to discourage workers from taking low-skill, low-wage jobs in favour of 
unemployment and living on state grants, unemployment grew dramatically in this period as 
a result of the lack of suitable jobs. In terms of the employed workforce, migrant workers of 
both sex and all four race groups made significant contributions to the growth in absolute 
numbers of high-skill jobs. Thus, the increase in high-skill, high-wage and middle-income 
service sector jobs was that much greater than low-skill job growth, leading to a pattern 
more consistent with growing professionalisation of the urban workforce, with a 
concomitant increase in unemployment. 
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Introduction 
 
In essence, the social polarisation hypothesis states that due to the decline in manufacturing 
employment and the growth in service sector employment, the numbers of high-skill, high-
pay and low-skill, low-pay jobs are increasing at the expense of middle-income jobs (Sassen, 
1994). While many scholars support this theory, others argue that low-skill work is actually 
on the decline, and that only high-skill jobs are increasing, thereby leading to increasing 
professionalisation of the occupational structure (Hamnett, 1994a). These two theories will be 
weighed up against each other, using data from the Johannesburg region of South Africa to 
critically engage with some of the central tenets of both hypotheses. 
 
In Chapter 1, the arguments for social polarisation and professionalisation will be reviewed. 
In addition, the contention that many scholars mistakenly reach the conclusion of increasing 
social polarisation due to the way in which certain service sector occupations are 
(mis)classified as low-skill, low-wage jobs will also be introduced (Borel-Saladin and 
Crankshaw, 2009). Literature on the role of immigrants in social polarisation will also be 
discussed. The argument will be made that those who support the social polarisation 
hypothesis view immigrants as contributing to increasing polarisation by filling increasing 
numbers of low-wage service jobs. The counter to this, namely that it is the presence of 
immigrants that makes a low-wage service sector possible, will also be explored (Hamnett, 
1994a). However, the idea that not all immigrants are necessarily confined to low-skill 
service sector work will also be discussed (Cross and Waldinger, 1992). The issue of welfare 
provision and its impact on reducing the need for workers to seek low-wage work will also be 
discussed, leading to the assertion that in countries with strong welfare states, 
professionalisation accompanied by growing unemployment rather than low-skill work is the 
dominant trend (Esping-Andersen, 1993; Hamnett, 1996b). However, the contention that 
professionalisation with a concomitant increase in unemployment can take place without the 
actions of a welfare state to limit the growth of low wage jobs will also be introduced. 
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Chapter 2 describes the methods used in exploring and testing the ideas introduced in chapter 
1. First, the method by which to accurately assess the polarisation theory will be discussed. 
Central to this discussion will be the issue of the classification of occupations. Another 
important section will deal with the shift-share method. This will be used later to examine 
occupational change and decompose said change into that caused by changes to the 
distribution of occupations across all industries and that due to changes in the distribution of 
industries themselves. The surveys used for studying this occupational change, as well as 
those selected for studying the impacts of immigration on the occupational structure will also 
be discussed. 
 
In chapter 3, changes to the sectoral and occupational structure of the employed workforce of 
the Johannesburg region will be analysed through the use of descriptive statistics and the 
shift-share method. It will be argued that the occupational structure is tending more towards a 
pattern of professionalisation than polarisation, and that this is due to increasing 
professionalisation in most sectors, not only the growing service sectors. 
 
The role of migrants in social polarisation will be considered in chapter 4. Evidence in 
support of the contention that migrants occupy mostly low-skill work will be critically 
examined. The argument will be made that migrants to the Johannesburg region are not 
overwhelmingly confined to low-skill work. Instead it will be shown that, overall, they have a 
similar occupational distribution to that of natives. However, occupational differences 
between individual race and gender groups of migrants will also be explored. 
 
Chapter 5 will consider the theory that professionalisation with a concomitant increase in 
unemployment can take place without the actions of a welfare state to limit the growth of low 
wage jobs. It will be shown that welfare benefits in South Africa do very little to dissuade 
workers from seeking low-wage work. It will be argued that despite this, there is much 
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unemployment due to insufficient economic growth in the face of extensive labour force 
growth, especially amongst the unskilled, thereby leading to a shortfall of low-skill and jobs 
and increasing unemployment.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
 
Deindustrialisation and the rise of the service sector 
 
In their 1982 paper World City Formation, John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff proposed that 
one of the most important issues facing emerging world cities would be the impact their 
changing employment structures would have on both their economies and social organisation. 
They expressed concern that certain sectors of the economy were growing at the expense of 
others in these cities. They argued that manufacturing’s share of employment was steadily 
dropping, and that, with the rapidly increasing automation of many jobs, manufacturing 
employment in the world city would continue to decline.  
 
The issue of the declining centrality of manufacturing mass production and employment has 
been taken up by many other scholars. Sassen (1994) contends that capital intensive, mass 
production and consumption in post-World War II America facilitated and encouraged the 
growth of a large middle-income, blue-collar class, while limiting inequality at the same time. 
Because this scale of production was so large, and played such a central role in employment, 
there were greater levels of unionisation and worker empowerment. Thus, these industries 
had large organised factories with many well-paid employees. Manufacturing was such a core 
industry in the economies of the 1950’s and 1960’s that, due to its high levels of unionisation, 
it even had great wage-setting power in other sectors (Sassen, 1994). Thus, Sassen (1994) 
argues, this type of economic growth led to a decrease in the number of poor in the United 
States (US), as well as other highly developed countries. 
 
However, the socioeconomic system and functioning of the urban land market began to 
change from the mid-1970’s (Sassen, 1994). Many scholars assert that not only did 
manufacturing employment begin to decline, but the organisation of manufacturing 
production began to change. Instead of large factories with highly unionised, well-paid 
employees, there was a decline in unions and a loss of protective measures, with increased 
part-time work and lower wages. Mass production manufacturing was also argued to provide 
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relatively high-paying jobs for blue-collar workers with little education (Sassen, 1994).1 
However, with the decline in this kind of manufacturing work, it is claimed the numbers of 
these jobs decreased most in industries with lower educational requirements, thereby leading 
to increased poverty and unemployment amongst unskilled workers (Kasarda, 1989; Soja, 
1991; Wilson, 1987). Thus, Wilson (1996:29) says “One study revealed that in the 1970’s, up 
to half of the huge employment declines for less-educated blacks might be explained by 
industrial shifts away from manufacturing toward other sectors”. As Soja (1991:369) states, 
“…restructuring and rationalisation shrank the once bulging middle-wage stratum and created 
new, post-Fordist landscapes of despair and abandonment in many of the old working class 
neighbourhoods that made Fordism work”. Therefore, it is reasoned, the general decline in 
wages and manufacturing employment led to the shrinking of the mass of middle-income 
earners.  
 
As many cities experienced deindustrialisation, it is also argued they simultaneously began 
assuming specific functions in the global market as a result of the world-wide decentralising 
of business and the demand for the specialised services needed to operate and sustain 
expanding transnational corporations (Soja, 1991). Thus, while manufacturing employment 
declined, service sector employment grew. Many authors maintain that most growth has 
occurred in the business services: management, banking, finance, legal services, accounting, 
technical consulting, telecommunications, computers, international transportation, research 
and higher education, and that the workers in these types of jobs are mostly professionals and 
clerical personnel (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). Also argued to be undergoing rapid growth 
are the numbers of jobs in international tourism, real estate, construction, hotel services, 
restaurants, luxury shopping, entertainment, private police and domestic services. While most 
of the jobs in these areas are considered to be stable and relatively well-paid, many are 
arguably not. For example, domestic servants are some of the worst paid urban workers 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). 
 
                                                 
1
 These typical blue-collar manufacturing jobs of plant and machine operators and assemblers “operate and 
monitor industrial and agricultural machinery and equipment on the spot or by remote control, drive and 
operate trains, motor vehicles and mobile machinery and equipment, or assemble products from component 
parts according to strict specifications and procedures” (Warwick Institute for Employment Research, 2012). 
These jobs include industrial robot operators, any processing plant/machinery operators processing any 
material, from chemicals, wood, metal, glass and ceramics, to meat, dairy, baked goods and fruit. Specific 
examples are iron-moulding machine operators and furnace operators to brewers and tobacco production 
machine operators. This also includes drivers of all vehicles, from taxis to cranes to earth moving equipment. 
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Thus the contention is that economic internationalisation and the growth of the service 
industry have caused a shift in the city’s economy from its traditional manufacturing base to 
services and high-tech industries, with the fastest growth occurring in finance and insurance 
services (Gu and Liu, 2002). This increase in service and high-tech industries is posited to be 
responsible for a growing income differential between high- and low-paid jobs as well as the 
simultaneous growth in the numbers of high-skilled, well-paid jobs and unskilled, irregular, 
low-paid jobs. Thus, these growing service industries are argued to have created a greater 
share of both low- and high-paying jobs than manufacturing, with several studies being 
offered as evidence that service industries, especially the producer services, create a larger 
number of both low-paying and the highest-paid jobs than manufacturing (Baum, 1997; Chiu 
and Lui, 2004; Sassen, 1994). 
 
 
Increasing social polarisation versus professionalisation 
 
Scholars such as Saskia Sassen contend therefore that the income structure has changed and 
earnings are distributed differently as a result of the shift from manufacturing to services as 
the city’s major employer (Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). With the traditional, mainly 
manufacturing blue-collar working class shrinking, the growing numbers of professionals, 
largely in business services, are now argued to be much more predominant in the city 
(Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). These professionals are drawn in stark contrast to the 
increasing population of the poor of the city, which some authors claim constitute 
approximately a third of the population. Thus, the theory put forward by proponents of the 
social polarisation hypothesis is that while the steadily-growing group of professionals enjoys 
stable jobs and permanent income, the equally growing number of poor queue for jobs on the 
edges of the formal economy and mostly provide personal services to the professionals, 
“doing the dirty work of the city” (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982:322).2 Therefore, many 
scholars argue that one of the greatest impacts of world city development is the polarisation 
of its social classes (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). 
 
Not all authors agree with this assessment of growing numbers of professionals and unskilled, 
low-wage workers and a stagnating or even shrinking middle-income stratum. Fainstein, 
                                                 
2
 Examples offered by Friedmann and Wolf (1982) of less desirable jobs include day labourers, street vendors 
and modest artisans. 
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Gordon and Harloe (1992) criticise the bimodal picture of world cities such as New York and 
London. They argue that the idea of the polarised dual city ignores the “middle mass”, which 
lives mostly in the suburbs and periphery of the city (Fainstein, et al., 1992:8). Chris Hamnett 
(1994a, 1994b, 2003) is highly critical of the social polarisation hypothesis. Hamnett 
contends that the suggestion that polarisation is absolute, that the numbers of high- and low-
skill jobs are increasing, only holds for certain cities, and then only because of their unique 
and specific conditions. Instead, he argues, the numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled jobs 
available in Western capitalist countries have been decreasing steadily over the last 20-30 
years (Hamnett, 1994a). 
 
Hamnett (1994a, 1994b, 2003) argues that the shift from manufacturing to financial and 
business services has resulted, not in a more polarised employed workforce in most cities, but 
a more professionalised one. He argues that there has not been an absolute increase in the 
numbers of both high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, low-pay workers. Rather, he asserts there 
has been an absolute increase in the numbers of professional, managerial and technical 
workers only. Hamnett refers to Daniel Bell’s pioneering work The Coming of Post-
Industrial Society (1973) and the theory that there has been a shift in Western capitalist 
societies from industrialism to post-industrialism and the production of goods and 
manufacturing to the production of services and an information processing economy 
(Hamnett, 1994a, 2003). Hence, post-industrialist theorists such as Bell (1973), Fuchs (1968), 
Gartner and Reisman (1974) and Richta (1967) assert that this industrial shift has led to 
employers requiring more workers with greater technical expertise. Thus, they argue, work is 
more reliant on professional, managerial and technical skills and non-manual work, and less 
on unskilled, routine manual labour (Hamnett, 2003).  
 
The post-industrial theory of an increasing demand for higher skilled workers is essentially 
the counterpoint to the Marxist theory of proletarianisation of the workforce. Wright and 
Singelmann (1982:178) state that “technical expertise is being confined to a smaller and 
smaller proportion of the labour force; routinisation of activity is becoming more and more 
pervasive, spreading to technical and even professional occupations; and responsibilities 
within work are becoming less meaningful.” They assert that most Marxist scholars agree 
with Braverman’s argument for increasing proletarianisation in advanced capitalist societies 
as set out in Labour and Monopoly Capital (Braverman, 1974). Moreover, Wright and 
Singelmann (1982) maintain that both of these processes would occur simultaneously. They 
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claim that proletarianisation is increasing within industrial sectors, but that there is a 
concomitant shift of employment to sectors where there is less proletarianisation overall. 
However, they contend that the shift of employment to sectors of relatively less 
proletarianisation is “weakening”. Therefore they predicted that from 1980 to1990 there 
would be a decrease in non-proletarianised positions and an increase in proletarianised 
positions; hence, “a net proletarianisation process” in the United States (Wright and 
Singelman, 1982:179). 
  
The theory of increasing proletarianisation has been criticised by many scholars. Esping-
Andersen, Assimakopoulou and van Kersbergen (1993:32) state, “Virtually all research 
rejects Braverman’s deskilling and mass proletarianisation thesis while pointing instead to a 
pervasive momentum of skill upgrading and professionalisation”. Marshall and Rose (1988) 
found that rather than systematic proletarianisation of the British class structure, there was 
significant upward mobility into professional, managerial and administrative, as well as 
routine clerical positions. They found no net expansion in proletarian class positions. Even 
Wright and Martin (1987) subsequently wrote that Wright and Singelmann (1982) were 
incorrect in their prediction of increasing proletarianisation. In fact, they argued that in the 
1970’s in the US, there was deproletarianisation and shrinking of the working class, as well 
as accelerated growth of managerial class positions and numbers of semi-autonomous 
employees (Wright and Martin, 1987).3 Wright himself states, “Unless these trends are a 
temporary detour, it thus appears that the class structure of capitalism continues to become 
increasingly complex rather than simplified around a single, polarised class antagonism” 
(1997: 111). 
 
Thus, industrial shifts since World War Two have arguably resulted in occupational 
upgrading (Tienda, Jensen and Bach, 1984). These changes are argued to have led to the 
emergence and growth of the “new middle class” of managers and professionals in the post-
industrial information-processing based economy, while the numbers of workers in all other 
occupations have declined (Hamnett, 1994a, 2003). Therefore, it is argued, many cities have 
experienced increased professionalisation of their occupational structure. 
 
                                                 
3
 “A good example is an engineer or a scientist who, within limits imposed by superiors, has considerable 
control over the immediate labor process but is excluded from any control over the apparatus of production.” 
(Wright and Singelmann, 1982:S183). 
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Proponents of the social polarisation and professionalisation hypotheses both posit a 
simultaneous decline in manufacturing employment and growth in services. Both sides of this 
debate also contend that this sectoral change has resulted in a concomitant increase in the 
numbers of high-skill managerial, professional and technical type jobs. However, they 
disagree on what is happening to the numbers of low-skilled workers. Supporters of the social 
polarisation hypothesis argue that the nature of these service industries is that their 
occupation structure is bimodal, and that therefore, growth in employment in services leads to 
higher numbers of both high-skill and low-skill workers. On the other hand, the post-
industrialist argument, like professionalisation, is that these service industries require mainly 
greater numbers of high-skill workers, not low-skill workers; thereby leading to increasing 
professionalisation of the employed workforce. 
 
Scholars such as Hamnett concede that it is not inconceivable that income and occupation 
polarisation has occurred in US cities such as New York and Los Angeles. However, these 
cities display certain characteristics not common to other major Western cities such as 
London and many European cities (Hamnett, 1994b). Thus, he asserts, many authors’ 
conceptualisation of polarisation tend to be “uni-causal”, focusing on economic restructuring, 
in global cities especially, as the sole cause of the shift from manufacturing to services as the 
dominant employer, thereby resulting in occupational and income polarisation. However, it 
can also be argued that depending on the level of welfare provision and taxation, the outcome 
of economic restructuring can be professionalisation of the employed workforce, increasing 
unemployment and growing income inequality, rather than the increasing numbers of 
professionals as well as low-wage workers necessary for polarisation (Hamnett, 1994b). If the 
welfare state is service intensive and employs many low-skill workers at above market 
wages, the chances of an expanded low-wage service sector developing are greatly reduced 
(Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993; Hamnett, 1996b). Several European countries with welfare 
states have good unemployment benefits and other forms of welfare for the poor and 
unemployed, arguably resulting in people being less inclined to take low-paying, menial, 
service sector jobs. Also, it is much more unlikely that a large group of low-wage workers 
will develop in countries where unions are strong, centralised and bargain nationally. Thus, 
the scant welfare provision and income support for the poor, as well as the absence of 
effective minimum wage legislation in the US could possibly facilitate the growth of an 
expanded low-wage service sector (Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993; Hamnett, 1996b). 
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Testing social polarisation  
 
The theory of social polarisation is indeed an appealing one, however, as Fainstein et al. 
(1992:13) point out: 
 
“The images of a dual or polarised city are seductive, they promise to encapsulate the 
outcome of a wide variety of complex processes in a single, neat, and easily 
comprehensible phrase. Yet the hard evidence for such a sweeping and general 
conclusion regarding the outcome of economic restructuring and urban change is, at 
best, patchy and ambiguous. If the concept of the ‘dual’ or ‘polarising’ city is of any 
real utility, it can serve only as a hypothesis, the prelude to empirical analysis, rather 
than as a conclusion which takes the existence of confirmatory evidence for granted.” 
  
Chris Hamnett too states: 
 
         “The debate [around polarisation] has been characterised more by assertion than 
conceptual analysis and evidence” (Hamnett, 1994a:402), and,  
 
        “This uncritical acceptance of the existence of social polarisation means that its 
existence is frequently assumed rather than demonstrated.” (Hamnett, 2012:361). 
 
While many scholars in this field use data to support their arguments, the so-called “hard 
evidence” Fainstein et al. refer to above, it is perhaps not surprising that different authors 
interpret the same data in ways that corroborate opposing arguments. One explanation offered 
for why many scholars who do examine empirical evidence conclude from the data that social 
polarisation is increasing in cities is concerned with the definitions of skill requirements and 
levels of remuneration of certain service sector occupations (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 
2009). There is little debate as to which jobs are considered high-skill and high-pay, and that 
both the proportion and absolute number of these jobs are increasing. However, in order for 
there to be a process of increasing polarisation, the numbers of both high-skill, high-pay and 
low-skill, low-pay jobs must increase. It is in the definition of these low-skill, low-income 
jobs that inconsistency occurs. Many authors classify clerical and sales and service worker 
occupations, and even some associate professional occupations, as low-skill, low-pay service 
sector jobs. For example, Wilson refers to ‘practical nursing’ and ‘clerical work’ as the kinds 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
11 
 
of service-sector jobs held by ‘less-educated’ women, implying that he views these as low-
skill, low-income occupations (Wilson, 1996:27). Sassen groups the clerical jobs of 
‘secretaries’ and ‘stock clerks’ with the unskilled manual job of ‘cleaner’ when discussing 
low-paid service sector jobs (Sassen, 1994:105). While a certain proportion of sales jobs may 
conceivably be categorised as unskilled, arguably, there is little evidence that there is a trend 
of disproportionate growth in the numbers of low-skill sales jobs (Esping-Anderson, et al., 
1993; Hamnett, 1994a). Following this scheme of classification, all non-managerial and non-
professional service sector jobs will be classified as low-income, low-skilled jobs. This leads 
to the contention of the “bipolar” distribution of the occupations of the service sector; with 
high-skilled, high-income professionals and managers at one end of the skill and pay 
spectrum, and supposedly low-skill, low-income clerical and sales and service workers on the 
other (Borel-Saladin, 2009). Therefore, by definition, any growth in service sector 
employment will lead to increased polarisation. In the “declining middle” conceptualisation 
of polarisation, the numbers of these high- and low-skill service jobs are increasing at the 
expense of middle-income skilled (artisanal) and semi-skilled (operative) manual jobs in the 
manufacturing sector (Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993). However, arguably the clerical and 
service and sales jobs “misclassified” as low-skill and low-pay have similar skill 
requirements and income distributions to the skilled and semi-skilled manual manufacturing 
jobs they are replacing. Therefore, growth in the numbers of semi-skilled middle-income 
clerical and service and sales jobs would not exacerbate social polarisation, and would also 
mitigate the decline in typical manufacturing occupations and shrinking of the middle-income 
group. Thus, the misclassification of clerical and sales occupations results in the arguably 
inaccurate conclusion that employment growth in service sector jobs at the expense of 
manufacturing jobs leads to increasing polarisation of the occupational structure (Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). 
 
Differing conclusions about social polarisation: the examples of London and New York 
 
It is perhaps not difficult to understand how scholars can conclude that one city is polarising 
and one is professionalising. However, in much of this literature, scholars reach conflicting 
conclusions about the same cities. 
 
In the case of London, as Hamnett (1994b) recounts, Saskia Sassen refers to rising numbers 
of jobs in the banking, insurance and finance and business services on one hand, as well as 
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growth in employment in personal services. Thus, the implication is that the jobs in the 
former sectors are high-skill, high-pay, while the latter are low-skill, low-pay. This she 
contrasts with the large job losses in important manufacturing industries. She also refers to 
increasing income polarisation and talks about low-wage work increasing, but does not offer 
evidence of absolute numbers of this trend (Hamnett, 1994b). Gordon and Harloe (1991) 
maintain that one of the reasons for increasing dualism in London is that jobs in the growing 
sectors are polarised between the stable, qualified jobs of the finance and business services 
sectors, and the unstable, unskilled jobs of the private consumer services. In partial agreement 
with these assessments of London, Hamnett (1994b) concedes that there is increasing income 
polarisation in London. However, this is not necessarily due to occupational change. 
Population census data indicate there was a steep absolute increase in the numbers of 
managers and professionals between 1981 and 1991, while the numbers in all other 
occupational groups declined. Thus, concludes Hamnett (1994b), the occupational data 
indicate that London is becoming professionalised, not increasingly polarised. 
 
With regard to New York, Edward Soja (1991:363) talks of “...a dramatically widening 
divide between the rich and the poor. An increasingly polarised city both socially and 
spatially has been taking shape in the economic recovery of the New York metropolitan 
region...”. He argues that the “poverty population” has increased in New York, though he 
asserts this is due more to growing job losses rather than low-wage job growth (Soja, 
1991:364). Moreover, he quotes estimates that professionals constitute a third of the 
population of New York. Thus, with growing numbers of poor and high-income workers, 
Soja views New York as increasingly polarised. Hamnett (1994a) acknowledges that New 
York may well be polarising. This he argues is due mainly to the large numbers of ethnic 
immigrants in the city. Thus, he asserts, the numbers of professional and managerial jobs are 
increasing, but, because of the ready supply of cheap unskilled labour in the form of Third 
World immigrants, there is also an expanded low-wage service sector (Hamnett, 1994a). 
However, Bailey and Waldinger (1991), maintain that earnings data for New York, while 
showing a trend towards greater inequality, do not indicate that immigrants are concentrated 
at the lower end of the earnings distribution. They contend that employment growth is 
concentrated in managerial and professional positions. Furthermore, they state that these 
occupations have increased much more substantially than either service occupations or blue-
collar occupations in the service sector. Thus, they conclude that the data show very little 
evidence of increasing polarisation in the employed workforce (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991). 
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Therefore, even when considering the same city, scholars disagree about whether or not the 
dominant process is one of increasing polarisation or growing professionalisation. 
 
Immigrants and Social Polarisation 
 
Those who support the social polarisation hypothesis arguably view immigrants as 
contributing to increasing polarisation. They maintain that while the native residents of the 
city fill the growing numbers of high-skill, high-wage service sector jobs, unskilled 
immigrants to the city fill the concomitantly increasing number of low-wage service jobs. 
These immigrants are posited to provide bespoke and domestic services to the affluent 
professionals and managers in the city. Some scholars argue that the presence of large 
numbers of uneducated migrants suppresses the wages of low-skilled work, while 
exacerbating unemployment among unskilled natives. However, other scholars assert that it is 
the presence of a large number of unskilled immigrants that facilitates the development of a 
large low-wage service sector. Others contend that different ethnic groups of migrants can 
experience quite diverse fortunes regarding employment in the city. Many studies have also 
shown that the presence of a large population of immigrants does not adversely affect native 
employment and income levels. Finally, some scholars question the importance of the scale 
of immigration and its impact on social polarisation. 
 
Some scholars maintain that the growth of low-wage service sector jobs in an increasingly 
polarising occupation structure attracts low-skilled immigrants to world cities (Sassen, 1994). 
Much of the expanding service sector, with its high turnover rate and ease of entry, is argued 
to attract immigrants, especially minorities, who experience greater difficulty breaking into 
more established or closed sectors of the economy (Sassen, 1994). Unskilled service jobs and 
downgraded manufacturing jobs are easy entry-level jobs for unskilled immigrant workers. 
Many new migrants also may not have their qualifications recognised on arrival in a world 
city, or cannot speak the local language, leading to their accepting lower-skill, lower-pay 
work (Baum, 1997; Wright and Ellis, 1999). Hence, the assertion that these “recent arrivals” 
are over-represented in the lower-paid entry-level jobs that the native population has rejected 
(Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993; Baum, 1997). Sassen (1991:318) states that migrants tend to 
be “disproportionately concentrated in lower-paying, more traditional service industries...and 
in the low-paying jobs of the producer services”. Thus, migrants are arguably portrayed as 
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contributing to social polarisation by filling the growing numbers of low-skill, low-paid 
service sector jobs available. 
 
Sassen (1991) contends that the scale and timing of migration to the United States can be 
explained only by the increased supply of low-wage jobs generated by major growth sectors. 
She argues that changes in immigration law and the existence of prior immigrant 
communities cannot account for the increased flow of migrants to the United States in the 
1970’s and 1980’s. She also points out that this increased immigration occurred in the face of 
growing unemployment in the United States and increasing employment opportunities in the 
immigrants’ countries of origin. Thus, despite there apparently being fewer jobs on offer in 
the country of destination, and an increasing number in the countries of origin, people still 
chose to migrate to the US. Another deterrent to migration at the time was the decline in the 
sectors that had traditionally employed large numbers of immigrants, namely the 
manufacturing and goods-handling jobs (Sassen, 1999). Sassen (1991) therefore maintains 
that despite all these disincentives to migrate to the US, migration in fact increased in this 
time as immigrants were drawn by the rapidly expanding supply of low-wage service sector 
and downgraded manufacturing jobs. 
 
It is asserted then that these immigrants are concentrated in world cities in particular, as 
this is where the major growth sectors that generate low-skill, low-income occupations are 
found (Sassen, 1994). Sassen (1991, 1994) argues that global cities are key points for the 
integration of large numbers of immigrants in activities that service the growing strategic 
sectors of global finance and trade. These migrants are either directly incorporated as low-
paid clerical and blue-collar workers, such as janitors and repair workers, or indirectly 
through the consumption patterns of the growing class of high-pay professionals. It is 
argued that while well-educated world city natives fill the growing numbers of high-skill, 
high-wage managerial, professional and technical jobs, poorly-educated immigrants to the 
city are employed in the growing number of low-skill, low-wage service jobs that exist to 
service the needs of the high-wage workers. These low-wage service jobs include, in 
Sassen’s view, nannies and maids, and low-wage workers in restaurants and shops. Thus, 
she states: 
 
“...immigration can be seen as providing labour for the low-wage service and 
manufacturing jobs that service both the expanding, highly specialised service sector 
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and the high-income lifestyles of those employed in the specialised, expanding service 
sector” (Sassen, 1991:315).  
 
In a polarised conceptualisation of the city, high-income gentrification and the expansion of 
the poor population of the city are two seemingly opposite processes that have the same 
outcome for immigrants. High-paid professionals with limited free time create a demand for 
specialised goods and services, from delicatessens and boutiques to nannies and maids 
(Gordon and Sassen, 1992; Sassen, 1994). These products and activities tend to be more 
labour intensive and are manufactured on a much smaller scale than the traditional Fordist 
mass production and consumption. The creation of these activities therefore leads to an 
increased demand for low-wage workers. On the other end of the occupational class 
spectrum, the rapidly increasing numbers of the poor also have needs better met by small-
scale manufacturing and smaller retail concerns (Gordon and Sassen, 1992). These 
establishments are usually more modest in size, rely on cheap or even free family labour, and 
often do not meet the health and safety standards of larger commercial businesses (Gordon 
and Sassen, 1992; Sassen, 1994). The contention therefore is that the demand from the 
increasing numbers of both the rich and the poor in the city is for a flexible workforce of low-
wage workers, often working in the informal economy. Thus, it is argued that it is in the 
informal economy that unskilled immigrants are most easily able to find work in world cities. 
 
Several proponents of the polarisation hypothesis tend to focus on low-skill migrant women 
in particular and their role in increasing levels of polarisation (Sassen, 1991, 1994; Baum, 
1997, Chiu and Lui, 2004). Sassen (1994) talks of the growing number of illegal immigrant 
women in medium sized and small factories in Tokyo. However, it is in the area of domestic 
help especially that unskilled immigrant women and high-skilled, well-paid professional 
women native to the city are argued to be linked. The growth in the producer services and 
international finance and commerce has led to a growing demand for well-educated 
professionals and managers. Many studies have shown increasing numbers of women 
entering these jobs. Thus, Sassen (1991) paints the picture of the professional household in 
the world city, where both partners are successful, high-income professionals with jobs that 
leave them with little time for domestic responsibilities. As more women take challenging, 
time-consuming professional jobs, so this increases the demand for other women, often 
migrants from ethnic minorities to fulfill their labour-intensive domestic roles in the home 
(Chiu and Lui, 2004). Baum (1997) asserts that most of the increase in domestic servants and 
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personal service workers in Sydney is due to migrant women. Furthermore, he states that the 
numbers of these immigrant women recorded are an underestimate, “as a large underground 
economy in personal services” exists in Sydney (Baum, 1997:1899). Perhaps more 
importantly, some of these immigrant women are argued to accept wages for domestic 
service work far below those on offer in the formal economy (Baum, 1997). Thus, arguably 
polarisation theorists view women migrants holding often poorly-paid domestic and personal 
services jobs as facilitating increasing social polarisation by increasing the numbers of low-
skill, low-wage workers in the city, opposite the increasing numbers of high-skill high-pay 
natives. 
 
Some scholars also submit to the theory that this ready supply of migrant labour drives down 
wages at the lower end of the job market (Sassen, 1994; Wilson, 1996). For example, some 
maintain that the influx of poorly educated immigrants into the US in the 1980’s is 
responsible for the growing wage differential between low- and high-income earners, thereby 
contributing to growing inequality. The addition of low-skill immigrant workers to the 
already large pool of native low-skill, poorly-educated labour is also argued to drive down the 
wages for all low-skilled workers (Wilson, 1996). Moreover, the steady supply of cheap, low-
skill immigrant labour is also claimed to limit the chances for advancement of indigenous 
workers as well as contribute to their unemployment levels (Gordon and Sassen, 1992). 
 
While the polarisation hypothesis was developed around global cities in Western capitalist 
countries, other world cities have been argued to be experiencing the same processes. Rural 
in-migration to the city of Johannesburg, South Africa has also been considered from the 
perspective of the social polarisation hypothesis. Poorly educated, unskilled rural migrants 
came to the city to work in the mines and factories as unskilled manual labourers during the 
pre- and early-apartheid period (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004). However, due to the 
government’s strict laws of the time designed to limit the size of the urban African 
population, many rural-born Africans were not granted permanent urban status. These rural 
migrants had only temporary urban rights, while their families remained in the homeland, to 
which they periodically returned (Lipton, 1989). Thus, two urban African groups were 
created: permanently settled African workers and their families residing in townships, and 
temporary migrant African workers housed mostly in single-sex hostels (Hindson, 1985). 
Subsequent government policies continued to disadvantage rural-born, non-resident Africans 
in comparison to urbanised Africans (Hindson, 1987). Manufacturing employment in 
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Johannesburg grew steadily until the early 1970’s, but declined precipitously in the 1980’s. 
(Crankshaw, 1997). At the same time, employment continued to increase in the tertiary sector 
and especially in the financial sector. With these changes in the labour market in the late 
Apartheid era, the numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled manual labour jobs in the mining 
and manufacturing sectors declined, whilst the demand for skilled white-collar workers and 
professionals in the commercial and financial sector grew (Hindson, 1991). This change from 
a need for unskilled to higher-skill workers meant employers wanted better educated labour 
to train (Crankshaw, 1997). As migrant workers were generally less educated and had higher 
turnover rates, employers preferred the urbanised African workers (Posel, 1991). Thus, due to 
the amendments to government’s education and employment policy with regards to Africans, 
those Africans who urbanised during the early Apartheid period had a substantial advantage 
in accessing these “more skilled” positions in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Crankshaw, 1997). In 
contrast, poorly-educated, unskilled rural migrants endured increasing levels of 
unemployment. 
 
Gu and Liu (2002) contend that Beijing is undergoing similar processes to Western countries’ 
cities where polarisation is taking place. Furthermore, they assert that Beijing is experiencing 
a similar influx of migrants (Gu and Liu, 2002). Beijing has experienced a massive influx of 
migrants from rural areas as a result of the relaxation of migration controls in the late 1970’s. 
At the same time, certain urban reforms instituted in the early 1980’s led to a similar shift 
seen in many world cities from a traditional manufacturing base to a service led economy. 
Due to economic internationalisation and uneven foreign direct investment, traditional 
manufacturing areas in Beijing have deteriorated while certain high-tech and service 
industries have grown. Thus, it is argued, this increase in high-tech manufacturing and 
service sector jobs has led to increases in high-skill, well-paid, as well as low-skill, irregular, 
low-paid jobs. Gu and Liu (2002) contend that rural migrants are so poorly educated that they 
cannot compete in the urban labour market for the high-skill, high-pay jobs. Therefore, they 
are only eligible for the low-pay, casual, informal jobs that native residents do not want. 
These migrants also do not enjoy the same rights and advantages as Beijing natives, such as 
guaranteed education for their children, low-cost housing and health services. Thus the 
“original equity of the urban classless society” has been upset partly due to the fact that these 
migrants do not have access to the same welfare benefits as registered urban citizens (Gu and 
Liu, 2002:198). Therefore, Gu and Liu (2002) argue that there are two new social groups in 
Beijing: one is the population of circulatory migrant unskilled low-wage earners, while the 
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other consists of high-income business professionals in transnational corporations. This, they 
argue, is causing increased social polarisation in Beijing (Gu and Liu, 2002). 
 
Some scholars however do not agree with the claim that it is the economy that is creating 
low-wage jobs to which immigrants are drawn (Hamnett, 1994a, 1994b, 1996a). Instead, they 
argue that the expansion of low-wage service sector jobs is only possible because of the 
presence of large numbers of poorly educated immigrants, and not that immigrants are 
attracted by said service sector (Hamnett, 1996a, 1994b). In American cities such as New 
York and Los Angeles, large and ever-growing numbers of unskilled, Third World 
immigrants swell the ranks of new entrants into low-paid consumer service and downgraded 
manufacturing jobs. Immigrants accounted for 22 per cent of the labour force growth alone in 
the 1980’s (Gordon and Sassen, 1992). This is not to say that other world cities do not have 
large numbers of unskilled immigrants concentrated in low-wage, low-skill jobs. Hamnett’s  
(1994a) argument is simply that the scale of migration to cities such as New York and Los 
Angeles is that much greater than that to other world cities, thus making their situation 
unique. 
 
Cross and Waldinger (1992) present a similar line of argument about the differing scale of 
immigration to London and New York. While similarities between the two cities are 
considered, Cross and Waldinger (1992) draw attention to the fact that the two cities have 
very different inflows of migrants. Arguably, New York has always had and will continue to 
have much higher levels of immigration than London (Cross and Waldinger, 1992; Hamnett, 
2003). Policy differences have played an important role in this. For example, the US relaxed 
immigration controls in the 1960’s when the United Kingdom (UK) was disallowing 
economic migrants, thereby preventing the influx of cheap Third World labour into the UK 
labour market (Gordon and Sassen, 1992). Cross and Waldinger (1992) therefore refer to 
New York as a “majority minority” city, due to the fact that ethnic minorities now form the 
majority of the population. Despite various attempts to limit Third World immigration in 
particular, London remains a destination of choice for certain immigrant groups. However, 
the immigrant populations are simply proportionately not as large as in New York, and most 
scholars predict that the scale of immigration to London, especially in the light of recent 
restrictions on immigration, will never be on a par with that of New York (Cross and 
Waldinger, 1992; Hamnett, 1994a, 2003). 
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Moreover, Hamnett (2003) offers evidence that most of the immigrants to a country like the 
UK come from developed nations, with large proportions of students, or those employed as 
managers and professionals. He concedes that the decline in the manufacturing industry in 
London affected particular groups of migrants more than others. For example, immigrants of 
West Indian and African extraction increasingly hold low-status, low-wage jobs in the 
declining industrial sector and there are higher rates of unemployment amongst these groups. 
However, he does make the point that different groups of migrants perform differently in the 
economy of London and there is considerable disparity amongst the ethnic minorities in 
terms of levels of employment and professionalism. Therefore, the immigrant communities in 
London are not uniformaly uneducated, and arguably do not constitute a “vast army of low-
wage workers entering the personal services sector” (Hamnett, 2003:107). Thus, Hamnett 
contends that the numbers of low-skill, low-wage immigrants in European cities are far 
smaller than those in major cities in the US, making the generalisation of the polarisation 
hypothesis beyond American cities such as New York and Los Angeles problematic. 
 
Other scholars too, argue that immigrant communities are not homogeneous and therefore 
have different employment prospects in world cities. For example, with changes to 
immigration law in 1965 in the US, the nature of immigration to the US changed. So, while 
the main immigrant groups in the US had been Blacks from the south and Puerta Ricans up 
until the 1960’s, with the change in legislation came a shift to more Asian immigrants, which 
continues today (Cross and Waldinger, 1992). Cross and Waldinger (1992) also consider the 
different make-up of immigrant communities in New York and London and their positions in 
what they call the new ethnic division of labour. They argue that many scholars have simply 
accepted the idea that the growth of services and the decline in manufacturing employment 
have left newcomers to the job market without the traditional entry-point of low-skill 
manufacturing work. However, as they point out, immigrants have continued to flock to the 
cities, countering the idea that there are no jobs for them. Cross and Waldinger (1992) assert 
therefore that not only demand-side factors should be considered when trying to understand 
the role of ethnic minorities in world cities, but supply-side issues too. They contend that the 
continuing outflow of whites from both London and New York to their respective suburbs has 
created a replacement demand significant enough to militate against manufacturing 
employment decreases, thereby giving ethnic minorities their opportunity to enter certain 
occupations and sectors. Which ethnic groups enter which sectors and occupations differs 
according to the particular group and its members’ skills, networks and group resources, 
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resulting in new “distinct ethnic niches” (Cross and Waldinger, 1992:171). For example, in 
New York, the public sector has become a major employer for native blacks, but provided 
very little employment for immigrants to the city. On the other hand, the manufacturing 
sector increasingly employs immigrants. In London, Afro-Caribbean minorities relocated to 
the public sector during restructuring, while some Asians moved into manufacturing and 
others into advanced private-sector services (Cross and Waldinger, 1992). Thus, the various 
ethnic and immigrant groups have responded differently to newly available employment 
opportunities left by white out-migration in London and New York. 
 
Even with this phenomenon of out-migration of whites, the demand for replacement labour 
does not necessarily match the inflow of migrants in these cities (Harloe and Fainstein, 1992). 
This imbalance between immigration levels and replacement labour demand has led to an 
increasing concentration of unemployment amongst blacks and new ethnic minorities in New 
York. London, with much less migration relative to New York, has not experienced such high 
levels of enduring unemployment amongst ethnic minorities and immigrants. Again the 
specific composition of the immigrant population becomes relevant here though, as 
unqualified school-leavers have the most limited employment opportunities (Harloe and 
Fainstein, 1992). Also, again, the argument can be made that the differing scale of 
immigration in New York and London results in different outcomes in terms of employment 
and social polarisation. 
 
However, there are myriad studies of the impact of immigration on the labour force, 
conducted in the US as well as in other countries. These studies are from a variety of sources 
using a diverse range of research methods, and the argument that an increasing presence of 
immigrants has a negative effect on native employment levels and income seems contentious 
at best. As Dustmann, Glitz and Frattini (2008) point out, the evidence from these studies for 
immigration leading to the reduction of natives’ wages and increased underemployment and 
unemployment is very mixed. It has been argued that of the research that has been conducted, 
in only a few cases has there been any significant negative impact on native employment or 
wages (Wright, Ellis and Reibel, 1997; Card, 2005). Borjas (2003:1335) states, “The 
measured impact of immigration on the wage of native workers fluctuates widely from study 
to study (and sometimes even within the same study), but seems to cluster around zero”. In a 
review of approximately 48 studies on the labour market effects of immigration, Okkerse 
(2008) found that most research does not show a significant effect of immigration on 
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unemployment rates. In fact, immigrants tend to create more jobs than they occupy, thereby 
lowering unemployment rates. It can be argued that the poorest workers in particular are 
vulnerable to increased competition from migrants. However, overall, Okkerse (2008) 
concludes that immigrants have only a small effect on the native-born labour market, and that 
most economies can bear many new labourers without diminishing the positions of natives. 
Thus the presence of migrants does not necessarily lead to declining wages in low-wage jobs, 
or to a low-wage service sector dominated by immigrants who have “pushed” natives out of 
the workplace. 
 
Despite these arguments, questions remain around the importance of large-scale immigration 
in deindustrialisation and service sector growth in cities (Borel-Saladin, 2006). In the case of 
Cape Town, South Africa, even though the number of unskilled jobs increased, there was 
much more employment growth in highly-skilled professional and managerial work, thereby 
making the changes in the city’s economy more consistent with a process of 
professionalisation rather than increasing polarisation. However, this happened in the face of 
a significant amount of migration of unskilled workers to the city, before, during and after the 
Apartheid migration controls. These migrants were largely poorly-educated Africans from 
former homelands. However, many of these people did not work in low-wage, menial service 
sector jobs as would be predicted by the polarisation hypothesis. Rather, a large proportion, 
approximately 28 per cent, was unemployed (Nattrass, 2002).4 Therefore, even though Cape 
Town continued receiving substantial numbers of unskilled migrants, a large, low-skilled, 
low-paid migrant class, doing menial service sector work for the increasingly affluent, did not 
develop. Considering that the occupational distribution in Cape Town became more 
professionalised than polarised, the contention that increased polarisation occurs in cities only 
where there are large numbers of poorly-educated migrants does not seem to hold. Large 
numbers of immigrants may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the growth of an 
expanded low-wage service sector (Borel-Saladin, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Calculated according to the strict definition of unemployment; that is, confined to the actively searching 
unemployed (Nattrass, 2002). 
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Unemployment and social polarisation 
 
Burgers (1996) critiques Hamnett for ignoring the unemployed in his assessment of the social 
polarisation hypothesis. He refers to Hamnett’s (1994a) argument for professionalisation 
rather than polarisation as the dominant process in world cities, with the case of the Randstad 
as evidence. He contends that the data Hamnett uses are biased in that they do not include the 
unemployed. He agrees with Hamnett’s (1994a) conclusion that the increase in employment 
opportunities have been at the upper end of the occupation spectrum. These managerial, 
professional, associate professional and technical jobs require greater education levels. In 
contrast he asserts that the unemployed tend to be concentrated amongst the least well-
educated, where ethnic minorities tend to be over-represented. Thus, he argues, the case of 
the Randstad actually involves two separate but related processes: growing 
professionalisation and increasing unemployment, especially amongst ethnic minorities 
(Burgers, 1996). He further states that in the Randstad specifically, there is an unequivocal 
distinction between those who are employed and those who are not and rely on welfare to 
survive, and that this divide correlates strongly with ethnicity (Burgers, 1996). 
 
In response to this criticism, Hamnett (1996a) asserts that, as Sassen presents the polarisation 
hypothesis, the unemployed are not included. Under discussion then are changes in the 
employed workforce only, specifically “absolute growth at the top and bottom end of the 
occupational and income structure” (Hamnett, 1996a:108). However, he argues that this 
conceptualisation of polarisation is based on the American case, where there is almost no 
welfare and very high levels of low-wage worker immigration. Thus he contends that 
Sassen’s uni-causal view of polarisation (that it is due to economic restructuring and the 
growth of high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, low–pay work) is short-sighted in that she does 
not consider the impact of strong welfare states on limiting the growth of a large, low-wage 
service economy. Hamnett (1996a) agrees with Burgers (1996) that Esping-Andersen’s 
(1993) work on welfare state regimes is crucial in understanding the differing outcomes of 
industrial and occupational change with regard to increasing professionalisation or 
polarisation.  
 
Hamnett (1996a, 1996b) claims that while the changes in the employment structure in the US 
result in growth in high-skill workers and an expanded low-wage service proletariat, in 
Europe, because of comparatively better welfare provision, alongside the growing ranks of 
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high-skill workers, one finds a greater number of unemployed and economically inactive 
instead. Thus, he argues, one needs to consider not just economic restructuring, but also the 
impact of various forms of welfare, state intervention and levels of unionisation on the 
growth of a low-wage service sector.  
 
If the state is committed to full employment, direct welfare state job provision can limit 
unemployment (Esping-Andersen, et al., 1993; Hamnett, 1996b). If this increased state 
employment is in expanding social services, then welfare state service jobs can become a sink 
for unskilled workers. Thus, potentially, a lower-skilled service proletariat can develop as a 
result of direct state employment. However, state service workers in low-skill jobs are 
unlikely to be paid low wages, but rather, higher than free market wages (Esping-Andersen, 
et al., 1993). Therefore, a low-skill but not low-wage state service proletariat may develop. 
Alternately, if the state actively reduces labour supply and does not have a policy of social 
service provision, a large “outsider surplus population” can result (Hamnett, 1996b). If the 
state provides a social wage however, these outsiders need not re-enter the employed 
workforce in low-skilled service sector jobs and can remain unemployed and live on welfare 
benefits (Esping-Andersen, et al., 1993). The provision of a social wage is also crucial if 
there are state-sponsored early-retirement programmes. These measures facilitate labour 
market exit for older workers, thus opening up positions for younger workers (Hamnett, 
1996b). However, it is due to the provision of a social wage that these retirees do not need to 
take low-wage work in order to survive. Moreover, welfare provision can be on such a level 
that there is no need for a person to enter the workforce in the first place: they need never 
take unattractive, low-skill, low-pay jobs as their needs are sufficiently provided for by the 
state (Esping-Andersen, et al., 1993). Thus, social wage provision can lead to a large 
population of the unemployed and economically inactive, some of whom may never have 
been employed at all. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important areas of state provision that can influence the numbers of 
low-skill workers in the workforce is education. A good quality education system can play an 
important role in preparing the populace for the increasing numbers of high-skill managerial, 
professional and technical jobs arguably so prevalent in the post-industrial knowledge-
economy (Esping-Andersen, et al., 1993). In addition, welfare states can even facilitate 
occupational mobility through sponsored adult training programmes for those who were not 
as well-educated in their formative years and who lack the necessary skills for these new 
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information-based occupations. However, in the absence of a comprehensive employment 
training system, a large unskilled labour force, such as that arguably present in US, can result 
(Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993). As Hamnett argues, it is this preponderance of low-skill 
workers in the US that enables the large low-skill, low-wage social sector to exist (Hamnett, 
1994a). 
 
The industrial relations system can also have a great impact on the numbers of low-wage 
workers in the workforce (Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993). Strong trade unions that bargain 
nationally and are committed to wage equalisation tend to lead to higher labour costs, thereby 
limiting the development of a large low-wage workforce. However, the US is characterised 
by weak, fragmented, localised unions. These are much less effective at militating against 
low-wage job growth, especially in the case of the service sector, where unions have minimal 
penetration (Esping-Anderson, et al., 1993). 
 
Thus, it can be argued, with weaker welfare systems and trade unions in the US than in 
Europe, as well as much higher levels of low-skill immigration adding to the native supply of 
low-skill labour, a large low-wage service proletariat has developed in the US (Hamnett, 
1996a). Hamnett (1996a) maintains that this unique set of circumstances, in combination with 
the increase in high-skill, high-pay work seen in all Western countries, has resulted in 
increasing polarisation in US cities. In contrast, Hamnett (1996a) contends that European 
cities, with much lower levels of low-wage immigration and strong welfare systems, have 
growing numbers of those who have never entered the workforce, the long-term-unemployed, 
the early-retired, and others subsisting on a social wage. Thus, alongside a professionalising 
employed workforce, a growing unemployed and economically inactive or “outsider surplus 
population” has also developed (Hamnett, 1996a). Thus, Esping-Anderson, et al. (1993:54) 
state, “It seems plausible that the post-industrial future will face a trade-off between a large 
service proletariat and a large outsider population”. 
 
The Johannesburg region seems to display the characteristics of the latter situation; that is, a 
large outsider surplus population of unemployed people. However, this is not through choice 
and the alternatives to employment offered by good welfare provision. As discussed above, 
Hamnett argues that many European cities display increasing professionalisation along with 
increasing unemployment, due to the provision of welfare making it unnecessary for people 
to take low-skill, low-pay service sector jobs. However, as will be shown, welfare provision 
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in South Africa is not on a par with that of many European countries, and therefore does not 
act to depress low-wage service sector growth. Rather, unemployment has resulted due to 
economic growth simply not keeping pace with population growth. Therefore, while the 
occupation distribution of the Johannesburg region has become increasingly professionalised, 
there has not been enough growth in low-skill, low-wage jobs for the large, unskilled 
population, thereby leading to high levels of unemployment. Thus, professionalisation with a 
concomitant increase in unemployment can take place without the actions of a welfare state 
to limit the growth of low wage jobs. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methods 
 
 
Testing the social polarisation hypothesis 
 
The social polarisation hypothesis is predicated on the idea that economic restructuring and 
the declining primacy of the manufacturing industry as the major employer and rising 
prominence and increasing employment offered by the service sector gives rise to certain 
changes in the occupation structure of world cities. Because occupations in the manufacturing 
sector are conceptualised as mostly semi-skilled and medium-income, and the occupations in 
the service sector are viewed as predominantly either high-skill, high-paid or low-skill, low-
paid jobs, the shift in the bulk of employment from manufacturing to services is argued to 
increase social polarisation.  
 
While this may seem to be a sensible, straightforward theory, arguably providing evidence of 
it is not. Saskia Sassen, one of the seminal proponents of the social polarisation hypothesis, 
has been criticised for not defining the concept of social polarisation precisely. Chris Hamnett 
(1994a) argues that Sassen is not clear whether she talks of occupational polarisation in 
absolute or relative terms. Absolute occupational polarisation results from the increase in the 
actual number of high-pay, high-skill and low-skill, low-pay jobs. This does not need to 
occur for relative occupational polarisation to take place. Relative occupational polarisation, 
that is, a greater proportion of jobs at the top and bottom of the occupation spectrum, can be 
caused by differential shrinkage of the labour force. For example, if the number of middle-
income earners decreased from one year to the next, then, in relative terms, the high-skill and 
low-skill occupations would constitute a greater proportion of the occupation structure. Thus, 
relative occupational polarisation is not necessarily reflective of absolute polarisation. 
Hamnett (1994a) asserts that the implication in Sassen’s writing is that she believes absolute 
occupation polarisation is occurring. However, because of this vacillation between absolute 
and relative arguments, Sassen is “flexible” as to what exactly can be considered evidence of 
social polarisation (Hamnett, 1994b:195). Thus, in order to test the social polarisation 
hypothesis, that is, whether or not the actual numbers of high- and low-skill jobs are 
increasing, one needs to study data on changes in the occupational structure.  
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Moreover, I would contend that rather than focus on the occupation data she arguably needs 
to substantiate the social polarisation thesis, Sassen refers, when utilising empirical data, to 
proxy data instead. Sassen (1994) has cited data on income differentials, changing family 
incomes, projections for educational requirements and changing percentages of part-time 
employment as evidence for increasing polarisation. Even though the trends she identifies 
using these data may point to changes in inequality, their relevance in terms of the debate 
around social polarisation is limited without the occupational data to demonstrate that the 
process they may or may not form part of is actually occurring. While Sassen (1994) argues 
for employment growth in high-skill and low-skill jobs, she does not provide direct evidence 
of this. She provides evidence of increasing poverty and unemployment, which may or may 
not be related to social polarisation, but not of actual changes in the amount of low- and high-
wage employment. As Hamnett notes in disagreeing with her on London becoming more 
socially polarised, “She does not give any overall occupational change figures, though this is 
a key element of her theoretical argument” (Hamnett, 1994b:195).  
 
Thus, following the logic of Hamnett (1994a, 1994b) and Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 
(2009), in order to confirm the social polarisation hypothesis, arguably, certain criteria have 
to be met in terms of occupations and their incomes: 
 
1. High-skill, high-pay occupations must require more skill and have greater levels of 
remuneration than low-skill, low-wage jobs. 
2. Middle-income jobs must require less skill and pay less than high-skill, high-wage 
jobs, and require more skill and pay more than low-skill, low-wage jobs. 
3. The numbers of high-skill, high-pay jobs as well as the number of low-skill, low-pay 
jobs must both increase in absolute terms (not only in relative terms). 
4. The number of middle-income jobs must decline or at least stagnate in absolute terms. 
 
Moreover, the above criteria are dependent on the definitions of high-skill, high-pay, semi-
skilled, medium-income, and low-skill, low-pay jobs. It is the definition of these different 
categories of occupations that is the key to substantiating or refuting the social polarisation 
hypothesis.  
 
What constitutes a high-skill, high-pay occupation is possibly the least contentious point 
(Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). The producer services sector has grown the fastest and 
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the most in many cities (Nijman, 1996; Soja, 1991). This sector comprises sophisticated 
business and other professional and managerial services in the areas of finance, insurance, 
advertising and law. In other cities where high-tech industry has increased, the numbers of 
highly-skilled, qualified, technical professionals are also on the rise (Gu and Liu, 2002; 
Nijman, 1996; Sassen, 1994; Soja, 1991). High-skill, well-paid managerial and professional 
occupations in these areas therefore include bankers, stock brokers, coporate lawyers, 
advertising executives, technical designers and engineers (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 
2009). 
 
Low-skill, low-wage service sector jobs on the other hand seem to be inconsistently 
classified. Presumably, no scholars would argue against the classification of occupations such 
as cleaners, janitors and domestic helpers as low-skill, low-wage. However, some, such as 
Sassen (1994) and Wilson (1996) would include clerks, secretaries, sales staff and even 
nurses in this category. In this view of the service sector then, there do not appear to be any 
middle-income service occupations, only a bipolar occupational distribution of high-skill, 
high-wage and low-skill, low-wage service jobs (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, these scholars view the growth of service sector employment at the expense 
of mostly middle-income manufacturing jobs as the cause of increased social polarisation. 
 
However, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) contend that there are middle-income service 
sector jobs with levels of remuneration comparable to that of semi-skilled, blue-collar 
manufacturing jobs. The growing numbers of clerical and sales jobs which polarisation 
theorists claim are low-skill, low-wage jobs are arguably semi-skilled, middle-income white 
collar occupations on a par with, in terms of skills required and levels of remuneration, the 
semi-skilled, blue-collar jobs typical of the manufacturing sector. According to the South 
African Standard Classification of Occupations (Statistics South Africa, c.1996a), the white-
collar occupations of clerks and service workers, shop and market sales workers have the 
same skill ranking as the blue-collar occupations of craft and related trades workers and plant 
and machine operators and assemblers (see list of main occupation groups below).5 These 
four major occupation groups are all ranked above elementary or unskilled workers, 
supporting the argument that the truly low-skill workers in the workforce are those in 
elementary/unskilled jobs.  
                                                 
5
 Please note that this is based on and to all intents and purposes identical to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO). See later discussion in chapter. 
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Main occupation groups in SASCO and their skill level ranking (Statistics South Africa, 
c.1996a): 
  
1. Legislators, senior officials & managers            (Reference in skill level not made) 
2. Professionals   (4) 
3. Technicians & associate professionals   (3) 
4. Clerks   (2) 
5. Service workers, shop & market sales workers   (2) 
6. Skilled agricultural & fishery workers   (2) 
7. Craft & related trades workers   (2) 
8. Plant & machinery operators/assemblers   (2) 
9. Elementary/Unskilled occupations   (1) 
 
Income data from the South African Labour Force Survey of 2007 also substantiate the claim 
that clerks and service workers, shop and market sales workers are not low-wage workers. 
These data indicate that most clerical and service, shop and market sales workers have a 
similar pay distribution to that of the typical blue-collar manufacturing occupations of craft 
and related trades workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers, and not that of 
unskilled workers (Table 2.1, with shading showing the range of income categories in which 
the majority – from 68 per cent to 94 per cent - of workers in a given occupation fall). In 
2007, the average monthly income for clerks, service and sales workers, craft and related 
trades workers and operators and assemblers was R6,588, R4,669, R6,272 and R4,399 
respectively.6 The average monthly income for unskilled workers was only R3,233. Most 
clerks (69 per cent), craft and related trades workers (76 per cent) and machine operators and 
assemblers (85 per cent) earned between R2,501 and R11,000 a month. While 59 per cent of 
service and sales workers earned monthly incomes in a slightly lower category (R1,501 to 
R4,500), a further 26 per cent earned between R6,001 and R16,000 per month. This is 
substantially more than the R501 to R3,500 range in which 75 per cent of unskilled workers’ 
monthly incomes fell. 
 
                                                 
6
 Average monthly incomes were estimated from the income categories shown in Table 2.1 by taking the 
midpoint of each category. Note though that the “over R30,000” category was treated as R30,000. 
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Esping-Andersen, in considering post-industrial class structures developed a post-industrial 
hierarchy consisting of (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 24-25): 
(a) Professionals and scientists 
(b) Technicians and semi-professionals (including school teachers, nurses, social workers, 
laboratory workers and technical designers) 
(c) Skilled service workers (including cooks, hairdressers and policemen) 
(d) Unskilled service workers or the service proletariat (including cleaners, waitresses, 
bartenders and baggage porters). 
It would appear, though, that the concept of skilled service workers does not feature in the 
occupational hierarchies of most proponents of the social polarisation hypothesis. As Esping 
–Andersen (1993:13) notes regarding Eric Wright’s proposed scheme for categorising 
classes, “To Wright, all service workers are classified together with the ‘manual proletariat’, 
which, accordingly, becomes so huge (about 50 per cent of the total labor force) that its 
analytical value is diminished”. Saskia Sassen (1991, 1994, 1999) and William Julius Wilson 
(1987, 1996) share a similar view to Wright; namely, that only the semi-autonomous 
occupations of managers and professionals are truly middle-class. Therefore, for these 
scholars, such occupations constitute high-skill, high-pay occupations in the service sector, 
while all other occupations are deemed low-skill, low-pay jobs. 
Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) argue that several scholars (Baum, 1997; Chiu and Lui, 
2004) when interpreting similar income data to that presented above, mistakenly classify 
clerical and service and sales work as low-skill, low-wage workers, rather than semi-skilled 
medium-income white-collar service occupations. In the case of Sydney, Baum (1997) argues 
that the absolute growth in the managers and administrators, professionals and para-
professionals at one end of the occupation spectrum and sales and personal services workers 
at the other is evidence for increasing social polarisation; especially in light of the absolute 
decline in the middle-income manufacturing jobs of trades persons and plant and machine 
operators and drivers. However, on closer examination of the incomes of these occupation 
groups, it could be argued that sales and personal service workers earn only marginally less 
than trades persons and plant and machine operators and drivers, and still earn more than 
labourers and related workers. Arguably then, labourers and related workers, by virtue of the 
minimal skill required for the job as well as the low levels of income should constitute the 
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low-skill, low-wage workers in this hierarchy, and not the sales and personal service workers. 
By this interpretation of the data, because the numbers of labourers and related workers are 
declining, the occupation distribution of Sydney appears to be professionalising (Borel-
Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). Similarly, in the case of Hong Kong, Chiu and Lui (2004) 
argue for increasing polarisation as a result of the growth of managerial and professional 
occupations along with an increase in service workers and shop and sales workers and 
elementary workers. Service workers and shop and sales workers are likened to elementary 
workers on the basis that their median monthly incomes are less than that of craft and related 
workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers. However, the monthly median 
income of service workers and shop and sales workers is far above that of elementary 
workers and on a par with that of craft and related workers and plant and machine operators 
and assemblers (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). 
Therefore, because clerical and service and sales work are often construed as low-skill, low-
wage jobs, any increase in their numbers is interpreted as swelling the ranks of a low-wage 
service proletariat. This combined with the concomitant increase in high-skill, high-pay 
occupations in these cities leads to the conclusion of increasing social polarisation. However, 
if clerks and service and sales workers are viewed as middle-income earners as Borel-Saladin 
and Crankshaw (2009) argue, then their growing numbers would not exacerbate polarisation. 
Additionally, the growth in these jobs can actually counteract the decline in the numbers of 
middle-income traditional blue-collar craft and related trades workers and plant and machine 
operators and assemblers occupations, and thereby mitigate any tendency towards social 
polarisation. 
These criticisms of data use and interpretation are not limited to those who argue for 
polarisation only. Baum (1999), on the basis of data very similar to that used in his Sydney 
study, argues against increasing polarisation in Singapore. He concludes that despite 
production workers, plant and machine operators, cleaners and labourers accounting for the 
biggest share of employment in 1996, the trend was one of “a significant upgrading of 
occupational status”, due to the amount of growth in legislators, senior officials and 
managers, professionals and technicians and associate professionals (Baum, 1999:1104). This 
was presumably partly due to the fact that the number of production workers, plant and 
machine operators, cleaners and labourers barely increased (from 539,919 in 1983 to 541,371 
in 1999). However, I would argue that it is difficult to draw this conclusion when the 
production workers and plant and machine operators, the typical semi-skilled blue-collar 
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manufacturing type occupations that many polarisation theorists lament the loss of, are 
combined with cleaners and labourers in one occupation category. Arguably, cleaners and 
labourers are of the lowest-skilled, lowest-paid workers in the occupation hierarchy. As it 
seems to be the trend in many cities, one would not be surprised if the numbers of production 
workers and machine operators decreased over time (although, this is still quite an 
assumption to make). But have the numbers of cleaners and labourers decreased? What if the 
numbers of cleaners and labourers grew dramatically, but the decline in production and 
machine operative workers was so large as to mask their growth? These data therefore cannot 
be used to test the social polarisation hypothesis. 
 
Hamnett (1994a:409) even states of the occupation data he uses when arguing for increasing 
professionalisation and not polarisation in the Randstad, “The [Labour Force Survey data] are 
very ambiguous and unsatisfactory for the purpose of occupational class analysis, consisting 
as it does of an uneasy mixture of occupational and sectoral categories”. Thus, arguably even 
the best available data for studying occupation change are not completely suitable for testing 
the social polarisation hypothesis. This is not to say that one should not use said data to 
attempt to test the social polarisation hypothesis. However, perhaps it is in this process of 
trying to interpret unsuitable data that the case for polarisation has been overstated. 
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Table 2.1. Occupation by monthly income category, Johannesburg region, 2007 (percentage distribution) 
Income category Managers,  
legislators and 
senior officials 
Professionals Associate 
professionals 
and 
technicians 
Clerks Service 
workers, 
shop and 
market 
sales 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trades 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
and 
assemblers 
Unskilled/ 
elementary 
occupations 
   Total 
R1 - R200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
R201 - R500  1 0 1 2 1 0 1 3 1 
R501 - R1 000  0 0 0 1 7 4 2 6 2 
R1 001 - R1 500  2 0 2 3 4 8 1 17 3 
R1 501 - R2 500  3 0 2 11 22 9 9 32 8 
R2 501 - R3 500  1 1 2 9 11 16 34 21 9 
R3 501 - R4 500  3 3 3 12 26 13 17 8 8 
R4 501 - R6 000  9 2 16 22 3 25 16 3 11 
R6 001 - R8 000  11 6 9 15 13 2 9 1 8 
R8 001 - R11 000  20 15 11 11 3 12 8 3 12 
R11 001 - R16 000  24 13 7 8 10 6 0 1 10 
R16 001 - R30 000  9 14 10 5 0 2 1 3 7 
R30,001+ 18 46 37 0 0 4 0 0 20 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average income 
(Rands) 13,939 20,836 17,076 6,588 4,669 6,272 4,399 3,233 12,226 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2007
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The Johannesburg region as a global city-region 
 
As the theory of social polarisation was initially developed as part of the world cities thesis, 
some might feel it is necessary to justify the testing of this theory in the Johannesburg region 
of South Africa.  
 
I have used the term “Johannesburg region” to refer to the province of Gauteng, as the latter 
name may be unfamiliar to a wider audience. The city of Johannesburg alone is well 
established as the decision-making and financial control centre of not just South Africa, but 
the southern African region (Rogerson, 2003). Various world city rosters include 
Johannesburg as a world city on the order of Melbourne, Washington, Amsterdam, Boston, 
Geneva, Santiago, Jakarta and Taipei (Beaverstock, Smith and Taylor, 1999; Taylor, 2000). 
Before the start of the century, Johannesburg was already considered to be a major 
accountancy and banking services centre (Beaverstock, et al., 1999). By various other 
measures of global connectivity, from telephone links to internet usage, office space and the 
number of international flights, Johannesburg is arguably a world city (Crankshaw and 
Parnell, 2004). 
 
Johannesburg is not a “city alone” though. It is integrated with several other urban nodes in 
what has more recently been dubbed the Gauteng City-Region (GCR) (Wray, 2010). This 
global city-region consists of the Gauteng province of South Africa. Global city-regions are 
vital to the economic performance of the country. Gauteng exceeds even Greater London in 
terms of significance to its national economy, with a population of some 13 million people 
and by contributing approximately 50 per cent of South Africa’s economic output (Wray, 
2010). It is this increasingly integrated urban network of crucial economic importance both 
nationally and regionally that I have referred to as the Johannesburg region. 
 
World city status aside, many scholars have used the polarisation theory as a framework in 
which to examine economic restructuring and its impacts on the labour markets of a range of 
cities throughout the world. These include cities as disparate as Beijing (Gu and Liu, 2002), 
Miami (Nijman, 1996), Rio de Janeiro (Ribeiro and Telles, 2000) and Chicago (Wilson, 
1996). Thus, even if one were to contest the world city or global city-region status of the area, 
testing the polarisation hypothesis in the context of the Johannesburg region is arguably still 
both a valid and relevant exercise.  
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Fig 2.1: Map showing the position of Gauteng province in South Africa 
Source:  http://www.africatreasure.co.za/south-africa/gauteng/ 
Consolidating Population Census Boundaries 
 
Ideally, one would collect the population census and labour force survey data according to 
the current metropolitan boundary of the Gauteng province.  However, this province only 
came into existence with the advent of full democracy in South Africa in 1994. Therefore, in 
order to study earlier periods, data were collated by the Magisterial Districts that constitute 
the Gauteng province, as incorporated into the province in the South African Population 
Census of 1996.7 A Magisterial District is a judicial area under the jurisdiction of a 
magistrate. These jurisdictional districts have also been used by the state as the geographical 
units for the presentation of population census statistics. Due to their boundaries remaining 
relatively stable over many years, magisterial districts are best suited for comparing different 
censuses (Satistics South Africa, 2007). The magisterial districts that make up the Gauteng 
province include: 
 
• Alberton 
• Benoni 
• Boksburg 
• Brakpan 
• Brits 
• Bronkhorstspruit 
• Cullinan 
• Delmas  
• Ga-Rankuwa 
• Germiston 
• Heidelberg (GT) 
• Johannesburg 
• Kempton Park 
• Krugersdorp 
• Kwamhlanga 
• Nigel 
• Oberholzer 
                                                 
7
 A table of the relevant magisterial districts and their codes in each of the South African Population Censuses is 
included in Appendix A.  
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Figure 2.2: Map of main urban centres in Gauteng province 
Source: http://www.commonwealth-towns.net/members/south_africa/gauteng.htm 
• Pretoria 
• Randburg 
• Randfontein 
• Roodepoort 
• Soshanguve 
• Soweto 
• Springs 
• Vanderbijlpark 
• Vereeniging 
• Westonaria 
• Witbank 
• Wonderboom 
 
The South African Labour Force Surveys collect data on a provincial scale, and came into 
existence in 2000, thereby negating the need to collect data via magisterial districts. 
 
 
Occupational and Sectoral data 
 
All occupational and sectoral data were recoded according to the South African Standard 
Classification of Occupations (SASCO) (Statistics South Africa, c.1996a ) and the South 
African Standard Classification of Industries (SASCI) (Statistics South Africa, c.1996b) 
respectively, both of which are based on (and practically identical to) the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the International Standard Classification 
of Industries (ISCI). 
 
The following are examples of the types of jobs and positions included in each of the 
occupation categories of the SASCO (Borel-Saladin, 2006:18-19): 
 
Legislators, senior officials and managers: Government minister, administrator or 
councillor, officers of various ranks in the armed forces, director-general, secretary-general, 
chief-executive, managing-director and various levels of manager from department manager 
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to production manager to general manager, producer in film and radio, shopkeeper, retailer, 
restaurant owner, working proprietor of a restaurant or hotel. 
 
Professionals: Physical, mathematical and engineering science professional from geologist to 
statistician to engineer, life science and health professional such as doctor or nurse, teaching 
professional, business professional such as accountant or economist, various types of 
consultant, legal professional such as lawyer or judge, computer programmer, sociologist, 
historian, reporter, editor, critic, commentator, painter, actor, musician, conductor, director, 
priest, rabbi.  
 
Technicians and associate professionals: Natural and engineering science associate 
professional, life science and health associate professional, technician in a range of fields 
such as agriculture, metallurgy and sound effects, computer assistant, technical assistant, 
medical assistant, teaching associate professional, photographer, operator of technical 
equipment such as a camera or radio, pilot of a ship or aeroplane, inspector of safety and 
health to quality control, sales agent, shipping agent, sports agent, buyer, assessor, broker, 
executive secretary, certain specialised clerks such as legal clerks, tax officer, customs 
officer, immigration officer, detective, designer, decorator, nightclub or street musician, 
dancer, sportsman/woman, trainer, lay preacher. 
 
Clerks: clerk, from auditing to data entry to wages, typist, secretary, bookkeeper, dispatcher, 
controller, postman or postwoman, cashier, bookmaker, receptionist. 
 
Service workers, shop and market sales workers: conductor, steward, guide, cook, waiter 
or waitress, nanny, nursing aid, dental aid, veterinary aid, attendant of schoolchildren, 
hospital attendant, canteen attendant, beautician and make-up artist, hairdresser, valet, 
mortician, fire-fighter, police officer from sergeant to superintendent, soldier, security guard, 
model, working proprietor of a wholesale or retail business and import or export business, 
salesperson in anything from a shop to a street stall (though not street vending), petrol pump 
attendant. 
 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers: farmer/grower/raiser/breeder of animals or crops, 
skilled farm labourer, skilled gardener and groundsman, zookeeper, lumberjack and related 
such as marker, cutter, feller, logger and trimmer, diver, fisherman or fisherwoman, hunter. 
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Note that in this thesis this category was combined with undetermined occupations, as there 
were very few agricultural and fishery workers. 
  
Craft and related trades workers: miner, quarryman, blaster, stonemason and stone 
workers including grinder, cutter and polisher, builder and related such as bricklayer, 
carpenter, roofer, plasterer, tile layer or insulation worker, repairer from clocks to electronics, 
fitter from pipes to machines to electronics, plumber, electrician, painter, welder, moulder, 
brazier, rigger, tool maker, setter-operator of various different types of machine, sharpener of 
tools, polisher, mechanic, blacksmith, instrument maker and tuner, jewellery maker and 
worker such as goldsmith, diamond polisher or jewel setter, handicraft worker, print worker 
from metal die engraver to typesetter, photograph developer and printer, meat/fish worker 
such as cutter, butcher or curer, baker, taster, tobacco worker, weaver, tailor, footwear maker. 
 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers: Note: many of these occupations have 
names that are similar to those listed under craft and related trades workers.  In this group 
however, the production process generally takes place on a production line and therefore 
involves the operation of industrial machinery.  These occupations can be practiced in several 
different industries. For example, a machine operator can operate equipment involved in 
anything from wood boring to glaze-mixing to noodle-making.  Occupations other than those 
mentioned above include furnace-operator, kiln-operator, assembler and driver/operator of 
any kind of vehicle from a taxi to a train to a forklift. 
 
Elementary occupations: street vendor, telephone salesperson, babysitter, char, cook in 
private household, domestic cleaner, office cleaner, aircraft cleaner, hand launderer and dry-
cleaner, caretaker, janitor, messenger, night watchman, fun-fair attendant, lavatory attendant, 
collector of anything from tolls to garbage, scavenger, labourer in a wide variety of activities, 
ranch hand, packer, labeller, loader, animal driver, porter. 
 
The sectors used in the data are:  
• Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
• Mining and Quarrying 
• Manufacturing 
• Electricity, gas and water supply (Utilities) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
39 
 
• Construction  
• Wholesale and retail trade 
• Transport, storage and communication 
• Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services (FIRE and Business 
services) 
• Community, social and personal services    
 
The following is a description of the four sectors providing the majority of jobs in the 
Johannesburg region in 2010 (Borel-Saladin, 2006:21): 
 
Community, social and personal services: This includes government bureaucracies at the 
national, provincial and municipal level, both public and private health and education 
services, sanitation, welfare, the activities of trade unions, professional associations and 
religious organisations, sporting, recreational and cultural activities, libraries, museums, 
botanical and zoological gardens, all entertainment activities, news agency activities, as well 
as private services such as laundries, hairdressing and funereal services.  According to 
Statistics South Africa (c.1996b), domestic services fall into a residual category including 
those employed in private households, exterritorial organisations and those representing 
foreign governments.  For the purposes of this analysis, this residual category is included in 
community, social and personal services.  
 
Wholesale and Retail trade: This includes all wholesale and retail trade, catering and 
accommodation services, from the sale of various materials and products, to motor vehicle 
and appliance repairs, to the activities of hotels and restaurants.   
 
Manufacturing:  All manufacturing activities fall under this category, from the processing 
and manufacture of chemical products, basic metals, machinery, electrical equipment and 
appliances to wood products, furniture, textiles, clothing, jewellery, beverages and food 
products; as well as printing and publishing activities. 
 
FIRE and Business services: This acronym refers to all financial, insurance, real estate and 
business services and also includes legal and accounting services, the renting of machinery 
and equipment, hardware and software consultancy and supply, data processing activities, 
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advertising, research and development in the natural and social sciences, as well as 
architectural and engineering activities.  There are also a host of “miscellaneous” activities 
that fall into this category.  These include a range of disparate services from labour recruiting, 
photographic activities, building cleaning, disinfection and extermination activities to 
security and debt collecting. 
 
The data used in this study are the South African Population Census data and Labour Force 
Survey data, analysed using SPSS. 
 
South African Population Census 
 
Electronic record unit data were used. In several cases, these required recoding in terms of 
industries and occupations especially. For example, the data files for the 1980 population 
census have 293 occupation codes that I recoded according to the SASCO system. 
 
Data not used in analysis: 
 
• Census 1970: The primary concern with these data is that the black population data set is 
only a 5 per cent sample. However, it is not weighted (I was instructed by Statistics South 
Africa to “multiply by 20”). I suspect it is because of this that the sample is heavily 
skewed towards elementary workers. For the sake of completion, I have included these 
data initially in chapter 3. However, in more in depth analysis later in the chapter, the 
range of data I use begins with 1980 (this is arguably more useful in any case, as this is 
when manufacturing employment peaked before it declined). 
• Census 1985: There are several problems with these data. There appears to be a different 
number of occupational categories in the data set than in the codebook. There are only 28 
or 29 occupational codes. In addition, the way the occupations have been grouped is quite 
dissimilar to how I have recoded the other sets according to the SASCO system. Another 
drawback is the fact that these occupational data may include the unemployed who were 
instructed to give their occupation when they were last employed if they were unemployed 
at the time of the census. This would not be such a problem if there was a “work status” 
variable giving the respondent’s employment status; however, there is not. These data have 
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also not been corrected for undercount, as all the other South African Population Censuses 
have been. 
 
Possible errors in the data: 
Census 1991: Even though there are 165 occupational categories, there is still overlap 
between what should be separate occupational groups according to the SASCO. For example, 
the occupational category “mining, quarry and related worker” can include anyone from a 
labourer to a craft worker or a machine operator or assembler in the mining industry. Thus, it 
is difficult to know which major occupation group to classify this as part of. 
 
Data sets used: 
South African Population Census 1970 , 1980 and 1991 
South African Population Census 1996 and 2001 10 per cent sample (the full sets are not 
available to the public).8  
 
As the unemployed are required to state the occupation and sector in which they were 
previously employed in the population census, I selected only for those respondents who 
were employed. Thus, the statistical analysis of occupational and sectoral data includes only 
the employed workforce.  
 
Labour Force Surveys 
 
Between 1994 and 1999, the main survey used for collecting labour market information was 
the October Household Survey (OHS) (Statistics South Africa, 2008a). Because the OHS 
tested a diverse range of variables, changes were made to the sample design from one year to 
the next. Thus, the OHSs were essentially independent cross-sectional surveys. In 2000, most 
of the non-labour questions were removed and incorporated into the General Household 
Survey (GHS), while the Labour Force Survey (LFS) retained the variables pertaining to 
labour issues (Statistics South Africa, 2008a). Thus, in 2001, the first LFS was conducted, 
and was undertaken on a six-monthly basis in March and September of each year until 2007 
(Statistics South Africa, 2008b). In 2008, the LFS was revised to the Quarterly Labour Force 
                                                 
8
 As these are 10 per cent samples of full population censuses, they are very large, allowing for precise and 
reliable statistical estimates. 
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Survey (QLFS) (note though that I refer to the Labour Force Survey for all of these data 
when labelling the source of the data in the tables). 
 
The LFS is representative of all provinces and strata within provinces (Statistics South 
Africa, 2008a). The sample consists of 3,000 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and 30,000 
dwelling units, drawn from the population census. The dwelling unit was chosen due to the 
high degree of mobility of households and difficulty in tracking them. Thus, the sample unit 
is the dwelling unit, and the unit of observation is the household. The QLFS sample size, 
again based on the population census, but Census 2000 specifically, is approximately 3,080 
PSU’s (Statistics South Africa, 2008a). This sample is also designed to be representative at 
the provincial level, and, within provinces, at the metropolitan level (Statistics South Africa, 
2008a). 
 
Thus, the LFS and QLFS are large stratified probability samples of households. Of particular 
importance to this study is the fact that the occupational and sectoral data include both 
informal and formal sector activity.  
 
I used the September LFS sets between 2000 and 2007. The third quarter was used for QLFS 
2008 and 2009, and the second quarter QLFS for 2010 (the only one available to me at the 
time). 
 
Occupational and sectoral data in the LFS are presented in accordance with the SASCO and 
SASCI coding systems respectively. In addition, these data are recorded for the employed 
only. 
 
Presentation of the data 
 
In the chapters to follow, when the entire range of data are given (1970/80 through to 2010), I 
have split the tables into South African Population Census 1970/80-2001, and Labour Force 
Surveys 2001-2010. Thus, the year 2001 is repeated. For the shift-share technique, I also split 
the analysis between the Population census (1980-2001) and the LFS (2001-2010). The 
reason for this is that the data for the two separate sets are generated quite differently (one is 
full census data, the other is sample survey data, where estimates of totals are based on 
population projections), and therefore, when comparing data, if possible, I preferred to 
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compare data of the same general set (population census or LFS). Of course, in generating 
data over the long term to compare 1980 to 2010 (in the case of migrants, for example) it was 
not possible to use only the population census or LFS exclusively. 
 
 
Shift-share9 
 
Shift-share is used later in this thesis to show that changes in the occupational structure have 
not occurred mainly due to changes in the relative sizes of the industries (that is, the shift 
from manufacturing as a major employer to services as the main source of employment) but 
mostly changes in the occupational distribution across the industries (all industries, 
manufacturing included, comprising of a growing percentage of professional workers).  
 
The shift-share method allows one to study changes in the occupational structure. This 
method is used when the focus is not the changes in absolute numbers in each occupation, per 
se, but the changes in the distribution of occupations across the entire employed workforce, 
independent of overall employment growth. In shift-share, changes in the occupational 
distribution are attributed to either changes in the distribution of industries, changes in the 
distribution of occupations across industries, or the interaction of both of these effects. 
 
Thus, shift-share aims to decompose the changes in the occupational structure into three 
distinct components: 
 
1. The industry shift effect:  
The effect of changes in the industrial structure on the overall occupational structure 
(independent of employment growth as well as intra-industry occupational change). 
This represents the effect of the shift of the employed workforce from one industry 
with a particular occupational distribution to another industry with a different 
occupational distribution. Thus, these are the changes in the overall occupational 
structure attributable to differential industrial growth. Therefore, if there is an increase 
in the numbers of professionals in the employed workforce from one year to the next, 
                                                 
9
  This method and description based on that used in Browning and Singelmann, 1975; Browning and 
Singelmann, 1978; Gubbay, 2000; Marshall, 1988; Singelmann and Browning, 1980; Tienda, Jensen and 
Bach, 1984; Wright and Martin, 1987 and Wright and Singelmann, 1982. 
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and, on using shift-share analysis, the industry shift effect is found to be the most 
significant, then the increase in professionals is due to employment growth in the 
types of industries that tend to employ more professionals.  
 
2. The occupation shift effect:  
The effect of changes in the occupational composition/distribution within industries 
on the overall occupational structure. Using the example of the increase in 
professionals above, if a shift-share analysis showed the occupational composition to 
have the greatest effect, then the reason for the increased employment of professionals 
would be that all industries were making greater use of professionals. 
 
3. The interaction shift effect:  
The joint effect of simultaneous industrial and occupational composition shifts on the 
overall occupational structure; that is, the effect of changes in the distribution of the 
employed population both across and within industries. This represents the changes in 
the overall occupational composition due to movements from one occupation in one 
industry, to another occupation in another industry. This occurs when neither the 
industry nor occupation shift effect alone have a significant impact on the overall 
occupation distribution; but, rather, the interaction of the two is responsible for the 
observed changes. This effect is perhaps best illustrated by means of an example. The 
agricultural industry is unique in that the occupation of farmer or farm worker appears 
in this industry only, as opposed to, for example, a professional, which can be found 
in any industry. During the Industrial Revolution, not only did employment in 
agriculture decline and that in manufacturing increase, but the numbers of farmers and 
farm workers declined while the numbers of skilled and semi-skilled craftsmen and 
machine operators increased. Thus, there was not only a change in the industry in 
which most people were employed (from farming to manufacturing), but also their 
occupations (from farmers and farm labourers to semi-skilled blue-collar craftsmen 
and machine operators). Therefore, neither changes in industry nor occupation 
independently had the greatest impact, but rather the interaction and joint effect of the 
two.  
 
Before examining the shift-share method in detail, a simplified explanation by means of an 
example will be provided. Between 1980 and 2001, the number of employed managers in the 
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Johannesburg region grew by 112,012 people. After accounting for population growth, the 
net shift in managers was a 93,160 (Table 2.2). The purpose of shift-share analysis is to 
calculate how much of this net shift was due to changes in the industrial structure, changes in 
the occupational structure within industries and the interaction of both industrial and 
occupational change. This is achieved by playing a kind of counterfactual game. First, one 
asks how many managers there would have been if the proportion of managers had remained 
the same between 1980 and 2001, but the industrial structure had been allowed to change the 
way it did between the two years. Thus, the proportion of managers is kept constant at 1980 
levels and the share of the increase in managers attributable to changes in the industrial 
structure alone is calculated. This is the industry shift effect and, in this case, when expressed 
as a percentage of the net shift, is approximately 15 per cent. Therefore, 15 per cent of the 
increase in the numbers of employed managers in the Johannesburg region between 1980 and 
2001 was due to the growth of industries that favoured the employment of managers versus 
those that did not. 
 
Next, the counterfactual game is reversed and the question becomes how many managers 
there would have been if the industrial structure had remained the same between 1980 and 
2001 but the proportion of managers in each industry had been allowed to change the way it 
did between the two years. Thus, the proportion of total employment in each industry remains 
the same as it was in 1980 and the share of the increase in managers attributable to changes in 
the occupational structure alone is calculated. This is the occupation shift effect and, in this 
case, expressed as a percentage of the net shift, is approximately 89 per cent. Thus, 89 
percent of the increase in the numbers of employed managers in the Johannesburg region 
between 1980 and 2001 was due to the changing distribution of managers within industries. 
 
The interaction shift effect is mathematically a residual term. Because the sum of all three 
shift effects must equal the net shift, in this specific example considering the employment of 
managers between 1980 and 2001, the interaction shift effect is -4 per cent (100-(89+15)). 
This means that although the numbers of managers increased between 1980 and 2001, the 
combined interaction of industrial and occupational change actually worked to decrease the 
numbers of managers.   
 
In this example then, the greatest impact by far on the increase in the overall number of 
employed managers between 1980 and 2001 in the Johannesburg region was the change in 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
46 
 
the occupational structure within industries (89 per cent). In simpler terms, the main reason 
there were more managers in 2001 is because all industries tended to employ more managers 
than in 1980. 
 
The following is a detailed explanation of calculations of the shift-share method. I will start 
with the calculations for the industry shift effect (see Table 2.2) 
 
Column (1):  
The absolute number of people employed in an occupation in Year 1 (the total of Column1 
therefore equals the total employed labour force in year 1). 
 
Column (2): 
The absolute number of people employed an occupation in Year 2 (the total of Column 2 
therefore equals the total employed labour force in year 2). 
 
Column (3): Expected Year 2  
The expected number of employees in an occupation in year 2 due only to growth in the total 
employed labour force between years 1 and 2. Year 2’s total labour force is therefore 
distributed among occupations in the same proportions as year 1. Each occupation in year 1 is 
multiplied by the percentage by which the total employed labour force grew between year 1 
and 2: Total employed labour force year 2/Total employed labour force year 1 = factor by 
which to multiply each occupation in year 1. For example, between 1980 and 2001, the total 
employed labour force of the Johannesburg region grew by 2,918,339/2,442,194 = 1.19. 
Thus, for managers in 2001: 96,692 (managers in 1980)*1.19 = 115,543 managers expected 
in 2001. 
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Table 2.2. Industry shift effect and changes in the class structure of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1980-2001 
 
        Components of Net Shift 
 
Percentage of Net 
Shift due to 
Occupation Census 
 1980    
(1) 
Census 
2001  
(2) 
Expected 
2001           
(3) 
Weighted 
2001         
(4) 
Actual 
Change  
   (5) =  
(2) - (1) 
Expected 
Change 
   (6) =  
(3) - (1) 
Net Shift 
   (7) =  
(5) - (6) 
Industry 
Shift Effect 
   (8) =  
(4) - (3) 
Occupation 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect 
   (9) =  
(2) - (4) 
Industry 
Shift 
Effect 
   (10) = 
(8)/(7) 
*100 
Occupation 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect 
 (11) = 
(9)/(7)*100 
Managers 96,692 208,704 115,544 129,862 112,012 18,852 93,160 14,318 78,842 15   85 
Professionals 148,905 275,180 177,936 205,436 126,275 29,031 97,244 27,499 69,744 28   72 
Technicians 118,393 282,749 141,476 163,336 164,356 23,083 141,273 21,860 119,413 15   85 
Clerks 344,698 380,346 411,902 527,376 35,648 67,204 -31,556 115,474 -147,030 -366         466 
Sales workers 233,622 333,808 279,170 312,782 100,186 45,548 54,638 33,612 21,026 62   38 
Craft workers 510,950 361,403 610,568 412,536 -149,547 99,618 -249,165 -198,032 -51,133 79   21 
Operators 325,037 236,564 388,408 292,067 -88,473 63,371 -151,844 -96,342 -55,503 63   37 
Unskilled 528,748 597,891 631,836 655,747 69,143 103,088 -33,945 23,911 -57,856 -70         170 
Skilled 
agricultural/ 
Other 
135,149 241,694 161,498 219,198 106,545 26,349 80,196 57,699 22,496 72    28 
Total 2,442,194 2,918,339 2,918,339 2,918,339 476,145 476,145 0 0 0 
 
  
Source: South African Population Census 1980 and 2001 
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Table 2.3. Occupation shift effect and changes in the class structure of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1980-2001 
 
        Components of Net Shift 
 
Percentage of Net 
Shift due to 
Occupation  Census  
1980    
(1) 
 Census 
2001  
(2) 
Expected 
2001           
(3) 
Weighted 
2001         
(4) 
Actual  
Change 
   (5) =  
(2) - (1) 
Expected 
Change 
   (6) =  
(3) - (1) 
Net Shift 
   (7) =  
(5) - (6) 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
   (8) =  
(4) - (3) 
Industry 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect 
   (9) =  
(2) - (4) 
Industry 
Shift 
Effect 
   (10) = 
(8)/(7) 
*100 
Occupation 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect  
(11) =  
(9)/(7)*100 
Managers 96,692 208,704 115,544 198,425 112,012 18,852 93,160 82,882 10,279 89 11 
Professionals 148,905 275,180 177,936 249,832 126,275 29,031 97,244 71,896 25,348 74 26 
Technicians 118,393 282,749 141,476 265,030 164,356 23,083 141,273 123,554 17,719 87 13 
Clerks 344,698 380,346 411,902 342,184 35,648 67,204 -31,556 -69,719 38,162 221    -121 
Sales workers 233,622 333,808 279,170 279,267 100,186 45,548 54,638 96 54,541 0     100 
Craft workers 510,950 361,403 610,568 477,705 -149,547 99,618 -249,165 -132,863 -116,302 53 47 
Operators 325,037 236,564 388,408 331,834 -88,473 63,371 -151,844 -56,574 -95,270 37 63 
Unskilled 528,748 597,891 631,836 612,924 69,143 103,088 -33,945 -18,912 -15,033 56 44 
Skilled 
agricultural/ 
Other 
135,149 241,694 161,498 161,137 106,545 26,349 80,196 -361 80,557 0     100 
Total 2,442,194 2,918,339 2,918,339 2,918,339 476,145 476,145 0 0 0     
Source: South African Population Census 1980 and 2010 
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Column (4): Weighted Year 2  
Here it is assumed there were no changes in the occupational structure, and only the industrial 
structure is allowed to change as it did between years 1 and 2. Therefore, the total 
employment in an industry in year 2 is distributed among the occupational categories in the 
same proportions as year 1. This is calculated as the sum of the number of people employed 
in an occupation in year 2, assuming the occupational distribution of employment in the 
industries was the same as year 1. For example, the proportion of managers in agriculture in 
1980 was 1,309/67,040 = 0.0195. Therefore, in 2001, the number of managers should be 
0.0195*the total number employed in agriculture in year 2 (69,011) = 1,347. If the same 
procedure is performed for the number of managers in each industry, and all of these 
industries added together, one receives an expected total of 129,862 managers in 2001.  
 
Column (5): Actual Change  
The actual change in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2. 
This is calculated as the difference between Column 2 and Column 1 (the number of people 
employed in an occupation in year 2 minus the number of people employed in an occupation 
in year 1). For example, the actual change in the number of managers between 1980 and 2001 
was 208,704-96,692 = an increase in the number of managers of 112,012 between 1980 and 
2001. 
 
Column (6): Expected Change 
The expected change in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 
and 2. This is calculated as the difference between Column 3 and Column 1 (the expected 
number of people employed in an occupation in year 2 - due to overall labour force growth 
only - minus the actual number of people employed in an occupation in year 1). The expected 
number of managers in 2001 of 115,544-96,692 managers in 1980 = an expected increase in 
the number of managers of 18,852 between 1980 and 2001. 
 
Column (7): Net Shift  
This gives the growth in employment in an occupation independent of total employment 
growth. It is calculated as the difference between Column 5 and Column 6 (the actual change 
in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2 minus the 
expected change in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2).  
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A positive net shift is obtained when the occupational category grew relatively more than 
expected and increased its share of total employment, and a negative one when the 
occupational category grew relatively less than expected and its share of total employment 
decreased between the two years. For example, the actual change in the number of managers 
between 1980 and 2001 minus the expected change in the number of managers between 1980 
and 2001 is 112,012 -18,852 = a positive net shift of 93,160.  
 
Components of net shift:  
Here the net shift calculated above is decomposed into the industry shift effect and the 
combined occupation shift and interaction shift effect.  
 
Column (8): Industry shift effect 
The effect of changes in the industrial structure on the net shift in an occupation. This gives 
the expected number of workers in an occupation or the amount of occupational change that 
occurred, as a result of industrial change between years 1 and 2, with no changes to the 
occupational composition of the industries themselves, while controlling for the growth rate 
of total employment. It is calculated as the difference between Column 4 and Column 3. This 
is the projected number of people employed in an occupation in year 2 as a result of industrial 
change only (where the occupational structure within industries has been kept constant, that 
is, the same as year 1) minus the expected number of people employed in an occupation in 
year 2 due to overall labour force growth only (where both the industrial and occupational 
structure are kept constant/the same as year 1). A positive industry shift effect is obtained 
when changes in the industrial structure resulted in a larger than expected increase in the 
numbers employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2. A negative industry shift effect 
indicates that the changes to the industrial structure between years 1 and 2 did not favour the 
growth of an occupation. For example, had there been no change in the proportion of 
managers in each industry between 1980 and 2001, changes in the industrial structure alone 
would have accounted for 129,862-115,544 = an increase of 14,318 managers. 
 
Column (9): Occupation Shift and Interaction Shift Effect 
This gives the expected change to the number of people employed in an occupation if there 
had been no change to the industrial structure and only changes in the occupational structure 
within industries as well as the interaction between the occupational and industrial structures 
between years 1 and 2. It is calculated as the difference between Column 2 and Column 4: the 
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actual number of people employed in an occupation in year 2 minus the projected number of 
people employed in an occupation in year 2 as a result of industrial change only (where the 
occupational structure within industries has been kept constant, that is, the same as year 1). 
For example, the combined occupation shift and interaction shift effects for managers 
between 1980 and 2001 was: 208,704-129,862 = 78,842. 
  
Column (10): 
The industry shift effect expressed as a percentage of the net shift. 
 
Column (11): 
The combined occupation shift and interaction shift effect expressed as a percentage of the 
net shift. 
 
Now that the industry shift effect and the combined occupation shift and interaction shift 
effect have been calculated, in order to separate the interaction shift effect from the combined 
occupation shift and interaction shift effect, the standardisation must be reversed. In the 
following, the occupation shift effect and combined industry shift and interaction shift effect 
will be calculated. Thus, the subtraction of the industry shift effect from the combined 
industry shift and interaction shift effect will yield the interaction effect. Alternately, the 
occupation shift effect could be subtracted from the combined occupation shift and 
interaction shift effect. 
 
To calculate the occupation shift effect (Table 2.3): 
 
Column (1):  
The absolute number of people employed in an occupation in Year 1 (the total of Column1 
therefore equals the total employed labour force in year 1). 
 
Column (2): 
The absolute number of people employed an occupation in Year 2 (the total of Column 2 
therefore equals the total employed labour force in year 2). 
 
Column (3): Expected Year 2  
The expected number of employees in an occupation in year 2 due only to growth in the total 
employed labour force between years 1 and 2. Year 2’s total labour force is therefore 
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distributed among occupations in the same proportions as year 1. Each occupation in year 1 is 
multiplied by the percentage by which the total employed labour force grew between year 1 
and 2: Total employed labour force year 2/Total employed labour force year 1 = factor by 
which to multiply each occupation in year 1. For example, between 1980 and 2001, the total 
employed labour force of the Johannesburg region grew by 2,918,339/2,442,194 = 1.19. 
Thus, for managers in 2001: 96,692 (managers in 1980)*1.19 = 115,544 managers expected 
in 2001. 
 
Column (4): Weighted Year 2  
Now the assumption is made that there was no change to the industrial structure, and that 
only the occupational structure changed as it did between years 1 and 2. Therefore, the 
industrial distribution of employment in year 1 is applied to the occupational distribution of 
employment in year 2. For example, managers: agriculture accounted for 3 per cent of the 
employed workforce in 1980. In absolute terms, 3 per cent of the employed workforce in 
2001 amounts to 80,111 employees. In 2001, 4.45 per cent of those employed in agriculture 
were managers. Therefore, given the “new” total number of employees in agriculture in 2001 
(using the industrial distribution of 1980), 4.45% *80,111 = 3,881 managers in the 
agricultural industry. This process is repeated across the rest of the occupations in agriculture, 
as well as across all occupations in all other industries. The sum of managers across all of the 
industries yields a projected total of 198,425 managers in 2001.  
 
Column (5): Actual Change  
The actual change in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2. 
This is calculated as the difference between Column 2 and Column 1 (the number of people 
employed in an occupation in year 2 minus the number of people employed in an occupation 
in year 1). For example, the actual change in the number of managers between 1980 and 2001 
was 208,704-96,692 = an increase in the number of managers of 112,012 between 1980 and 
2001. 
 
Column (6): Expected Change 
The expected change in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 
and 2. This is calculated as the difference between Column 3 and Column 1 (the expected 
number of people employed in an occupation in year 2 - due to overall labour force growth 
only - minus the actual number of people employed in an occupation in year 1). The expected 
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number of managers in 2001 of 115,544-96,692 managers in 1980 = an expected increase in 
the number of managers of 18,852 between 1980 and 2001. 
 
Column (7): Net Shift  
This gives the growth in employment in an occupation independent of total employment 
growth. It is calculated as the difference between Column 5 and Column 6 (the actual change 
in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2 minus the 
expected change in the number of people employed in an occupation between years 1 and 2). 
A positive net shift is obtained when the occupational category grew relatively more than 
expected and increased its share of total employment, and a negative one when the 
occupational category grew relatively less than expected and its share of total employment 
decreased between the two years. For example, the actual change in the number of managers 
between 1980 and 2001 minus the expected change in the number of managers between 1980 
and 2001 is 112,012 -18,852 = a positive net shift of 93,160.  
 
Components of net shift:  
Now the net shift calculated above is decomposed into the occupation shift effect and the 
combined industry shift and interaction shift effect. 
 
Column (8): Occupation Shift Effect 
The interaction effect has now been allocated to the industry shift effect (as opposed to the 
occupation-shift effect in Table 2.2). This gives the changes in an occupation (controlling for 
employment growth) that would have occurred had there been changes in only the occupation 
distribution across industries, but no change in the industrial structure of the employed 
workforce. Again, this is calculated as the difference between Column 4 and Column 3 (the 
projected number of managers due to the changing occupation structure minus the expected 
number of managers in year 2 due only to growth in the total employed labour force between 
years 1 and 2). For example, 198,425-115,544 = an increase of 82,882 managers between 
1980 and 2001. 
 
Column (9): Industry Shift and Interaction Effect  
This gives the expected change to the number of people employed in an occupation if there 
had been no change to the occupational structure within industries, and only changes in the 
industrial structure as well as the interaction between the occupational and industrial 
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structures between years 1 and 2 and is calculated as the difference between Column 2 and 
Column 4 (the actual change in the number of managers between 1980 and 2001 minus the 
projected number of managers due to the changing occupational structure). For example, 
208,704-198,425 = a combined industry shift and interaction shift effect of an increase in the 
number of managers between 1980 and 2001 of 10,279. 
 
Column (10): 
The occupation shift effect expressed as a percentage of the net shift. 
 
Column (11): 
The combined industry shift and interaction shift effect expressed as a percentage of the net 
shift. 
 
The interaction effect is then calculated by subtracting the occupation shift effect (column 8 
of Table 2.3) from the combined occupation shift and interaction shift effect (column 9 of 
Table 2.2). The results of the calculations in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 are summarised in Table 
3.13 (see chapter 3, or excerpt below) which consists of: 
 
Net Shift: from Table 2.2 or Table 2.3, Column (7) 
 
The components of net shift: 
 
Industry Shift Effect: From Table 2.2, Column (8) 
 
Occupation Shift Effect: From Table 2.3, Column (8) 
 
Interaction Shift Effect:  
Calculated as the difference between Table 2.2, Column 9 and Table 2.3, Column 8 
(combined occupation shift and interaction shift effect minus occupation shift effect). As 
mentioned previously, one could also calculate this as the combined industry shift and 
interaction shift effect (Table 2.3, column 9) minus the industry shift effect (Table 2.2, 
column 8). Both calculations yield the same result. 
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Components of net shift in percentage 
 
Industry Shift Effect: Industry Shift Effect above as a percentage of Net Shift. 
 
Occupation Shift Effect: Occupation Shift Effect above as a percentage of Net Shift. 
 
Interaction Effect: Interaction Shift Effect above as a percentage of Net Shift. 
 
Therefore, using the example of managers given in the simplified explanation above (see 
excerpt from Table 3.13 below. Full results of Table 3.13 discussed in chapter 3 ):  
 
 Components of Net Shift Components of Net Shift in percent 
Occupation Net Shift Industry 
Shift Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Industry 
Shift Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Managers   93,160    14,318     82,882   -4,040 15 89       -4 
 
 
There is a positive net shift in managers of 93,160; therefore, the numbers of managers 
increased relative to the other occupations between 1980 and 2001 and managers gained a 
greater share of the overall occupation distribution between 1980 and 2001. The industry shift 
effect of 15 per cent and occupation shift effect of 89 per cent indicate that changes in both 
the structure of industries as well as the distribution of occupations within those industries 
contributed to this increase between the two years. The interaction shift effect or joint effect 
of industrial and occupational change actually worked to decrease the numbers of managers, 
but by an almost negligible amount (4 per cent). However, the greatest effect was arguably 
the occupation shift effect, contributing 89 per cent of the net shift. Thus, an increase in the 
numbers of managers across all industries was the main contributor to the greater share of 
overall employment held by managers in 2001 versus 1980. 
 
As one further example of interpreting shift-share results (also from the analysis of 
occupational change during the period 1980-2001): 
 
 Components of Net Shift Components of Net Shift in percent 
Occupation Net Shift Industry Shift 
Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Industry Shift 
Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Unskilled    -33,945    23,911       -18,912    -38,944   -70   56 115 
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As the net shift in unskilled work is negative (-33,945), this indicates that unskilled jobs lost 
share of the occupational distribution between 1980 and 2001. In terms of the effects though, 
only the occupation shift and interaction shift effects contributed to this decline, as they are 
both negative (-18,912 and -38,944 respectively). The industry shift effect was positive 
(23,911) and therefore did not contribute to the declining share of all work represented by 
unskilled jobs. Note that the sign changes when these effects are presented as percentages 
though. The occupation shift effect as a percentage of net shift is 56 per cent, as a negative 
divided by a negative gives a positive: (-18,912/-33945)*100 = 0.557. This means that the 
occupation shift effect contributed 56 per cent to the decline in unskilled jobs (and similarly 
with the interaction shift effect). The industry shift effect as a percentage of net shift is -70 
per cent, as a positive divided by a negative is a negative: (23,911/-33,945)*100 = -0.704. 
This means that the industry shift effect worked in the opposite direction as it were to the net 
shift. That is, changes in the composition of industries between 1980 and 2001 actually 
worked in favour of increasing the proportion of unskilled workers, not decreasing them as 
happened during this period. 
 
(Below are tables 2.4 and 2.5 of the shift-share analysis for the period 2001-2010). 
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Table 2.4. Industry shift effect and changes in the class structure of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 
 
        Components of Net Shift 
 
Percentage of Net 
Shift due to 
Occupation LFS 2001    
(1) 
LFS 2010 
(2) 
Expected 
2010           
(3) 
Weighted 
2010        
(4) 
Actual 
Change 
   (5) =  
(2) - (1) 
Expected 
Change 
    (6) =  
(3) - (1) 
Net Shift 
   (7) =  
(5) - (6) 
Industry 
Shift 
Effect 
   (8) =  
(4) - (3) 
Occupation 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect 
   (9) =  
(2) - (4) 
Industry 
Shift 
Effect 
   (10) = 
(8)/(7) 
*100 
Occupation 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect 
 (11) =  
(9)/(7)*100 
Managers 239,029 399,540 312,188 301,839 160,511 73,159 87,352 -10,349 97,701 -12 112 
Professionals 162,235 306,441 211,890 377,436 144,206 49,655 94,551 165,547 -70,995 175 -75 
Technicians 342,582 418,817 447,435 384,347 76,235 104,853 -28,618 -63,088 34,470 220 -120 
Clerks 369,148 516,993 482,132 545,597 147,845 112,984 34,861 63,465 -28,604 182 -82 
Sales workers 424,801 542,686 554,819 486,190 117,885 130,018 -12,133 -68,628 56,496 566 -466 
Craft workers 386,672 429,387 505,020 471,254 42,715 118,348 -75,633 -33,766 -41,867 45 55 
Operators 255,624 289,040 333,862 313,233 33,416 78,238 -44,822 -20,629 -24,193 46 54 
Unskilled 613,740 832,112 801,586 743,125 218,372 187,846 30,526 -58,461 88,987 -192 292 
Skilled 
agricultural/ 
Other 
77,478 15,106 101,191 127,100 -62,372 23,713 -86,085 25,908 -111,994 -30 130 
Total 2,871,309 3,750,122 3,750,122 3,750,122 878,813 878,813 0 0 0     
Source: South African Labour Force Surveys 2001 and 2010
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Table.2.5. Occupation shift effect and changes in the class structure of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 
 
 
        Components of Net Shift 
 
Percentage of Net 
Shift due to 
Occupation LFS 2001    
(1) 
LFS 2010  
(2) 
Expected 
2010           
(3) 
Weighted 
2010        
(4) 
Actual 
Change 
   (5) =  
(2) - (1) 
Expected 
Change 
    (6) =  
(3) - (1) 
Net Shift 
   (7) =  
(5) - (6) 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
   (8) =  
(4) - (3) 
Industry 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift 
Effect  
   (9) =  
(2) - (4) 
Industry 
Shift 
Effect 
   (10) = 
(8)/(7) 
*100 
Occupation 
Shift and 
Interaction 
Shift Effect 
 (11) =  
(9)/(7)*100 
Managers 239,029 399,540 312,188 496,915 160,511 73,159 87,352 184,728 -97,375 211 -111 
Professionals 162,235 306,441 211,890 279,760 144,206 49,655 94,551 67,870 26,681 72 28 
Technicians 342,582 418,817 447,435 378,103 76,235 104,853 -28,618 -69,333 40,714 242 -142 
Clerks 369,148 516,993 482,132 664,101 147,845 112,984 34,861 181,969 -147,108 522 -422 
Sales workers 424,801 542,686 554,819 450,796 117,885 130,018 -12,133 -104,022 91,890 857 -757 
Craft workers 386,672 429,387 505,020 386,995 42,715 118,348 -75,633 -118,024 42,392 156 -56 
Operators 255,624 289,040 333,862 274,112 33,416 78,238 -44,822 -59,750 14,928 133 -33 
Unskilled 613,740 832,112 801,586 784,342 218,372 187,846 30,526 -17,243 47,770 -56 156 
Skilled 
agricultural/ 
Other 
77,478 15,106 101,191 34,997 -62,372 23,713 -86,085 -66,195 -19,891 77 23 
Total 2,871,309 3,750,122 3,750,122 3,750,122 878,813 878,813 0 0 0     
Source: South African Labour Force Surveys 2001 and 2010 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
59 
 
Surveys for migrants 
 
The broadest definition of migration is possibly: “The crossing of a spatial boundary by one 
or more persons involved in a change of residence” (Posel, 2009; Statistics South Africa, 
2007:81). This definition includes only the spatial and change of residence aspects of 
migration though. Many would argue that a time and social dimension would be necessary in 
the definition of a migrant as well (Statistics South Africa, 2007). These are some of the 
topics of debate in migration studies literature. Thus, in the broader field of migration studies, 
distinctions are made between, for example, international and internal migrants, temporary 
and permanent migrants, legally documented and illegal immigrants, voluntary migrants and 
refugees (Kok, van Zyl and Pietersen, 2006b). Of course, the list goes on. 
 
Ideally, for the purposes of this study, I would have liked to define a migrant as someone who 
was born and educated outside of the Johannesburg region, and who came to the area as an 
adult, or over the age of 18, in search of work. This definition of a migrant would have 
yielded mostly economic/labour migrants. However, the available data do not allow for this 
level of detail in combination with information on the occupation and industry in which the 
respondent worked. That is, it is not possible to find all of these variables in any one data set. 
 
Therefore, in this study, I will not be going into this level of detail around migrants. 
Definitions of migration most useful in this study then are (Borjas, 2000:1): 
 
• Migration: A move from one geographic area to another.  
• Internal migration: the household/individual moves across larger geographically distinct 
units - such as counties, metropolitan areas, states, or provinces - but remains within the 
same country.  
• International migration: the household/individual moves across national boundaries. 
 
Thus, in this study, a migrant is defined as someone who was not born in the Johannesburg 
region (Gauteng province) of South Africa, but who was living and working there at the time 
the survey or census was conducted. This includes both internal migrants (born within the 
borders of South Africa, but not in the Johannesburg region) and foreign migrants (born 
outside of South Africa) (see detailed discussion of data sets used later). This is obviously 
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quite a broad definition of migration, and, as such, yields a much wider sample than if I had 
used the definitions of migrants in the various data sets, which tend to focus on 
circulatory/temporary labour migrants. 
 
In order for a data set from any survey to be useful in studying migrants in the Johannesburg 
region, the following variables were necessary: 
 
1. Place of birth 
2. Current province  
3. Occupation 
4. Industry 
5. Employment status (so that only those currently employed are captured, including 
both formal and informal sector activity, as well as the self-employed) 
6. Race 
7. Gender 
8. Highest level of education 
 
Of the data sets to which I had access, many did not fulfil even these basic requirements. The 
data sets below were not suitable for the purpose of researching migrants to the Johannesburg 
region for this particular study for the following reasons: 
 
South African Population Census 1970: 
In terms of the African sample (and while this is a population census, only a 5 per cent 
sample was used for the African population), the place of birth variable is of limited utility 
because it only differentiates between South African and foreign-born Africans. Thus, there is 
no indication of where in South Africa an African respondent was born. 
 
South African Population Census 1985: 
Please see previous discussion of the shortcomings of the South African Population Census 
1985 and why it was not used at all for this research. 
 
South African Population Census 1991: 
The place of birth variable only differentiates between those born in South Africa and those 
born outside of the country (including the Bantustans or African homelands). Therefore, there 
is no indication from which province in South Africa a respondent originates. 
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South African Population Census 1996: 
The place of birth variable only asks in which country the respondent was born. Therefore, 
for South African-born respondents, there is no indication from which province in South 
Africa a respondent originates. 
 
The Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey, Republic of South Africa, 1999/2000: 
While the necessary variables are available in the data sets, the proportion of employed 
migrants and natives is very different in comparison to the other surveys and censuses used. 
So, while migrants are the majority of the employed workforce in the other data sets 
analysed, in this survey, natives are the majority (see discussion below on the data sets used 
in this study for greater detail on these data). While this may not be important when 
comparing the characteristics of migrants and natives in relative terms, I do compare these 
two groups in absolute terms as well. 
 
Internal Migration in South Africa, 1999: 
While this is a rich, detailed data set in many ways, it has certain limitations for the specific 
purposes of this study. However, the main problem with regard to studying migrants and the 
kinds of work they do is in the occupational categories used and the method of sampling.  
 
The categories for occupations used in this study are not the same as that used in most other 
studies, such as the South African Population Censuses and Labour Force Surveys. The 
categories are as follows: 
 
1.00 Managerial, executive and high administrative 
2.00 Independent professional 
3.00 Middle and lower salaried professional 
4.00 Inspectoral and semi-professional 
5.00 Clerical and non-counter sales 
6.00 Skilled manual 
7.00 Routine white collar and counter sales 
8.00 Semi-skilled 
9.00 Unskilled 
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There is no detailed explanation of what occupations are contained in each of these 
categories, either in the codebook or in the report. While several of the occupational category 
names in the Internal Migration survey are directly comparable to those in the Population 
Censuses and Labour Force Surveys, some are particularly vague, and therefore, hard to 
compare. This problem is perhaps greatest in the category semi-skilled in the Internal 
Migration survey. According to the International Organisation for Migration (Bureau of 
European Policy Advisors [BEPA], 2010), a semi-skilled worker is one who requires a 
certain amount of training or familiarisation with a job before he/she can perform it with a 
high level of competence. The amount of training required is less than that of a skilled/craft 
worker, lasting usually only days or weeks, and usually below the tertiary level. Thus, many 
manual workers, including production and construction workers would fall into the category 
of semi-skilled workers. If one accepts this definition, semi-skilled workers in the Internal 
Migration survey best approximate plant and machine operators and assemblers in the South 
African Population Censuses and Labour Force Surveys (Table 2.6 below). 
 
Table 2.6. Occupational distribution of the Johannesburg region, 1999 and 2001. 
  
Internal Migration Survey, 1999                         Census 2001  
Occupation Per 
cent 
Occupation Per 
cent 
1.Managerial, executive and high 
administrative 
0 Legislators, senior officials and managers 7 
2.Independent professional 1 Professionals 9 
3.Middle and lower salaried 
professional 
6   
4.Inspectoral and semi-professional 1 Technicians and associate professionals 10 
5.Clerical and non-counter sales 10 Clerks 13 
7.Routine white collar and counter 
sales 
4 Service, shop and market sales workers 11 
6.Skilled manual 5 Craft and related trades workers 12 
8.Semi-skilled 43 Plant/machine operators & assemblers 8 
9.Unskilled 26 Elementary occupations 20 
0.Don’t know 4 Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 8 
 Sources: Internal Migration survey 1999 and South African Population Census 2001. 
 
If semi-skilled workers in the Internal Migration survey are the same as plant and machine 
operators and assemblers in the Population Census and surveys using similar occupation 
categories, then semi-skilled workers, at 43 per cent of the sample (Table 2.6), appear to be 
grossly over-represented in the Internal Migration survey in comparison to the census of the 
same year (8 per cent). Even if an aggregated blue-collar type occupation grouping is created 
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from the combination of semi-skilled and skilled manual workers in the Internal Migration 
survey, and this is compared to a combined craft and related trades workers and plant and 
machine operators and assemblers group in the Population Census, there remains a large 
disparity of 28 per cent (48 per cent versus 20 per cent respectively).  
 
This is not the only discrepancy between the Internal Migration survey data and the 
Population Census data. Unskilled workers appear to be over-represented in the Internal 
Migration survey in comparison to the Population Census too (26 versus 20 per cent 
respectively, Table 2.6). On the other hand, high-skill, high-income occupations appear to be 
under-represented in the Internal Migration survey in comparison to the Population Census. 
Legislators, senior officials and managers represent at least 7 per cent of employed workers 
in the Johannesburg region in 2001 according to the Population Census, but less than 1 per 
cent in 1999 according to the Internal Migration survey. If the independent professionals and 
the middle- and lower-salaried professionals of the Internal Migration survey are combined, 
the percentage of professionals is similar across the Internal Migration survey and the 
Population Census (7 versus 9 per cent respectively). However, the percentage of technicians 
and associate professionals is much higher in the population census than the Internal 
Migration survey (10 versus 1 per cent respectively). Thus, it would appear that the Internal 
Migration survey over-sampled manual workers, and under-sampled high-skill, high-pay 
workers. 
 
These discrepancies may be a result of the sampling method. Only the black African 
population was sampled in this survey (South African Data Archive, 1999). Instead of the 
more conventional simple random sample, the Internal Migration survey used a stratified 
sample, dividing the sample evenly between metropolitan, other urban and rural areas. As the 
black African population is likely to be over-represented amongst manual workers and under-
represented amongst high-skill, high-pay workers, and it is not unreasonable to expect that 
those respondents from rural areas would also include a disproportionate number of manual 
workers, this may explain the preponderance of manual workers in the Internal Migration 
survey versus other surveys. 
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The 2001/2002 HSRC Migration Survey 
 
The necessary variables for the purposes of this study of migrants are found in the 2001/ 2002 
HSRC Migration Survey. However, most of the individual data set is missing values on a 
range of variables, and, most importantly for this study, for the variable province of birth. 
Of the 3,618 cases of individual respondents, only 637 reside in the Gauteng province, and, 
of these, approximately 260 have data on province of birth. This appears to be a derived 
variable (probably from a question about the magisterial district in which the respondent’s 
mother lived when he/she was born). I attempted to “fill in the blanks” of missing birth place 
data by manipulating several other, tangentially related variables, but this gave a very high 
percentage of natives of 78.5 per cent. This likely gives an undercount of migrants in the 
Johannesburg region (see discussion below of data sets used for greater detail). There is a 
migrant status variable, but no indication how it was derived. In addition, one of the category 
labels of this variable is “internal migrant (or origin not known)”. Thus, there seems to be a 
certain degree of uncertainty around the birth place of respondents in the individual data set 
to which I have not been able to find a satisfactory solution. 
 
One explanation for this could be the person who answered the individual respondent 
questionnaire. While there were specific within-household sampling instructions for choosing 
the person from the household to interview for the individual questionnaire, it would appear 
these were not adhered to: in 79 per cent of the individual respondent cases, the person 
interviewed as the individual respondent was also the person who answered the household 
questionnaire (Kok, et al., 2006). This could have resulted in significant interviewer and 
respondent fatigue, which may have contributed to the large proportion of missing data. Also, 
the questionnaire is quite complicated, which may have resulted in substantial confusion for 
both the interviewer and the respondent, and may also have contributed to the large amount 
of missing data. 
 
Labor Force Surveys, 2001-2010 
In none of the Labor Force Surveys is there a question about place of birth. The Labour Force 
Surveys of 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 do have a separate section on migrant workers. 
However, migrants are specifically defined as anyone who is considered part of the 
household but usually absent from it for a month or more each year due to work. This is a 
much narrower definition of a migrant than the one employed in this study, which defines a 
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migrant as anyone who now lives and works in the Johannesburg region of South Africa but 
who was not born there.  
 
In the Labour Force Surveys of 2003, 2004 and 2005 there is also a question about where the 
respondent lived five years earlier. Again though, this would give too narrow a definition of a 
migrant for the purposes of this study and it would be limited to those who had moved to the 
Johannesburg region in the last five years only. Labour Force Surveys from 2006 through to 
2010 have no useful data on migrants for the purposes of this study, as there is no question 
about birth place. 
 
Data sets used in this study to compare migrants and natives 
The South African Population Census 1980, the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000, 
the South African Population Census 2001 10 per cent sample and the Community Survey 
2007 all have the variables necessary for this study (place of birth, current province, 
occupation, industry, employment status, race, gender and highest level of education).  
 
Over and above this consideration is the question of how accurately these data reflect the 
population of the Johannesburg region in general. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show that the 
occupational distribution in the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000 is very similar to 
that of the Labour Force Survey 2000, except with regard to the percentage of professionals, 
which is higher in the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000 (13 per cent) than the 
Labour Force Survey 2000 (by only 6 percentage points though). The South African 
Population Census 2001 10 per cent sample and the South African Population Census 2001 
have identical occupational distributions, unsurprisingly. The Community Survey 2007 also 
has a similar occupational distribution to the Labour Force Survey 2007, with the most 
notable divergence amongst elementary/unskilled occupations and undetermined occupations. 
The Community Survey 2007 records 16 per cent elementary or unskilled occupations, while 
the Labour Force Survey 2007 has 22 per cent. The Community Survey 2007 has 16 per cent 
undetermined occupations though in comparison to only 1 per cent in the Labour Force 
Survey 2007, thereby making it likely that several percent of the elementary occupations, 
along with several other occupational categories, were either misclassified as undetermined 
or were simply not recorded. Thus, the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000, the South 
African Population Census 2001 10 per cent sample and the Community Survey 2007 all 
appear to have occupation distributions similar to other data sets used in this research. 
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Table 2.7. Comparing the occupational distribution of data sets used to study migrants to other data sets used to study occupational change in the 
Johannesburg region (frequency distribution) 
 
Occupation Census 
1980 
LFS 2000 Mesebetsi 
1999/2000 
Census 
2001 
Census 
2001 10% 
LFS 2007 Community 
Survey 2007 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 96,692 182,295 195,267 208,018 208,705 440,371 425,784 
Professionals 148,905 221,761 326,947 269,756 275,180 445,229 457,308 
Technicians and associate professionals 118,393 345,563 277,361 280,420 282,750 455,560 274,444 
Clerks 344,698 354,136 294,189 379,678 380,346 431,410 317,621 
Service, shop and market sales workers 233,622 438,676 311,708 331,365 333,809 458,052 358,504 
Craft and related trades workers 510,950 426,181 299,313 361,500 361,403 543,431 407,484 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 325,037 315,461 214,975 236,713 236,565 371,869 270,487 
Elementary occupations 528,748 674,819 481,467 590,162 597,891 898,802 579,947 
Undetermined and Skilled Agricultural 135,149 92,639 35,108 237,228 241,693 56,237 600,142 
Total 2,442,194 3,051,530 2,436,334 2,894,840 2,918,341 4,100,962 3,691,721 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001, 2001 10 per cent sample, Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000, Labour Force Survey 2000 and 2007 and  
Community Survey 2007 
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Table 2.8. Comparing the occupational distribution of data sets used to study migrants to other data sets used to study occupational change in the 
Johannesburg region (percentage distribution 
 
Occupation in percent Census 
1980 
LFS 
2000 
Mesebetsi 
1999/2000 
Census 
2001 
Census 
2001 10% 
LFS 2007 Community 
Survey 2007 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 4 6 8 7 7 11 12 
Professionals 6 7 13 9 9 11 12 
Technicians and associate professionals 5 11 11 10 10 11 7 
Clerks 14 12 12 13 13 11 9 
Service, shop and market sales workers 10 14 13 11 11 11 10 
Craft and related trades workers 21 14 12 12 12 13 11 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 13 10 9 8 8 9 7 
Elementary occupations 22 22 20 20 20 22 16 
Undetermined and Skilled Agricultural 6 3 1 8 8 1 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001, 2001 10 per cent sample, Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000, Labour Force Survey 2000 and 2007 and 
Community Survey 2007 
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There is a similar distribution of migrants versus natives in these data too, with natives 
comprising between 57 per cent and 61 per cent and migrants accounting for 38 per cent to 
43 per cent (internal and foreign migrants combined) of respondents (Table 2.9). However, if 
one considers the employed amongst these only, the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 
1999/2000 has a substantially higher percentage of employed natives in comparison to the 
other data sets (Table 2.10). Natives comprise between 40 and 47 per cent of all those 
employed in the South African Population Census 1980, South African Population Census 
2001 10 per cent sample and the Community Survey 2007, but 60 per cent of the Mesebetsi 
Labour Force Survey 1999/2000 sample. That is a difference of at least 13 per cent in the 
number of migrants between the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000 and the other 
three sets. Thus, the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000 appears to have a very 
different distribution of migrants and natives amongst employed respondents in comparison 
to the other data.  
 
Given this divergence in the percentage of migrants from the other data sets in the Mesebetsi 
Labour Force Survey 1999/2000, the consistency of migrant versus native numbers between 
the two South African Population Census sets and the Community Survey 2007, and the 
proximity in time of the Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 1999/2000 and the South African 
Population Census 2001 10 per cent sample, I decided not to use the Mesebetsi Labour Force 
Survey 1999/2000, and rather use the two South African Population Census sets and the 
Community Survey 2007 for the purposes of studying migrants in the Johannesburg region of 
South Africa. 
 
Table 2.9. Percentage distribution of migrants and natives in the Johannesburg region (all) 
 
Migrant Status (all) Census 
1980 
Mesebetsi 
1999/2000 
Census 
2001 10% 
sample 
Community 
Survey 2007 
Native 57 61 59      57 
Internal Migrant 35 34 35      37 
Foreign Migrant 8 4 5       6 
Unknown 0 0 0      0 
Total 100 100 100   100 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001 10 per cent sample, Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 
1999/2000 and Community Survey 2007 
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Table 2.10. Percentage distribution of migrants and natives in the Johannesburg region 
(employed only) 
 
Migrant Status 
(employed only) 
Census 
1980 
Mesebetsi 
1999/2000 
Census 
2001 10% 
sample 
 Community 
Survey 2007 
Native 40 60 47          44 
Internal Migrant 48 34 44          47 
Foreign Migrant 12 6 9            9 
Unknown 0 0 0            0 
Total 100 100 100         100 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001 10 per cent sample, Mesebetsi Labour Force Survey 
1999/2000 and Community Survey 2007 
 
 
Average Annual Employment Growth Rate 
 
The average annual employment growth rate was calculated using the following formula:10 
 
 
{[(T2/T1) (1/(Y2-Y1))] –1} * 100 
 
Where: 
T1 = Total number of people employed in the first year 
T2 = Total number of people employed in the second year 
Y1 = First year 
Y2 = Second year 
 
For example, the average annual employment growth rate in the finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services sector between 1980 and 2010 was: 
 
{[(707,171/140,805) (1/(2010-1980))]-1} * 100 = 5.52 per cent. 
 
Thus, the number of people employed in the finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services sector grew on average approximately 6 per cent per annum between 1980 and 2010. 
 
                                                 
10
  This method from Mohr, P., van der Merwe, C., Both, Z. and Inggs, J. 1988. The Practical Guide to South 
African Economic Indicators. Johannesburg: Lexicon Publishers. 
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Chapter 3: Sectoral and Occupational Change in the Johannesburg Region 
 
 
The Johannesburg region is not only South Africa’s most densely populated area, but 
contributes some 50 per cent of South Africa’s economic output, and is arguably the country’s 
most dynamic economic region (Rogerson, 2003; Wray, 2010). This region was established as 
a result of the discovery of gold, the mining and processing of which first connected it to the 
rest of the world economy. The Johannesburg region led the processes of industrialisation and 
modernisation in South Africa, with a third of the country’s industrial establishments, as well 
as 44 per cent of industrial employees located in this region by 1948 already (Nieftagodien, 
2006). However, as with many other world city regions, the Johannesburg region has 
experienced a move away from mining and industrial production towards services and trade 
(Rogerson, 2003). While manufacturing had overtaken mining as the main source of 
employment by 1950, there has since been a relative downturn in the significance of 
manufacturing in the face of strong growth in the service s ctor (Rogerson, 2003). Arguably, 
the most significant growth has been in finance, insurance, real estate (FIRE) and business 
services, with this sector contributing 21,4 per cent to the region’s Gross Domestic Product in 
2004, the largest share of any sector (Statistics South Africa, 2004).  
 
Industry in the Johannesburg region: a brief history 
 
The community, social and personal services sector has always been one of the largest 
employers in the Johannesburg region. However, there have been considerable shifts in 
employment in other sectors (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004). Since the discovery of gold on 
the Witwatersrand, mining had been the main employer of labour, and continued to be so up 
until the 1960’s. As was the case in most cities post-World War Two, Johannesburg 
experienced an economic boom which was to last till the oil crisis in the 1970’s (Beall, 
Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). Thus, employment grew rapidly during this period. However, 
with the depletion of gold ore reserves in the Witwatersrand mines and the establishment of 
new gold fields in the Orange Free State, mining employment in the Johannesburg region 
declined (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004).  
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The manufacturing sector began as a service industry to the gold mines, but grew to the 
extent that  it was the second largest employer in the Johannesburg region, behind the 
community, social and personal services sector by 1960 (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004; 
Trapido, 1971). In the early post-war period, due to high commodity prices and the rapidly 
developing international economy, the mining industry profited handsomely from its primary 
exports (Black, 1991). These considerable profits were then invested in large-scale 
manufacturing. The expansion of the manufacturing sector was facilitated not only by 
demand from the growing mining sector, but also through state intervention in the creation of 
parastatals to develop capacity in the key industries of iron and steel, electricity and 
petroleum production (Beall, et al., 2002). The manufacturing sector also benefitted from 
protectionist measures such as tariff barriers on imported goods; one of the main instruments 
of the state’s industrialisation policy (Black, 1991). Employment growth in the manufacturing 
sector was particularly impressive in the 1960’s and early 1970’s (Crankshaw and Parnell, 
2004). This corresponds to when the bulk of investment in manufacturing took place in South 
Africa, with investors being attracted by an already sizeable and rapidly growing domestic 
market and relatively low wages (Black, 1991). However, with a period of long-term lower 
output growth beginning in the late-1970’s, manufacturing employment soon decreased 
dramatically (Beall, et al., 2002).  
 
Several explanations have been offered for the precipitous manufacturing employment 
decline after 1980 (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004). Scholars argue that at no point did South 
Africa’s manufacturing sector achieve its potential growth (Joffe, Kaplan, Kaplinsky and 
Lewis, 1995). Many have blamed the expansion of the manufacturing sector under the policy 
of import substitution from the 1950’s already, as there was limited foreign exchange during 
this time (Moll, 1991). The growth of manufacturing was also heavily dependent on 
increasing demand for consumer durables from what was only a small, mainly white market 
(Freund, 1986). Unfortunately, the change to export-led industrialisation in the late 1970’s did 
not ameliorate this situation. As the rest of the world began to embrace neo-liberal macro-
economic policies, so too did South Africa (Beall, et al., 2002). Protectionist measures in the 
manufacturing industry were steadily removed and the government reduced expenditure and 
inflation control in accordance with the principle of promoting the operation of the free 
market. However, many industries that had started under trade barriers still needed them 
decades later (Moll, 1991). Interest rates became so high that manufacturers’ and other 
companies’ profit margins were substantially reduced. In addition to this, lessened control 
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over the flow of capital into and out of the country led to disinvestment from export-oriented 
South African manufacturers for more profitable overseas business concerns (McGrath and 
Jenkins, 1985). However, poor macro-economic planning was not the only culprit. 
Deindustrialisation and education policies, which both sought to limit African urbanisation, 
hindered manufacturing growth. Under deindustrialisation policies, employers either had to 
reduce the numbers of African workers or relocate to remote areas, especially in or near the 
Bantustans, to limit the numbers of African workers coming to the cities (Beall, et al, 2002; 
Karam and Sihlongonyane, 2006). One of the impacts of this industrial decentralisation was 
greatly increased opportunity costs of manufacturing (Tomlinson and Hyslop, 1984). Thus, 
many argue that several state industrialisation initiatives, such as parastatals, were inefficient 
and that policies such as the industrial decentralisation policy were misguided (Moll, 1991). 
Education policies, for example, also meant that only limited secondary education was 
available to Africans in Johannesburg (Lipton, 1989; Beall, et al., 2002). Thus these policies 
acted to intensify the situation of a dearth of skilled workers in the region (Crankshaw and 
Parnell, 2004).  
 
In terms of labour, gold mining historically relied mainly on cheap rural migrant workers 
(Freund, 1991). What skilled jobs there were, were filled by Whites, who defended their 
market position though trade unions and government support (Trapido, 1971). Consequently, 
only unskilled and semi-skilled manual jobs were available to Africans, and therefore were 
mainly filled by poorly-educated rural migrant Africans. Employment in the manufacturing 
sector followed a similar pattern to that of mining. Whites, usually from urban areas and with 
better education, held the best semi-skilled factory jobs (Crankshaw, 1997). Whites also 
dominated the skilled trades by excluding Africans from apprenticeships and, as in the mining 
sector, with government support and job reservation when their jobs were under threat from 
cheaper African labour (Lipton, 1989). Thus, unskilled and low-wage semi-skilled work was 
all that was available to Africans in the manufacturing sector as well, which was again 
attractive to poorly-educated rural migrant Africans in particular.  
 
However, significant employment growth during the 1960’s and 1970’s precipitated a skilled 
white labour shortage; initially in the skilled trades, then later in white-collar occupations too 
(Crankshaw, 1997). Employers therefore lobbied government to intervene with white trade 
unions and reform employment and education policies towards Africans, thereby allowing 
them to be trained and employed in semi-skilled jobs to make up the labour shortfall (Platzky 
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and Walker, 1985). In several sectors, agreements were reached which allowed Africans to be 
advanced into semi-skilled, supervisory and white-collar work, although not at the expense of 
White employment (Lipton, 1989). Previously urbanised, better-educated Africans were 
therefore best placed to take advantage of these new opportunities for upward occupational 
mobility (Crankshaw, 1997). At the same time, employers were switching to more capital 
intensive methods of production. Therefore, while employment opportunities for semi-skilled 
African plant and machine operators and assemblers increased, so demand for unskilled 
labour decreased (Hindson, 1991). Thus, while the late-apartheid period gave rise to more 
skilled and professional work for educated urbanised Africans, employment opportunities for 
unskilled rural migrant Africans dwindled. 
 
Employment in the smaller industrial sectors of construction, utilities, transport and 
communication continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate, during the manufacturing 
employment boom years of the 1960’s and 1970’s and beyond (Crankshaw and Parnell, 
2004). While manufacturing and mining employment declined after 1980, employment in the 
tertiary sector continued to grow. Thus, the only apparent commonality between the early- 
and late-apartheid periods is high levels of employment in the community, social and 
personal services sector. With regard to other sectors, in the early-apartheid period, unskilled 
and semi-skilled labour was in high demand in the mining and manufacturing sectors. By the 
late-apartheid period though, skilled white-collar and professional workers were in higher 
demand for the commercial, business and financial services sectors (Crankshaw and Parnell, 
2004). 
 
After 1994, the new government followed the same policy as the former regime of 
controlling inflation by limiting the supply of money, inadvertently causing interest rates to 
rise (Beall, et al., 2002). This was part of a greater strategy of reducing public debt in order to 
appear economically stable enough to attract foreign investment.11 However, these high 
interest rates suppressed demand for both locally made and imported goods. Moreover, the 
Rand became over-valued and South African made goods became too expensive to compete 
in world markets. Added to this was the global recession of the early 1990’s. Thus, the 
manufacturing industry did not recover with the export-led growth strategy of the 1980’s and 
1990’s either (Beall, et al., 2002). 
                                                 
11
 See discussion of GEAR in chapter 5. 
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Changing employment patterns 
 
Manufacturing employment peaked at 619,680 workers in 1980, representing 25 per cent of 
all employment in that year (Tables 3.1 and 3.3, Figure 3.1). From this point, manufacturing 
employment decreased in both absolute and relative terms, reaching a low of 310,049 
employees or 13 per cent of the employed workforce of the Johannesburg region in 1996 
(Tables 3.1 and 3.3). After this nadir, manufacturing employment started to recover, reaching 
a maximum of 688,606 by 2008, but dropping below the 600,000 mark by 2010 (Table 3.2 
and Figure 3.2). By 2010, manufacturing represented only 16 per cent of the employed 
workforce (Table 3.4).  
 
During this same period (1970 to 2010), employment in all service sectors grew substantially 
The number of employees in the community, social and personal services sector more than 
doubled between 1970 and 2010, from 473,369 to 1,012,516, and accounted for between 24 
per cent and 30 per cent of all employment in this period (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, Figures 
3.1 and 3.2).12 The wholesale and retail trade sector steadily increased its share of 
employment from 13 per cent in 1970 to 22 per cent in 2010, with an increase of 588,389 
employees (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). The most impressive growth was arguably in the finance, 
insurance, real estate (FIRE) and business services sector. The numbers of employees in 
FIRE and business services increased almost eight-fold, from 91,130 and a share of total 
employment of 5 per cent in 1970 to 707,171 and a 19 per cent share of employment in 2010 
(Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). Therefore, while manufacturing accounted for the second 
largest share of employees in 1970, only marginally behind the number of workers in the 
community, social and personal services, by 2010, employment in each of the service sectors 
had surpassed that in the manufacturing sector (Figure 3.2). 
 
Manufacturing employment appeared to have recovered to 1980 levels by 2007 (Tables 3.1 
and 3.2). However, between 1980 and 2010, the average annual growth rate of manufacturing 
employment was 0 per cent.13 Added to this is the fact that this “recovery” in manufacturing 
employment happened in the face of a massive expansion of service sector employment. By 
contrast, the average annual growth rates of employment during the same period in the 
community, social and personal services, wholesale and retail trade, and FIRE and business 
                                                 
12
 Note: the community, social and personal services sector includes domestic workers. 
13
 See Research Methods for how this was calculated. 
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services sectors were 1 per cent, 3 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. Thus, the 
Johannesburg region experienced simultaneous growth in employment in its service sectors 
and a decline and recovery, and therefore overall stagnation of employment growth in the 
manufacturing sector between 1980 and 2010. 
 
In the terms of the social polarisation hypothesis, this decline in manufacturing’s share of 
employment and concomitant growth in the service sector’s share thereof should result in a 
decline in the numbers of middle-income skilled and semi-skilled manufacturing jobs, and a 
rise in the numbers of both high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, low-pay service sector jobs, 
leading to increased social polarisation. However, it can be argued that the real changes in the 
occupational structure of the Johannesburg region during this period were not consistent with 
this predicted outcome. This conclusion about the precise nature of the changes to 
occupational structure is dependent upon the definitions of skill requirements and levels of 
remuneration of certain service sector occupations (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2009). As 
was mentioned in chapter 1 and discussed in chapter 2, there is little debate in the literature as 
to which jobs are considered high-skill and high-pay, and that both the proportion and 
absolute number of these jobs are increasing. However, in order for there to be a process of 
increasing polarisation, the numbers of both high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, low-pay jobs 
must increase, while the numbers of medium-pay jobs must stagnate or decline. It is in the 
definition of these low-skill, low-income jobs that inconsistency occurs.  Many polarisation 
theorists categorise clerical and service and sales worker occupations, and even some 
associate professional occupations, as low-skill, low-pay service sector jobs (Baum, 1997; 
Clark, 1998; Sassen, 1994; Wilson, 1996). Therefore, by this definition, all non-managerial 
and non-professional service sector jobs are effectively classified as low-income, low-skilled 
jobs. As the numbers of employees in these types of jobs are also growing, along with the 
numbers of high-skill, high-pay workers, this leads to a “bipolar” distribution of the 
occupations of the service sector, with high-skilled, high-income managers and professionals 
at one end of the skill and pay spectrum, and low-skill, low-income workers on the other.  
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                             Table 3.1. Employment by main economic sector, Johannesburg region, 1970-2001 (frequency distribution) 
 
Sector Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 1991 Census 1996 Census 2001 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 74,699 67,040 66,945 34,043 69,010 
Mining and Quarrying 206,969 253,185 236,452 168,595 96,846 
Manufacturing 439,662 619,680 537,447 310,049 401,580 
Utilities 16,745 23,103 33,977 34,333 21,808 
Construction 112,098 113,191 156,440 147,174 162,210 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 238,718 345,023 461,600 331,212 485,974 
Transport, Storage and Communication 90,605 132,093 169,402 157,903 171,356 
FIRE and Business services 91,130 140,805 243,091 310,305 416,113 
Community, Social and Personal Services 473,369 651,356 851,554 687,899 807,101 
Other and Unspecified 75,891 96,718 101,677 238,616 286,342 
Total 1,819,886 2,442,194 2,858,585 2,420,129 2,918,341 
                                  Source: South African Population Censuses 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 3.2. Employment by main economic sector, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 (frequency distribution) 
 
Sector LFS 2001 LFS 2002 LFS 2003 LFS 2004 LFS 2005 LFS 2006 LFS 2007 LFS 2008 LFS 2009 LFS 2010 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing 27,826 59,180 27,095 63,503 54,833 61,699 74,626 66,494 42,845 28,771 
Mining and Quarrying 126,824 123,666 134,366 87,647 69,998 85,828 74,648 27,575 31,834 27,894 
Manufacturing 510,153 526,221 502,843 519,564 531,896 564,458 625,139 688,606 560,736 592,391 
Utilities 19,836 17,556 25,573 36,997 31,382 52,070 30,010 31,046 39,965 41,413 
Construction 130,610 136,930 123,551 217,756 309,644 281,470 273,218 297,920 268,209 252,084 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 643,033 605,240 668,330 692,281 851,954 905,949 880,712 919,008 843,050 827,107 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 181,000 216,800 181,399 191,107 216,973 196,735 320,979 276,881 258,036 254,731 
FIRE and Business services 456,280 504,201 507,427 483,580 583,289 579,456 687,844 715,548 702,449 707,171 
Community, Social and Personal 
Services 756,987 694,165 835,807 802,297 839,333 897,508 1,109,372 1,081,772 1,005,051 1,012,516 
Other and Unspecified 18,760 48,422 22,481 8,698 13,801 22,887 24,413 2,203 5,786 6,045 
Total 2,871,309 2,932,381 3,028,873 3,103,431 3,503,103 3,648,060 4,100,962 4,107,052 3,757,961 3,750,122 
   Source: Labour Force Surveys 
   Note: Discrepancy between values for 2001 in this table and Table 3.1 above due to use of different data sets, namely the LFS and Population Census. See Research Methods. 
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                           Table 3.3. Employment by main economic sector, Johannesburg region, 1970-2001 (percentage distribution) 
 
Sector Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 1991 Census 1996 Census 2001 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 4 3 2 1        2 
Mining and Quarrying 11 10 8 7        3 
Manufacturing 24 25 19 13      14 
Utilities 1 1 1 1        1 
Construction 6 5 5 6        6 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 13 14 16 14      17 
Transport, Storage and Communication 5 5 6 7        6 
FIRE and Business services 5 6 9 13      14 
Community, Social and Personal Services 26 27 30 28      28 
Other and Unspecified 4 4 4 10      10 
Total 100 100 100 100    100 
                                 Source: South African Population Censuses 
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 Table 3.4. Employment by main economic sector, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 (percentage distribution) 
 
Sector LFS 2001 LFS 2002 LFS 2003 LFS 2004 LFS 2005 LFS 2006 LFS 2007 LFS 2008 LFS 2009 LFS 2010 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry 
and Fishing 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1       1 
Mining and Quarrying 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1       1 
Manufacturing 18 18 17 17 15 15 15 17 15     16 
Utilities 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1       1 
Construction 5 5 4 7 9 8 7 7 7       7 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 22 21 22 22 24 25 21 22 22     22 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 6 7 6 6 6 5 8 7 7        7 
FIRE and Business services 16 17 17 16 17 16 17 17 19       19 
Community, Social and Personal 
Services 26 24 28 26 24 25 27 26 27       27 
Other and Unspecified 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0         0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100     100 
 Source: Labour Force Surveys 
 Note: Discrepancy between values for 2001 in this table and Table 3.3 above due to use of different data sets, namely the LFS and Population Census. See Research Methods. 
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        Fig 3.1. Employment by main economic sector, Johannesburg region, 1970-2001  
 
         Source: South African Population Censuses 
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         Fig 3.2. Employment by main economic sector, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010  
 
          Source: Labour Force Surveys 
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Arguably though, many clerical and service and sales jobs are not low-skill, low-pay and 
require the same amount of skill as craft and related trades work, and plant and machine 
operator and assembler jobs (see previous discussion in chapter 2). These are the types of 
skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar manufacturing jobs many supporters of the polarisation 
hypothesis view as middle-income jobs. Therefore, these “misclassified” clerical and service 
and sales jobs have similar income and skill distributions to the skilled and semi-skilled blue-
collar manual manufacturing jobs they are supposedly replacing (Borel-Saladin and 
Crankshaw, 2009). Thus, the ever-increasing numbers of clerical and service and sales jobs 
are not only not low-pay, low-skill, but the continued growth in their numbers offsets the 
decline in the numbers of so-called middle-income manufacturing jobs.  
 
Reflecting the fortunes of the declining manufacturing sector then, employment in the semi-
skilled, blue-collar jobs of craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operators 
and assemblers reached a combined peak of 835,987 (Table 3.9a) in 1980, after which point 
employment in these jobs decreased to a low of 597,968 in 2001.14 After 2001, these numbers 
began to rise again, reaching a highest total of 915,300 in 2007, before dropping to 718,429 
by 2010: 117,558 fewer and a loss of 14 per cent from the peak 28 years before in 1980 
(Tables 3.9a). 
 
By contrast, all other job categories grew substantially more between 1980 and 2010 (Tables 
3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8). The most growth occurred among the high-skill, high-pay jobs of 
managers, professionals, associate professionals and technicians. Between 1980 and 2010, the 
numbers of managers increased by 302,847 or 313 per cent, professionals by 157,536 or 106 
per cent, and associate professionals by 300,423 or 254 per cent (Table 3.9a). Taken together 
as a group, this represents the creation of 760,806 jobs and employment growth of 209 per 
cent between 1980 and 2010 (Table 3.9b). Significant growth of 172,296 jobs (50 per cent) 
and 309,063 jobs (132 per cent) also occurred amongst clerks and service and sales workers 
respectively between 1980 and 2010 (Table 3.9a). Together, these semi-skilled, white-collar 
jobs increased by 481,359 or 83 per cent (Table 3.9a). Unskilled/Elementary work also grew 
by 303,364 jobs between 1980 and 2010 – an increase of only 57 per cent (Table 3.9b). 
 
                                                 
14The craft and related trade workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers are combined here, as 
they are both semi-skilled, blue-collar jobs in which there is substantial overlap in required skills and 
remuneration.   
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On the face of it, these figures could be interpreted as evidence for increased polarisation. 
The numbers of both high-skill, high-pay jobs (managers, professionals, associate 
professionals and technicians) and low-skill, low-pay jobs (unskilled/elementary workers) 
increased, while the numbers of typical manufacturing semi-skilled, blue-collar jobs at first 
declined and then recovered to match their original peak in 1980. But there are several 
arguments why this would be an erroneous interpretation of the data. 
 
First, following the methodology of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009), clerks and service 
and sales workers arguably should be viewed as middle-income, white-collar semi-skilled 
jobs. In this case, the growth of these middle-income service sector jobs (481,359 between 
1980 and 2010, Table 3.9a) more than outweighs the lack of growth in the middle-income 
manufacturing jobs of craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operators and 
assemblers (a loss of 117,558 jobs in the same period, Table 3.9a). In other words, the 
increase in the numbers of clerks and service and sales workers did not contribute to the 
decline of middle-income jobs – middle-income work in fact grew by 363,801 jobs between 
1980 and 2010 (Table 3.9b). Therefore, the growth of clerks and service and sales workers 
did not contribute towards social polarisation.   
 
Also of importance is that while there was an absolute increase in the numbers of high-skill, 
high-pay and low-skill, low-pay jobs, the increase in the numbers of managers, professionals 
and associate professionals was far greater than that in unskilled workers. The numbers of 
managers, professionals, associate professionals and technicians increased by 760,807 
between 1980 and 2010, versus an increase of only 303,364 amongst unskilled workers 
(Table 3.9b). Therefore, the number of high-skill, high-pay jobs increased by more than two 
and a half times the number of unskilled jobs (Table 3.9b and Figure 3.3). Thus, what appears 
superficially to be a polarising tendency is more a skewing of the occupational structure 
towards professionalisation of the employed workforce. Moreover, middle-income jobs also 
increased more than unskilled work: an absolute increase of 363,801 versus 303,364 
respectively (Table 3.9b). Figure 3.3 gives a visual representation of the distribution of 
employment per occupational category in 1980 and 2010, as well as the absolute difference 
between the two years. In this figure it is clear how much greater the increase in high-skill 
workers is versus that of unskilled workers. 
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                     Table 3.5.Occupational distribution of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1970-2001 (frequency distribution) 
 
Occupation Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 1991 Census 1996  Census 2001 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 52,646 96,692 152,425 126,749         208,705 
Professionals 85,785 148,905 225,689 247,553         275,180 
Technicians and associate professionals 62,464 118,393 52,264 190,111         282,750 
Clerks 230,322 344,698 432,512 241,379         380,346 
Service, shop and market sales workers 140,628 233,622 585,975 245,021         333,809 
Craft and related trades workers 240,277 510,950 295,816 390,415         361,403 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 330,815 325,037 382,364 219,193         236,565 
Elementary occupations 599,409 528,748 573,953 467,392         597,891 
Undetermined and Skilled Agriculture 77,547 135,149 157,585 292,319         241,693 
Total 1,819,893 2,442,194 2,858,583 2,420,132      2,918,341 
                          Source: South African Population Censuses 
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Table 3.6.Occupational distribution of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 (frequency distribution) 
 
Occupation LFS 2001 LFS 2002 LFS 2003 LFS 2004 LFS 2005 LFS 2006 LFS 2007 LFS 2008 LFS 2009 LFS 2010 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 239,030 298,633 329,630 321,629 316,296 330,309 440,371 445,369 385,859 399,539 
Professionals 162,235 183,493 207,580 141,839 213,736 186,180 445,229 310,447 295,905 306,441 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 342,582 374,252 374,912 321,908 362,092 341,862 455,560 484,969 474,249 418,816 
Clerks 369,149 417,445 411,002 404,804 415,512 422,565 431,410 536,840 502,345 516,994 
Service, shop and market sales 
workers 424,800 370,849 373,139 420,367 462,958 528,559 458,052 500,799 527,369 542,685 
Craft and related trades workers 386,672 372,363 365,610 416,501 518,394 569,351 543,431 550,526 434,522 429,387 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 255,624 284,328 290,546 328,941 315,662 320,440 371,869 358,112 320,451 289,042 
Elementary occupations 613,741 566,751 661,832 731,995 876,155 929,145 898,802 907,410 800,974 832,112 
Undetermined and Skilled 
Agriculture 77,477 64,267 14,622 15,448 22,299 19,650 56,237 12,581 16,287 15,106 
Total 2,871,309 2,932,381 3,028,873 3,103,431 3,503,103 3,648,061 4,100,962 4,107,052 3,757,961 3,750,122 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 
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                     Table 3.7. Occupational distribution of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1970-2001 (percentage distribution) 
 
Occupation Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 1991 Census 1996  Census 2001 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 3 4 5 5     7 
Professionals 5 6 8 10      9 
Technicians and associate professionals 3 5 2 8    10 
Clerks 13 14 15 10    13 
Service, shop and market sales workers 8 10 20 10    11 
Craft and related trades workers 13 21 10 16    12 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 18 13 13 9      8 
Elementary occupations 33 22 20 19    20 
Undetermined and Skilled Agriculture 4 6 6 12      8 
Total 100 100 100 100  100 
                          Source: South African Population Censuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8. Occupational distribution of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 (percentage distribution) 
 
Occupation LFS 2001 LFS 2002 LFS 2003 LFS 2004 LFS 2005 LFS 2006 LFS 2007 LFS 2008 LFS 2009 LFS 2010 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 8 10 11 10 9 9 11 11 10    11 
Professionals 6 6 7 5 6 5 11 8 8     8 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 12 13 12 10 10 9 11 12 13    11 
Clerks 13 14 14 13 12 12 11 13 13    14 
Service, shop and market sales 
workers 15 13 12 14 13 14 11 12 14    14 
Craft and related trades workers 13 13 12 13 15 16 13 13 12    11 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 9 10 10 11 9 9 9 9 9     8 
Elementary occupations 21 19 22 24 25 25 22 22 21    22 
Undetermined and Skilled 
Agriculture 3 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0      0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   100 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 
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                               Table 3.9a. Changes in the occupational distribution of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1980-2010  
                              (frequency distribution) 
 
Occupation 1980 2010 Absolute Change 1980-2010 
Percentage change  
     1980-2010 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 96,692 399,539 302,847 313 
Professionals 148,905 306,441 157,536 106 
Technicians and associate professionals 118,393 418,816 300,423 254 
Clerks 344,698 516,994 172,296 50 
Service, shop and market sales workers 233,622 542,685 309,063 132 
(all semi-skilled, white collar workers 578,320 1,059,679 481,359          83) 
Craft and related trades workers 510,950 429,387 -81,563 -16 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 325,037 289,042 -35,995 -11 
(all semi-skilled, blue-collar workers 835,987 718,429 -117,558 -14) 
Elementary [unskilled] occupations 528,748 832,112 303,364 57 
Undetermined and Skilled Agriculture 135,149 15,106 -120,043 -89 
Total 2,442,194 3,750,122 1,307,928 54 
                                       Sources: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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Table 3.9b. Aggregate changes in the occupational distribution of the 
 
Occupation   
Occupational 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 
 
 
highProfessionals 
Technicians and associate professionals 
Clerks 
 
 Semi
Middle
Service, shop and market sales workers 
Craft and related trades workers 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
 
Elementary [unskilled] occupations 
 Low
Undetermined and Skilled Agriculture 
 
Total   
Sources: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1980-
category 
1980 2010 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
High-skill, 
-income 
  
 
  
363,990 15 1,124,797 30
 
 
 
-skilled, 
-income 
 
 
 
   1,414,307 58 1,778,108 47
 
 
 
Low-skill, 
-income 528,748 22 832,112 22
 
135,149  15,106 
     2,442,194  3,750,122 
 2010 
89 
2010 (frequency distribution) 
Absolute 
Change 
1980-2010 
Percentage 
change     
1980-2010 
 
 
  
 760,807 209 
 
  
 
  
 363,801  26 
 
  
 303,364 57 
 
-120,043  -89 
 1,307,928       54 
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Fig 3.3. Employment by occupational categories in 1980 and 2010 and the change over this period, Johannesburg region 
 
                                  Sources: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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Fig 3.4. Changes in employment per occupational category, Johannesburg region, 1970-2010 
 
Source: South African Population Censuses and Labour Force Surveys (note:from left to right, first 2001 is the Census, second 2001 is the LFS) 
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These absolute changes in the occupational structure of the employed workforce of the 
Johannesburg region indicating a tendency towards increasing professionalisation are also 
reflected in relative terms. The percentage of the employed workforce in 
elementary/unskilled occupations reached a maximum of 25 per cent in 2005 and 2006 (Table 
3.8).15 For most of the period between 1980 and 2010 though, the percentage employed in 
unskilled work was between 19 per cent and 22 per cent (Table 3.9b). The trend line (solid 
line) in Figure 3.4 shows very little change in the percentage of jobs accounted for by 
unskilled work in this period. Therefore, the percentage of the workforce employed in low-
skill, low-pay jobs in the Johannesburg region has remained reasonably constant over time. In 
contrast, the percentage of high-skill, high-pay workers (managers, professionals, associate 
professionals and technicians) doubled from 15 per cent in 1980 to 30 per cent in 2010 
(Tables 3.7 and 3.8), and the trend line (dotted line) in Figure 3.4 shows a clear increase over 
time in the percentage of jobs accounted for by high-skill work. So, while the percentage of 
low-skill, low-pay workers remained constant, and was, in fact, no higher in 2010 than in 
1980 in the Johannesburg region, the percentage of high-skill, high-pay workers doubled in 
the same period. Unskilled employment exceeded high-skill employment in 1980 in both 
absolute and relative terms: 22 per cent of all employment versus 15 per cent respectively and 
528,748 versus 363,990 jobs respectively (Table 3.9b). However, these positions reversed 
over time, and by 1996, high-skilled employment had already overtaken unskilled 
employment (564,413 jobs versus 467,392). This trend continued through 2010, with high-
skill work constituting 30 per cent of all employment versus 22 per cent for low-skill work 
(760,087 versus 303,364 jobs respectively, Table 3.9b). Thus, the occupational structure 
became more professionalised. 
 
This chapter started with evidence of the change in the sectoral distribution of work in the 
Johannesburg region between 1970 and 2010, the decline in manufacturing employment and 
concomitant growth of service sector work. In accordance with the social polarisation 
hypothesis, due to the predominance of semi-skilled, manual, blue-collar middle-income jobs 
in the manufacturing sector versus the much greater share of high- and low-skill in the 
service sector in comparison, this change should lead to increased social polarisation, with 
many more high-skill and low-skill jobs than middle-income jobs. However, the results of the 
                                                 
15As the South African Population Census 1970 only sampled 5 per cent of the African population and no 
weights were calculated for this sample, the 32 per cent employment in elementary/unskilled occupations is 
most likely an overestimate as a result of this sampling without a correct weight. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
93 
 
analysis of occupational change over the same period do not support this. Why is this the 
case? 
 
Arguably, one of the main flaws in the polarisation hypothesis is the assumption about the 
nature of the “typical” job in the manufacturing and service sectors. Manufacturing jobs are 
assumed to be middle-income, blue-collar, semi-skilled manual jobs in the main while the 
service sector consists of predominantly either high-skill, high-pay, or low-skill, low pay 
jobs. However, the evidence does not support this interpretation. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show 
the distribution of occupations across the four main sectors of employment for 1980 and 
2010: manufacturing, and the three service sectors of wholesale and retail trade, FIRE and 
business services and community, social and personal services. Historically, the 
manufacturing sector did have a greater share of semi-skilled middle-income jobs (both 
white-collar – clerks and service and sales workers - and blue-collar – craft and related trades 
workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers) than each of the service sectors. In 
1980, semi-skilled, white- and blue-collar jobs combined accounted for 449,485 jobs out of a 
total of 619,680 or 73 per cent of manufacturing employment (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). Not far 
behind this though was the wholesale and retail trade sector, with 237,489 out of a total 
345,023 jobs (69 per cent) in semi-skilled, white- and blue-collar work. Even 82,294 of the 
140,805 jobs, or 58 per cent, in the FIRE and business services sector in 1980 were semi-
skilled, white- and blue-collar positions (Tables 3.10 and 3.11). However, by 2010, the share 
of semi-skilled, white- and blue-collar work in manufacturing employment had decreased by 
15 percentage points to 58 per cent – on a par with that of the wholesale and retail trade 
sector (59 per cent); and 45 per cent of jobs in the FIRE and business services sector were 
still semi-skilled (Table 3.11). Thus, while the manufacturing sector still consisted of mostly 
middle-income jobs by 2010, this was only by a slender majority and on a par with the 
wholesale and retail trade sector, one of the biggest employers. Therefore, all major 
employment sectors, including manufacturing and service sectors, have experienced a relative 
loss of semi-skilled, white- and blue-collar, middle-income work over time.  
 
However, while the manufacturing sector and all the service sub-sectors other than the 
community, social and personal services sector showed a relative loss in semi-skilled work 
between 1980 and 2010, there were considerable gains made in absolute terms in the numbers 
of semi-skilled, white- and blue-collar jobs in most of these sectors (Table 3.10). In the 
manufacturing sector, the total number of semi-skilled jobs declined between 1980 and 2010 
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by 107,884 (Table 3.12). In contrast, the total numbers of semi-skilled workers in each of the 
service sectors increased in this time, the vast majority in the white-collar, semi-skilled 
clerical and service and sales jobs. The wholesale and retail trade sector gained 249,673 semi-
skilled jobs in total, the FIRE and business service sector 235,260 jobs and the community, 
social and personal services sector 100,601 of these jobs (Table 3.12). With such large 
absolute increases, how is it there was a substantial relative decline in semi-skilled, white- 
and blue-collar work in the FIRE and business services and wholesale and retail trade sectors, 
and a negligible 1 per cent gain in the community, social and personal services sector?  
 
The answer lies in what happened to the numbers of high-skill, high-pay jobs. Over this same 
period of time, most of these sectors experienced large increases in the numbers of high-skill 
managerial, professional, associate professional and technical positions. In comparison to the 
substantial gains made in semi-skilled employment, the number of high-skill, high-pay jobs 
in the FIRE and business services sector increased by even more – 247,897 (Table 3.12). Due 
to the large proportion of the FIRE and business services sector composed of high-skill jobs 
in 1980 already, the addition of this large a number of jobs between 1980 and 2010 meant 
that the growth in semi-skilled work in this sector was overshadowed by the total number of 
high-skill occupations. Therefore, high-skill work increased from the already considerable 33 
per cent of all FIRE and business services employment in 1980 to an even more substantial 
42 per cent in 2010 (Table 3.11). Thus, the FIRE and business services sector went from an 
already highly professionalised sector in 1980 to one consisting of an even greater proportion 
of managerial, professional, associate professional and technical jobs in 2010, due to massive 
growth in the numbers of these jobs. The increase in number of high-skill, high-pay jobs in 
the community, social and personal services sector was more than twice the increase in semi-
skilled jobs in this sector (224,117 versus 100,601 respectively, Table 3.12). Again, the 
already substantial base of high-skill jobs in 1980 and the exceptional growth in these jobs 
between 1980 and 2010 led to the less substantial growth in semi-skilled jobs in this sector 
being overshadowed (and appearing as less, in relative terms, in 2010 in comparison to 
1980). Thus, while high-skill jobs accounted for only a fifth (21 per cent) of all work in the 
community, social and personal services sector in 1980, by 2010, high-skill jobs represented 
over a third (36 per cent) of community, social and personal services sector work (Table 
3.11). 
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In the case of the wholesale and retail trade sector, the relative decline in the numbers of 
semi-skilled, white- and blue-collar jobs is a result of increases in both the high-skill, high-
pay professions (100,056), as well as unskilled jobs (139,366, Table 3.12). Due to the 
massive gains in total number of semi-skilled jobs (249,673, Table 3.12) relative to those in 
high-skill and low-skill work, the wholesale and retail trade sector did not lose as big a 
percentage of semi-skilled jobs in comparison to the drop in the manufacturing sector. 
However, due to the gains in both high and low-skill jobs in this sector, one could argue that 
it became more polarised between 1980 and 2010, but with greater relative and absolute 
growth in the low-skill jobs than in the high-skill jobs. 
 
As has been discussed already, all of the main sectors had large gains in high-skill 
occupations. However, in all except the wholesale and retail trade sector, these gains in high-
skill, high-pay occupations were much larger than the increases in low-skill jobs (Table 3.12). 
Ironically, it is the manufacturing sector that showed the greatest percentage increase in high-
skill work. Although high-skill jobs accounted for only 12 per cent of manufacturing 
employment in 1980, by 2010, this had more than doubled to 27 per cent (Table 3.11) – that 
is, a gain of 85,294 jobs, in comparison to a gain of only 17,956 low-skill jobs (Table 3.12). 
Unskilled work in the manufacturing sector increased by only 4 percentage points, from 11 
percent in 1980 to 15 per cent in 2010 (Table 3.11). Unskilled work in the FIRE and business 
services sector increased from 7 per cent in 1980 to 13 per cent in 2010 (Table 3.11), 
representing 84,867 jobs, in comparison to the nearly 250,000 high-skill jobs gained in this 
sector during this period (Table 3.12). Low-skill jobs in the community, social and personal 
services sector increased by a comparable 79,179 positions (Table 3.12). Again though, high-
skill work in this sector increased by almost 225,000 jobs (Table 3.12). Therefore, while there 
was a relative increase in the percentage of high-skill workers of 15 percentage points 
between 1980 and 2010, there was a relative decline in unskilled workers, from 46 per cent to 
37 per cent of jobs in the community, social and personal services in this period (Table 3.11). 
Therefore, not only most of the major service sectors, but the manufacturing sector too, have 
become more professionalised, and not more polarised, over time (see Figures 3.5 to 3.8 for a 
visual representation of the absolute changes in employment in each of the main sectors 
discussed). 
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      Table 3.10. Occupational category by main sector, Johannesburg region, 1980 and 2010 (frequency distribution) 
 
Occupational category 1980 2010 
 Manufacturing FIRE 
and 
business 
services 
Community 
Social and 
Personal 
Services 
Wholesale 
and  
Retail Trade 
Manufacturing FIRE 
and 
business 
services 
Community 
Social and 
Personal 
Services 
Wholesale 
and 
 Retail Trade 
High-skill 76,976 46,929 135,630 46,035 162,270 294,826 359747 146,091 
Semi-skilled, white-collar 98,729 76,931 138,476 172,038 77,885 289,477 253568 367,275 
Semi-skilled, blue-collar 350,756 5,363 29,901 65,451 263,716 28,077 15410 119,887 
(all semi-skilled jobs 449,485 82,294 168,377 237,489 341,601 317,554 268,978 487,162) 
Low-skill 69,841 9,924 299,896 54,488 87,797 94,791 379075 193,854 
Undetermined and Skilled 
Agriculture 23,378 1,658 47,453 7,011 723 0 4,716 0 
Total 619,680 140,805 651,356 345,023 592,391 707,171 1,012,516 827,107 
       Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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      Table 3.11. Occupational category by main sector, Johannesburg region, 1980 and 2010 (percentage distribution) 
 
Occupational category 1980 2010 
 Manufacturing FIRE 
and 
business 
services 
Community 
Social and 
Personal 
Services 
Wholesale 
and 
 Retail Trade 
Manufacturing FIRE  
and 
business 
services 
Community 
Social and 
Personal 
Services 
Wholesale 
and 
 Retail Trade 
High-skill 12 33 21 13 27 42 36       18 
Semi-skilled, white-collar 16 55 21 50 13 41 25        44 
Semi-skilled, blue-collar 57 4 5 19 45 4 2        14 
(all semi-skilled jobs 73 58 26 69 58 45 27       59) 
Low-skill 11 7 46 16 15 13 37        23 
Undetermined and Skilled 
Agriculture 4 1 7 2 0 0 0         0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100     100 
        Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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                                       Table 3.12. Changes in Occupational distribution by main sector, Johannesburg region, 1980 to 2010 
                                       (absolute difference) 
 
Occupational category Absolute difference between 1980 and 2010* 
 Manufacturing FIRE  
and business 
services 
Community Social 
and Personal 
Services 
Wholesale  
and 
 Retail Trade 
High-skill 85,294 247,897 224,117         100,056 
Semi-skilled, white-collar -20,844 212,546 115,092         195,237 
Semi-skilled, blue-collar -87,040 22,714 -14,491           54,436 
(all semi-skilled jobs -107,884 235,260 100,601           249,673 ) 
Low-skill 17,956 84,867 79,179         139,366 
Undetermined and Skilled 
Agriculture -22,655 -1,658 -42,737           -7,011 
Total -27,289 566,366 361,160         482,084 
                                               Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
                                              *For a visual representation of these absolute differences by main employment sector, see Figures 3.5 to 3.8 
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Fig 3.5. Manufacturing sector employment by occupational categories in 1980 and 2010 and the change over this period, Johannesburg region 
 
            Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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Fig 3.6. FIRE and Business services sector employment by occupational categories in 1980 and 2010 and the change over this period, Johannesburg region 
 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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Fig 3.7. Community, Social and Personal services sector employment by occupational categories in 1980 and 2010 and the change over this period, 
Johannesburg region 
 
 Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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Fig 3.8. Wholesale and Retail Trade services sector employment by occupational categories in 1980 and 2010 and the change over this period, Johannesburg 
region 
 
 Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Labour Force Survey 2010 
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Despite the fact that the sectoral distribution of employment changed as predicted by the 
polarisation hypothesis, the occupational distribution of employment did not. Even though 
employment shifted from the manufacturing to the service sector, the occupational 
distribution did not tend towards polarisation, but professionalisation. Part of the reason for 
this is that the service sector, especially the producer services of FIRE and business services, 
are generally not as polarised as polarisation theorists portray them to be, as shown above. 
They do not consist only of high- or low-skill occupations, but a substantial percentage of 
semi-skilled, middle-income jobs. Furthermore, all sectors, manufacturing included, became 
more professionalised between 1980 and 2010. Thus, while all major employment sectors 
showed absolute increases in middle-income and low-skill work, these changes were 
overshadowed by the gains in managerial, professional, associate professional and technical 
positions, leading to increasing professionalisation. 
 
 
Shift-share analysis of occupational change between 1980 and 2010 
 
Shift-share analysis: 1980 to 2001 
 
Further evidence of why the decline of employment in the manufacturing sector and the 
growth of employment in the service sector have not led to increased polarisation can be 
found in the application of the shift-share method to occupational and sectoral change in the 
Johannesburg region between1980 and 2010. Briefly, the shift-share method measures how 
much of the change in the overall occupational structure of the workforce over time is due to 
changes in the relative sizes of the industries (industry shift effect), changes in the 
occupational distribution across the industries (occupation shift effect), and the joint effect of 
industrial and occupational change (interaction shift effect).16 The net shift is calculated for 
an occupation, yielding the growth/decline in employment in that occupation independent of 
total employment growth. A positive net shift is obtained when the occupation grew relatively 
more than expected and increased its share of total employment, and a negative one when the 
occupation grew relatively less than expected and its share of total employment decreased 
between two points in time. This net shift in an occupation is then decomposed into the three 
components of industry, occupation and interaction shift effects. These three components can 
                                                 
16
 See chapter 2 for a full explanation of the shift-share method. 
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also be presented as percentages of the net change, where all three shift effects combined, be 
they positive or negative, add up to 100 per cent. In addition to the directions of the net shifts, 
it is also worth noting the relative sizes of these shifts. The relative net shift gives the net shift 
as a percentage of the total in the starting year in the shift-share analysis. Thus, the net shift 
of 93,160 managers between 1980 and 2001 represents a relative net shift of 96 per cent on 
the total number of managers in 1980 (96,692). 
 
If, as is asserted in the polarisation theory, the change from the manufacturing industry as the 
main employer to the majority of employment being provided by the service sector is the 
main cause for an increase in low-skill and high-skill occupations, then the industry shift 
effect would be greater than the occupation shift and interaction shift effects for all 
occupations. The high-skill occupations of managers, professionals, associate professionals 
and technicians, as well as the low-skill occupations, would show positive net shifts, while 
crafts and related trades workers, and machine operators and assemblers (typical blue-collar, 
semi-skilled manufacturing type jobs) would have negative net shifts, with the majority of 
these changes being attributable to the industry shift effect.  However, the results of the shift-
share analysis, calculated for the period during which manufacturing employment declined 
(1980 to 2001) and the period during which it grew again (2001 to 2010), do not show this. 
Instead, generally the high-skill occupations showed positive net shifts, but mostly due to the 
occupation shift effect, and not the industry shift effect. Thus, the main driver of the 
increasing share of high-skill occupations was the occupation shift effect: all industries 
gained a greater proportion of high-skill workers, not service industries alone. At the other 
end of the occupational spectrum, the low-skill occupations actually lost share in the period 
1980 to 2001, and showed only a relatively small positive net shift between 2001 and 2010. 
Craft and related trades workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers displayed 
considerable negative net shifts, and, therefore, a decreased share in the overall occupational 
structure - even between 2001 and 2010, when manufacturing employment was growing. 
However, this was not due solely to the industry shift effect (the decline of manufacturing 
employment) but also the occupation shift effect (a declining share of craft and related trades 
workers and plant and machine operators and assemblers within each industry). Thus, the 
results of this shift-share analysis show why deindustrialisation did not result in social 
polarisation. The results support the argument that the occupational distribution of the 
Johannesburg region is becoming more professionalised across all sectors, from 
manufacturing to the service sub-sectors and that the share of low-skill work is growing much 
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less than that of high-skill work, and then also not exclusively due to the shift to services as 
the main employer, but, again, also across all sectors. 
 
The high-skill occupations increased their share of the overall occupational structure of the 
employed workforce of the Johannesburg region between 1980 and 2001, but due mainly to 
the occupation shift effect, not the industry shift effect. The substantial positive net shifts 
aside, the relative net shifts are arguably even more impressive, at 96 per cent, 65 per cent 
and 119 per cent for managers, professional and associate professionals and technicians 
respectively (Table 3.13). However, counter to the prediction of the polarisation hypothesis, 
this was not due mainly to the industry shift effect, but the occupation shift effect. The 
growth of industries that favour the employment of high-skill workers had a relatively small 
impact on the increasing share of high-skill occupations, as the industry shift effect for 
managers, professionals, associate professionals and technicians was only 15 per cent, 28 per 
cent and 15 per cent, respectively. (Table 3.13) Rather, all industries employed growing 
numbers of high-skill workers; hence, the occupation shift effect accounting for 74 per cent 
to 89 per cent of the positive net shift in the numbers of managers, professionals, associate 
professionals and technicians (Table 3.13). Thus, it would appear that the increase in high-
skill workers between 1980 and 2001, and therefore the trend of increasing 
professionalisation, was due mainly to increasing employment of high-skill workers across all 
industries. This result is counter to that posited by the polarisation hypothesis, namely 
increasing numbers of high-skill workers due to the shift from manufacturing to services as 
the main employer.  
 
Low-skill occupations lost share in the overall occupational structure of the Johannesburg 
region in this time, evidenced in its negative net shift (Table 3.13). However, consistent with 
the polarisation hypothesis is the fact that the industry shift effect acted counter to this 
negative net shift and loss of occupational share (-70 per cent, Table 3.13). Thus, the growth 
of industries that employ low-skill workers actually encouraged an increased share of low-
skill occupations.  However, the occupation shift and interaction shift effects far outweighed 
the industry shift effect (56 per cent and 115 per cent, respectively, Table 3.13) thereby 
leading overall to a decreasing share of low-skill employment between 1980 and 2001. Thus, 
in part, the general trend of a decreasing share of low-skill work across all sectors led to a 
lower share of low-skill work in the occupational distribution of the employed workforce of 
the Johannesburg region between 1980 and 2001. 
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As one would expect, given the massive decline in blue-collar, semi-skilled employment 
between 1980 and 2001, craft workers and machine operators and assemblers displayed 
considerable negative net shifts, and, therefore, a decreased share in the overall occupational 
structure. However, this was not due solely to declining manufacturing employment and 
growing service sector employment, as argued by polarisation theorists. The industry shift 
and occupation shift effects are quite similar: the industry shift effects for craft workers and 
machine operators and assemblers were 79 per cent and 63 per cent respectively, versus 
occupation shift effects of 53 and 37 per cent respectively (Table 3.13). Thus, the effect of 
the decline in the share of blue-collar work across all sectors was comparable to the effect of 
sector specific manufacturing employment losses. That is, the share of the occupational 
distribution of typical semi-skilled, blue-collar work declined not only because of the 
contraction of employment in the manufacturing sector itself, but because of a shrinking 
share of this kind of work in other sectors as well. 
 
Shift-share analysis: 2001 to 2010 
 
In the following period, 2001 to 2010, despite the growth of employment in the 
manufacturing industry from approximately 2001 onwards, there was a continuing, and 
arguably greater, decline in the share of blue-collar work in all industries. Relative net shifts 
amongst craft workers and machine operators and assemblers were -49 and -47 per cent in the 
period 1980 to 2001 (Table 3.14). In the following period, the relative net shifts were smaller, 
but still negative (-20 per cent and -18 per cent respectively). Thus, craft workers and 
machine operators and assemblers continued to display considerable negative net shifts, and, 
therefore, decreased shares in the overall occupational structure between 2001 and 2010. As 
was the case between 1980 and 2001 though, this does not appear to have been solely due to 
declining manufacturing employment and growing service sector employment, as argued by 
polarisation theorists, because the occupation shift effects were actually larger than the 
industry shift effects. Occupation shift effects for craft workers and machine operators and 
assemblers were 156 and 133 per cent respectively, versus the industry shift effects of 45 and 
46 per cent respectively (Table 3.14). Thus, consistent with trends discussed earlier, semi-
skilled, blue-collar work continued to lose share in the occupational distribution due mainly 
to relative losses in all sectors, and not only in specific sectors such as manufacturing. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Table 3.13. Decomposition of changes in the occupational structure of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 1980-2001 
 
 Components of Net Shift (absolute) Components of Net Shift (percentage)  
Occupation Net Shift Industry Shift 
Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Industry 
Shift Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Relative Net Shift 
Managers 93,160 14,318 82,882 -4,040 15 89 -4 96 
Professionals 97,244 27,499 71,896 -2,152 28 74 -2 65 
Technicians 141,273 21,860 123,554 -4,141 15 87 -3 119 
Clerks -31,556 115,474 -69,719 -77,311 -366 221 245 -9 
Sales workers 54,638 33,612 96 20,929 62 0 38 23 
Craft workers -249,165 -198,032 -132,863 81,729 79 53 -33 -49 
Operators -151,844 -96,342 -56,574 1,072 63 37 -1 -47 
Unskilled -33,945 23,911 -18,912 -38,944 -70 56 115 -6 
Skilled 
agricultural/Other 80,196 57,699 -361 22,858 72 0 29 59 
                   Source: South African Population Census 1980 and 2001 
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               Table 3.14. Decomposition of changes in the occupational structure of the employed workforce, Johannesburg region, 2001-2010 
 
 Components of Net Shift (absolute) Components of Net Shift (percentage)  
Occupation Net Shift Industry Shift 
Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Industry 
Shift Effect 
Occupation 
Shift Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Relative Net Shift 
Managers 87,352 -10,349 184,728 -87,027 -12 211 -100 37 
Professionals 94,551 165,547 67,870 -138,866 175 72 -147 58 
Technicians -28,618 -63,088 -69,333 103,802 220 242 -363 -8 
Clerks 34,861 63,465 181,969 -210,573 182 522 -604 9 
Sales workers -12,133 -68,628 -104,022 160,518 566 857 -1323 -3 
Craft workers -75,633 -33,766 -118,024 76,158 45 156 -101 -20 
Operators -44,822 -20,629 -59,750 35,556 46 133 -79 -18 
Unskilled 30,526 -58,461 -17,243 106,230 -192 -56 348 5 
Skilled 
agricultural/Other -86,085 25,908 -66,195 -45,799 -30 77 53 -111 
                  Source: Labour Force Survey 2001 and 2010 
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Between 2001 and 2010, as one would expect given the trend towards increasing 
professionalisation shown already in this chapter, most of the high-skill occupations 
continued to increase their share of the overall occupational structure of the employed 
workforce of the Johannesburg region, as evidenced in their substantial positive net shifts. 
The relative net shift for managers was 37 per cent and 58 per cent for professionals (Table 
3.14). Again, consistent with the professionalisation theory and counter to the prediction of 
the polarisation hypothesis, the increased share of managers was not due mainly to the 
industry shift effect, which was -12 per cent, but the occupation shift effect, which was a 
considerable 211 per cent (Table 3.14). Thus, as was also shown earlier in this chapter, most 
industries employed more managers between 2001 and 2010. In the case of the increasing 
share of professionals, the industry shift effect for this high-skill occupation group was 175 
per cent versus only 72 per cent for the occupation shift effect (Table 3.14). Thus, 
professionals increased their share of the overall occupational structure due more to the 
growth of industries that favoured the employment of professionals than to an overall 
increase in their numbers across all industries – a prediction consistent with the polarisation 
hypothesis. Contrary to both hypotheses though, the share of technicians declined in this 
period, evidenced in a negative net shift, a decline apparently almost evenly contributed to by 
both industry and occupation shift effects (220 per cent and 242 per cent respectively, Table 
3.14). However, the relative net shift is only -8 per cent, thus this was arguably not a strong 
tendency towards declining share of the occupational structure. 
 
While low-skill occupations did increase their share in the occupational structure of the 
Johannesburg region between  2001 and 2010, evidenced in a positive net shift, the relative 
net shift of only 5 per cent indicates that this was not a strong trend (Table 3.14). However, 
contrary to the predictions of the polarisation hypothesis is the fact that the industry shift 
effect acted counter to this positive net shift. The interaction shift effect far outweighed this 
counter industry shift effect though (348 versus -192 per cent respectively, Table 3.14), 
thereby leading to an increasing share of low-skill employment between 2001 and 2010. 
Thus, the joint effects of industrial and occupational change led to an increase in the relative 
numbers of low-skill workers.  
 
However, overall, the positive relative net shifts of the high-skill occupations are larger and 
more significant than those of low-skill jobs. Not only is this consistent with an increasingly 
professionalising workforce. More importantly, this was not exclusively due to the shift to 
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services as the main employer (industry shift effect), but also across all sectors in general 
(occupation shift effect). Between 1980 and 2001, the relative net shift amongst managers 
was 96 per cent, amongst professionals, 65 per cent, and 119 per cent for associate 
professionals and technicians (Table 3.13). In contrast, the relative net shift for unskilled/low-
skill workers was -6 per cent. Between 2001 and 2010, the relative net shift for managers and 
professionals was 37 per cent and 58 per cent respectively (Table 3.14). Technicians showed 
a negative relative net shift, but of only -8 per cent. In this period, low-skill work increased 
and there is a positive relative net shift, but it is only 5 per cent. Thus, the relative net shifts 
amongst high-skill workers were far more significant than those amongst low-skill workers. 
In addition, the results of these shift-share analyses support the findings shown earlier in this 
chapter that most of the increase in high-skill workers was due to increasing numbers of 
managers, professionals, associate professionals and technicians across all industries 
(occupation shift effect). This greater increase in high-skill work than low-skill work due to 
changes in the entire occupational structure, regardless of industry, is consistent with the 
professionalisation hypothesis. Contrary to the polarisation hypothesis, the numbers of high-
skill and low-skill jobs did not increase equally, and the occupational changes were not due 
mainly to increasing employment in the service sector (industry shift effect). 
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Chapter 4: The Role of Migrants in Social Polarisation 
 
 
A brief overview of migration in South Africa 
 
African migration 
 
During the height of Apartheid, many measures were implemented to limit the numbers of 
Africans in the cities (Hindson, 1987; Posel, 1991). These included influx control and 
relocation of people, in particular, returning them to the homelands which had been created to 
be their permanent places of residence (Lipton, 1989). Not only internal migrants were 
affected by this. African migrants from the rest of the continent were also barred from settling 
in South Africa permanently. Thus, Apartheid affected not only the patterns of internal 
migration in South Africa, but those across the whole of Southern Africa (Kok, Gelderblom 
and van Zyl, 2006a).  
 
In the early 1900’s, very few Africans lived in urban areas (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994). Prior 
to the 20th century, many Africans had been subsistence farmers (Portes, 1978). This self-
sufficient economy was destroyed by the establishment of protectorates and the imposition of 
hut taxes on African farmers. Thus, Africans were forced to enter the cash economy (Savage, 
1986). Some African farmers sold excess produce to generate income. However, dwindling 
opportunities to do so, land expropriations and discriminatory policies such as subsidies in 
favour of white farmers resulted in most Africans eventually having no alternative but to 
migrate to urban areas to find work (Lipton, 1989; Portes, 1978). Thus, while many Africans 
had lived on largely white-owned farms and in the Reserves (later “homelands”), the end of 
share-cropping and the labour-tenancy system on white farms, as well as increasing 
mechanisation of farming, instigated the migration of Africans from the farms to the cities 
(Kok, et al., 2006a).  
 
Very few work migrants could take their families to the cities (Lipton, 1989). Those African 
families who had been living on white-owned farms also had to migrate to a new place to 
live. Most moved to the reserves, which, during segregation and Apartheid were continually 
expanded to provide more land to accommodate the growing African population (Kok, et al., 
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2006a). Thus, African men would work in the cities, and remit their incomes to their families 
in the reserves where there was, on the whole, no work to supplement the meagre remittances 
from the breadwinners in town and transfer payments from the state. 
 
Many African men went to work in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand (Portes, 1978). The 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886 cemented the migrant labour system that had 
started on a much smaller scale on the diamond mines of Kimberley 16 years earlier 
(Trapido, 1971; Van der Horst, 1971). Thus, South Africa’s Apartheid-era labour 
requirements for the mines was in large part the motivation behind the creation of the 
reserves, both in South Africa, and in neighbouring African countries (Adepoju, 2006). 
Because such a large supply of cheap labour to extract low-grade gold ore in very deep mines 
was needed, employers started to recruit beyond South Africa’s borders as well (Breytenbach, 
1979). Outside of South Africa, employment agencies recruited unskilled labour from 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  
 
Failing economies in the reserves left many African men with few choices but to urbanise to 
work in the ever growing mining and manufacturing sectors (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). 
Thus, by the 1940’s, the scale of African urbanisation had resulted in a housing shortage in 
Johannesburg (Crankshaw and Parnell, 2004). In response, the government provided a large 
amount of low-cost housing during the 1950’s and 1960’s for Africans (Lipton, 1989). 
Throughout this, the government continued with forced removals and other forms of control 
over African urbanisation. Even with these controls in place, the government granted 
permanent urban status to a substantial number of African families (Hindson, 1985). As a 
result, by 1960, 31 per cent of the African population of South Africa had urbanised (Wentzel 
and Tlabela, 2006). 
 
All workers, whether native or foreign born, were allowed to stay in the urban areas for a 
specified period of time only, while strict influx control laws prohibited their families from 
relocating to the cities (Lipton, 1989). In addition, it became compulsory for migrant workers 
to return to their place of origin a minimum of once a year (Platzky and Walker, 1985). Thus, 
circular or oscillatory migration was systematically engineered by law. Once their contract 
was up, workers had to return to their families in the reserves, thereby greatly reducing the 
financial burden on the South African government and employers with regard to the welfare 
and other costs of maintaining a workforce (Malan, 1985; Portes, 1978;). Thus, for migrant 
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workers, there was continuous movement between their families in the rural areas of the 
Bantustans and the (usually) all-male mining barracks of the urban areas (Trapido, 1971). 
  
During the 1970’s, mechanisation programmes, rationalisation policies and a general decline 
in the growth of labour demand resulted in increasing levels of unemployment in South 
Africa (Adepoju, 2006; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). This prompted the government to 
institute laws forcing the mines to give South African Africans preference of employment 
over foreign Africans (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). By 1986, influx control had been 
abolished and Africans were allowed to settle in the cities (Posel, 2009). However, foreign 
Africans still did not have the benefit of residential rights in South Africa, and many South 
African workers preferred to leave their families in the homelands. More current research 
indicates that Africans still choose to leave their households and migrate temporarily for 
purposes of work (Mabin, 1990). Thus, the migrant labour system has persisted.  
 
In South Africa today, other than contract mine migration, documented circular migrants and 
undocumented migrants, international African migrants include skilled immigrants, 
consisting of highly-skilled, professional, semi-professional, managerial and technical 
workers (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). Under Apartheid, the only African people allowed into 
South Africa were temporary farm and mine labourers, and professionals who settled in the 
homelands (Kok, et al., 2006a). Since the late 1980’s, many more African professionals from 
the rest of Africa have been attracted to South Africa; so much so, that some now talk of a 
“brain drain” from the rest of Africa to South Africa (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). However, 
arguably a substantial brain drain from the rest of the continent has been stanched by the 
arduous process immigrants now face to secure work permits or permanent residency visas in 
South Africa (Crush, 1999). 
 
A relatively newer trend throughout Africa is the migration of women (Adepoju, 2006). As 
their husbands lose their jobs, incomes become more irregular, and rural living and working 
conditions worsen, women are migrating to urban areas in ever increasing numbers. Cities 
offer education, training and employment options for women they often cannot access from 
the rural areas. With the expansion of employment opportunities in cities, the prospects of 
educated women in particular have improved (Adepoju, 2006). In South Africa specifically, 
pre-1920, African women migrated to the cities predominantly following their husbands 
(Anderson, 2006). However, later, growing numbers of women migrated for economic 
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reasons. Ironically, even though they were not the targets for recruitment, the economic 
depression in the homelands in South Africa drove many African women to become domestic 
workers in white households (Anderson, 2006). These migrant African women as a group 
also became more diverse, not confined to married women, but including the divorced, 
widowed, childless and single (Cockerton, 1997). 
 
Other migrants 
 
Problems in the agricultural sector such as deficient farming techniques, depression and 
drought in the late 1800’s led many Afrikaners to abandon farming and move to the towns 
(Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). Thus, by 1936, approximately half of all Afrikaners were 
urbanised (Giliomee, 2003). However, many of them were poor; a problem the government 
addressed via the civilised labour policy by making them state employees. Other solutions to 
the “poor white” problem were public works programmes and job reservation. Parastatals 
were also forced to institute the civilised labour policy and eventually the private sector came 
under pressure to do the same. These actions remedied unemployment amongst Afrikaners 
and facilitated their urbanisation (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994; Giliomee, 2003). 
 
In terms of white international migration, different strategies have been adopted at different 
times throughout South African history. In 1948, the National Party controlled government 
discouraged the immigration of white Europeans in order to consolidate white Afrikaner 
power (Anderson, 2006). However, by 1960, concerned about the shrinking proportion of the 
population that was white, the government began actively encouraging white immigration by 
means of subsidies and recruitment (Brown, 1987). 
 
Revisiting the views on migrants and their role in increasing social polarisation 
 
Most authors agree that global cities are points of concentration for the producer services 
vital to managing global financial systems and the high-skill, high-pay workers that perform 
these tasks. If this was the only phenomenon in question though, there would likely be an 
indisputable trend towards professionalisation and no debate about increasing polarisation. 
Many authors argue that world cities also attract large numbers of poorly-educated, unskilled 
rural immigrants to service these strategic sectors in ever-increasing numbers of low-skill, 
low-wage service jobs. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
115 
 
 
Some scholars argue that immigration to world cities is inextricably linked to the growth of 
the service sector, with its preponderance of high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, low-pay jobs. 
They assert that the high levels of migration to the US, both in the past and at present, can be 
explained only by the increased supply of low-wage jobs generated by major growth sectors 
such as personal services. Thus, arguably, many polarisation theorists view immigrants as 
part of the cause of social polarisation in that they provide the unskilled labour necessary to 
fill the growing numbers of low-skill, low-pay service sector jobs. These scholars maintain 
that immigrants are greatly over-represented amongst low-skill, low-pay workers. Much of 
this demand is argued to be from high-pay professionals with disposable income but no time 
to maintain their households. Thus, it is argued, they employ low-skilled immigrants, 
especially women, who are paid very low wages to clean their houses, care for their children 
and complete other domestic tasks (Baum, 1997; Chiu and Lui, 2004; Esping-Anderson, et 
al., 1993; Gordon and Sassen, 1992; Gu and Liu, 2002; Sassen, 1991).   
 
In contrast to these views, other scholars contend that in most of Western Europe, the changes 
to the occupational structure point towards professionalisation, along with growing numbers 
of unemployed and economically inactive, rather than polarisation with a large, low-pay 
service class posited for the United States. Here the argument is two-fold, revolving around 
the nature, as well as the levels, of immigration. These scholars maintain that different 
immigrant communities, with their divergent histories and differing degrees of social capital, 
each has a different experience with regards to finding employment in world cities. Certain 
ethnic immigrant groups prosper in specific occupations, and some in others (Bailey and 
Waldinger, 1991; Cross and Waldinger, 1992; Hamnett, 2003). Thus, they argue there is no 
one standard employment trajectory for immigrants in world cities. The scale of immigration 
is also a point of contention.  Many argue that the great and ever growing numbers of 
unskilled immigrants with poor job prospects and limited access to welfare benefits provide a 
large pool of cheap labour in the US. However, they dispute that this is the case in other 
countries, especially in Europe. Therefore, the employment outcomes for immigrants may 
also depend on the scale of immigration to a particular world city (Cross and Waldinger, 
1992; Hamnett, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2003; Harloe and Fainstein, 1992). 
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The role of migrants in social polarisation: evaluating a sample of evidence 
 
Baum (1997) states that of the total resident labour force in Sydney in 1991, 30 per cent were 
born outside of Australia. Thus, he contends, the occupational distribution of this foreign-
born labour force has important implications for social polarisation. Baum (1997:1898) even 
talks of the “causal link between migration and social polarisation”, without defining this 
“causal link” though. However, he argues that recently-arrived migrants tend to be over-
represented in lower-skilled, lower-paid occupations. He states that despite the emphasis on 
skilled migration to Australia, migrants tend to “fill places at the bottom of the occupational 
ladder”, the “lower-paid entry-level jobs which have been rejected by the native-born 
population” (Baum 1997: 1898 and 1897). Baum (1997:1899) reiterates “the link between 
migration, social polarisation and the occupational structure”. Thus, arguably the implication 
here is that immigration contributes to polarisation by providing the workers for the 
increasing number of low-skill, low-wage service jobs, while natives fill the increasing 
number of high-skill, high-pay occupations. As evidence of this “causal link” between 
migration and the increasing social polarisation he maintains is occurring in Sydney, he offers 
the following data:  
 
1. The percentage of plant and machine operators and drivers, as well as labourers and 
related workers is higher amongst newly-arrived immigrants (those who arrived between 
1981 and 1991) than amongst those who were born in Australia (approximately 26 per 
cent versus 14 per cent) (Table 4.1).  
2. The percentage of managers, professionals and para-professionals is lower amongst 
recent migrants than natives (28 per cent versus 33 per cent).  
 
Thus, the implication is that while native Australians hold ever-increasing numbers of high-
skill, high-pay jobs (the managers, professionals and para-professionals), recent migrants are 
over-represented in the lower-skill, lower-paid jobs (the plant and machine operators and 
drivers and labourers and related workers), thereby leading to increasing social polarisation.  
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Table 4.1. Occupation by migrant status, Sydney, Australia (percentage distribution) 
 
Occupational group Australian-born Overseas-born 
arrived prior to 
1981 
Overseas-born 
arrived 1981-
1991 
Managers and administrators 11 12   9 
Professionals 15 13 13 
Para-professionals 7 6  6 
Trades persons 13 14 13 
Clerks 19 15 15 
Sales and personal services workers 15 12 12 
Plant and machine operators and 
drivers 5 8   9 
Labourers and related workers 9 14 17 
Inadequately described and not stated 5 7   8 
Total* 100 100 100 
Source: adapted from Baum (1997) 
*Pease note: original data presented to one decimal place, which have been rounded up here. 
 
However, plant and machine operators and drivers are arguably not low-skill, low-wage 
occupations, but rather, semi-skilled, medium-income ones. Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw 
(2009) argue that middle-income jobs have been misclassified as low-income jobs in much of 
the polarisation literature. Thus, they contend, the blue-collar, semi-skilled occupations such 
as the plant and machine operators and drivers Baum refers to should actually be classified as 
middle-income jobs. In fact, earlier in the same paper, Baum (1997) portrays the occupations 
of plant and machine operators and drivers this very way: as middle-income manufacturing 
jobs in decline due to deindustrialisation. This assessment is even supported by the income 
data he presents. He therefore contradicts himself when considering the impact of migration 
on the occupational structure of Sydney by referring to this occupational group as lower-
skilled and lower-paid. If these plant and machine operator and driver jobs are, arguably, 
correctly viewed as semi-skilled, middle-income jobs, then one reaches a different conclusion 
about the impact of immigration on polarisation in Sydney. Baum’s argument about 
increasing numbers of migrants being over-represented in jobs “at the bottom of the 
occupational ladder” only holds if these are low-skill, low-pay jobs. Therefore, if these jobs 
are semi-skilled and middle-income, increasing numbers of migrants working in them does 
not contribute to increasing social polarisation.  
 
Moreover, these are not the only semi-skilled, middle-income jobs misclassified as low-skill 
low-income occupations by Baum. Clerks and service and sales workers are also often  
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misclassified as low-skill, low-income jobs.17 In offering evidence for the increasing 
polarisation of occupations in Sydney, Baum (1997) makes the point that the only 
occupational groups to grow were the managers, professionals and para-professionals on one 
hand, and the sales and personal service workers on the other. He considers the service and 
sales workers to be low-skill, low-pay jobs, and their increasing numbers to intensify social 
polarisation. Yet, he ignores these occupations when discussing the role of immigrants in this 
supposed increasing polarisation in Sydney. Why would this be, if, as he claims, migrants are 
concentrated in low-skill, low-wage occupations? The reason for this may be that the data 
appear to contradict his argument. The group with the highest percentage of sales and 
personal service workers is neither older nor newer migrants (both 12 per cent), but those 
born in Australia (15 per cent) (Table 4.1). If these occupations are as Baum claims low-skill, 
low-pay, and “recently arrived migrants are over represented in lower-skilled, lower-paid 
occupations” (Baum, 1997:1897), one would expect sales and personal service work to form 
a much more substantial proportion of the migrant workforce’s occupational distribution. If, 
however, one views these as semi-skilled, medium-income jobs, then the similarity of the 
percentages of these jobs between natives and migrants again does not support the contention 
that migrants occupying mostly low-skill, low-wage jobs.  
 
The data in support of the argument for ethnic immigrant women being marginalised in 
domestic and personal service work in Sydney are also problematic. Baum (1997) asserts that 
there is evidence of a burgeoning household service economy in Australia, fuelled by the 
employment of poorly-paid, unskilled, foreign domestic servants, many of whom are women. 
On the evidence for Sydney, he states that 1991 census data indicate that 500 people were 
involved in domestic services work, 60 per cent of which were women. He argues that this is 
a significant increase since 1986. This would mean that 301 women were engaged in 
domestic work in 1991 out of an employed workforce of 2,896,400, or 0.01 per cent of the 
working population.18 Even if this figure is an underestimate, and there is a large 
underground personal services sector in Sydney, as Baum argues, how significant a factor can 
woman immigrant employment in domestic services really be in increasing social 
polarisation in Sydney? Baum (1997) also gives domestic and personal service worker figures 
for the whole of Australia for 1991. These figures show that 13,000 people were employed in  
domestic services in private homes, with a further 134,000 people in personal service 
occupations. It is suggested that a large proportion of these also consists of migrant women. 
Again, the significance of these numbers in comparison to the whole population is 
questionable, and 147,000 workers in total does not appear to be a large number in the 
context of the total employed workforce of Australia. Arguably then, this is not the best 
evidence for the claim that increasing immigration, especially of poor, unskilled women, has 
a significant impact on social polarisation. 
 
A more recent critique of Hamnett argues that while his assessment of immigration to Britain 
in the 1990’s may have been accurate, it is now out-of-date and no longer accurately reflects 
                                                 
17
 See discussion in chapter 2. 
18
 This total workforce calculated as the sum of each occupation group in 1991 (Table 2, pg 1886) as well as the 
“other” occupation group (Table 5, pg 1892) in Baum (1997). 
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the economic position of migrants. May, et al., (2007) contend that due to labour shortages, 
British migration laws were changed to allow greater numbers of not only highly skilled, but 
also unskilled workers into the country. They argue that due to a process of managed 
migration, where unskilled migrants are afforded only temporary admission rights to the 
country and no welfare benefits, the number of unskilled foreign-born workers in low-skill, 
low-wage jobs in London has increased.  Thus May, et al., (2007) contend that London is 
becoming increasingly polarised, with new migrants disproportionately represented amongst 
low-skill jobs, representing a new “reserve army of labour” (May, et al., 2007:162). 
 
Again though, the data in support of this argument are problematic. First, in terms of the 
growth of low-skill, low-wage jobs, the authors refer to a “small but significant rise in 
the proportion of low-paid jobs” (May, et al., 2007: 152). However, the graph they present 
shows only a 13 per cent to 14 per cent rise in jobs in the lowest income decile, versus 70 per 
cent and 84 per cent increases in the number of jobs in the top two income deciles 
respectively. Thus the increase in low-wage jobs hardly seems significant, and certainly not in 
comparison to the increases in high-skill, high-pay jobs. 
 
The greater problem perhaps is with the data used to draw the conclusion of a “new migrant 
division of labour” with “an extraordinary preponderance of migrants in parts of London’s 
low-paid economy” (May, et al., 2007: 155 and 158). The data are drawn form a survey of 
341 migrants working in four specific sectors in London known to employ high numbers of 
low-wage workers. Respondents were selected utilising the help of trade unions, through 
snowballing and some were “randomly” selected, that is, approached on the street outside 
their places of work (thus, not technically randomly sampled at all). Targeting certain sectors 
and using these methods of finding respondents, it is perhaps not surprising that the authors 
find such a disproportionate representation of foreign-born migrants in low-wage jobs in 
London. As May, et al., (2007: 158) state: “The relatively small number of people 
interviewed, the limited number of sectors investigated and mixed sampling frame mean that 
we cannot claim the data are representative of low-paid employment in London as a whole.” 
Given these constraints, arguably the authors cannot make quantitative claims about 
London’s workforce from these data. 
 
Earlier in the same paper, May, et al., (2007) give data from other studies that show that while 
foreign-born migrants form 35 per cent of London’s working-age population, they are 
employed in 46 per cent of London’s elementary occupations. While this does support the 
contention that migrants are over-represented in low-skill, low-wage work, approximately 11 
per cent is arguably not a large degree of over-representation, and certainly does not support 
the argument of the rise of a “new migrant division of labour” with migrants being confined 
to low-skill, low-wage service sector work. 
 
Dustmann, Fabri and Preston (2005) use occupational and educational data to argue that 
unlike the US with its large contingent of unskilled immigrants, migrants to Britain are more 
similar to native Britons in terms of educational and skill levels. First, using British Labour 
Force Survey data for the year 2000, they compare the educational levels of native-born 
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workers, immigrants and recent immigrants (those who entered Britain between 1991 and 
2000). Educational qualifications are divided into low (no formal qualification), intermediate 
(up to O-levels or equivalent) and advanced (A-levels or college/university degree). While 
they concede that the percentage of native-born workers with advanced education is higher 
than in the two groups of migrants, they also point out that both groups of migrants have 
higher percentages of intermediate education than the native-born workers. Percentages of 
low education are very similar amongst all three groups. Thus, they conclude, migrants to 
Britain have a similar educational background to native Britons. 
 
While some of the disparities in the educational levels are more significant than Dustmann, et 
al. (2005) acknowledge, I would argue that more importantly these data show that immigrants 
are not mostly uneducated, low-skilled workers. There is a 21 per cent difference between the 
percentage of native-born and recent immigrants with advanced education (Table 4.2). The 
difference between these two groups is again quite stark when considering their levels of 
intermediate education (a 23 per cent difference in favour of recent immigrants). These are 
not small differences, and I would question the conclusion that the educational background of 
native-born and immigrant workers to Britain are “fairly similar” (Dustmann, et el., 
2005:330). However, there is a similar percentage of workers with low education amongst 
natives and immigrants (17 and 18 respectively), and a slightly lower percentage even 
amongst recent immigrants (15 per cent) (Table 4.2). Furthermore, 55 per cent of recent 
immigrants have an intermediate education and 30 per cent have advanced education. Thus, 
immigrants are by no means overwhelmingly uneducated and unsuitable for any work other 
than low-skilled service sector jobs, as many who support the polarisation hypothesis would 
contend. 
 
Table 4.2. Educational and occupational distribution, Immigrants and natives 
 
Education Advanced 
education 
Intermediate 
education 
Low 
education 
Total 
Natives 51             32          17 100 
Immigrants 42              3 18 100 
Recent Immigrants 30             55 15 100 
 
Occupation Skilled* Semi-skilled† Unskilled‡ Total 
Natives 25  40         36 100 
Immigrants 31      36         33 100 
Recent Immigrants 31       36         32 100 
Source: adapted from Dustmann, Fabri and Preston, 2005. 
*Those with highest hourly wages, including employers and managers, professionals and the armed forces. 
†Includes intermediate and junior non-manual workers, and foremen and supervisors. 
‡Includes farmers and farm workers, manual workers and personal service workers. 
Pease note: original data presented to one decimal place, which have been rounded up here. 
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The occupational data (second half of Table 4.2) presented by Dustmann, et al. (2005) are 
much more consistent with the argument that immigrants’ skill distribution is similar to that 
of native Britons. Also, as they argue, the similarities between the three groups are much 
stronger in the skill distribution than the educational distribution. The greatest difference is 
between natives and recent immigrants in terms of skilled work. Even then, they are 
separated by approximately 6 per cent only (Table 4.2). Amongst the other skill categories, 
the difference between any two groups is no greater than 4 per cent. Arguably, these data are 
well chosen in support of the authors’ claim that immigration to Britain has not led to a 
massive increase in unskilled or low-skilled labour (Dustmann, et al., 2005).  
 
Employment patterns amongst migrants and natives in the Johannesburg region 
 
Bearing in mind the critique of data presented above, as well as the arguments around the 
effects of immigration on social polarisation in cities throughout the world, I have 
endeavoured to utilise the best available data to answer the question of the possible role of 
migrants in any polarising tendencies there may exist in the occupational distribution of the 
Johannesburg region. 
 
Briefly, the argument I will make here is that migrants have a very similar occupational 
distribution to natives. While migrants are slightly under-represented in high-skill work in 
comparison to natives, and slightly over-represented in unskilled work, these differences are 
arguably not as large as polarisation theorists would have expected. In addition, migrants also 
have a similar educational profile to that of natives. Thus, migrants are well represented in 
high-skill, high-pay and semi-skilled, middle-income work and not overwhelmingly 
uneducated and marginalised in low-skill service sector work. 
 
In considering the opposing theories about the impact of migration on social polarisation with 
regard to the Johannesburg region, it is important to establish the scale of migration first.19 As 
the core of South Africa’s economy and the country’s centre of trade with rest of Southern 
Africa and beyond, the Johannesburg region has long attracted migrants from both South 
Africa’s rural areas and other urban centres (Wray, 2010). It has been the most popular 
destination for moves from both non-metropolitan areas as well inter-provincial migration 
within South Africa (Casale and Posel, 2006). Between 1980 and 2007, migrants constituted a 
significant proportion of the total population of the Johannesburg region: between 40 per cent 
and 43 per cent. Moreover, migrants formed the majority of the employed workforce, 
between 53 per cent and 60 per cent, a proportion of the total workforce that remained stable 
over this 27-year period (Table 4.5). Thus, there has been and continues to be a significant 
movement of people to the Johannesburg region.  
 
                                                 
19
 Immigration status is determined by birthplace. If the respondent was born in the Johannesburg 
region, he/she is a native. If the respondent was born in another province of South Africa, he/she is 
classed as an internal migrant. If the respondent was born outside South Africa, he/she is called a 
foreign migrant. See chapter 2 for full discussion of categorisation of migrants. 
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While internal migrants (those born in South Africa, outside of the Johannesburg region) are 
over-represented in unskilled work, arguably they are not over-represented in low-skill, low-
wage work to the extent that many polarisation theorists would anticipate. Table 4.4 shows 
that elementary occupations or unskilled work formed a similar percentage amongst natives 
and South African or internal migrants in comparison to the working population as a whole in 
1980: 21 per cent and 26 per cent respectively, versus 22 per cent amongst the whole 
population. Foreign migrants were under-represented amongst unskilled workers in 
comparison to the rest of the working population, with elementary occupations constituting a 
mere 6 per cent of work amongst employed foreign migrants versus the 22 per cent in the 
whole employed population of the Johannesburg region (Table 4.4). Thus, while all migrants 
(internal and foreign combined) formed 60 per cent of the working population in 1980, they 
held a slightly higher percentage of unskilled jobs, 62 per cent (Table 4.5). Therefore, in 
1980, migrants were only slightly over-represented in unskilled/elementary work in 
comparison to those native to the Johannesburg region. 
 
By 2001, migrants constituted a bigger percentage of low-skill, low-wage workers. However, 
again, arguably polarisation theorists would have presumed the degree to which this occurred 
to be much greater than it in fact was. Natives to the Johannesburg region were under-
represented in unskilled work, with 15 per cent of native employment consisting of 
elementary occupations, versus the slightly lower than 1980 level of 20 per cent of the entire 
working population (Table 4.4). Approximately 27 per cent of internal migrants held 
elementary/unskilled jobs (Table 4.4). Internal migrants formed 58 per cent of all unskilled 
workers, but constituted only 44 per cent of the employed workforce (Table 4.5). Foreign 
migrants were slightly under-represented amongst unskilled workers, with only 16 per cent of 
their work coming from unskilled jobs versus the 20 per cent of the whole population (Table 
4.4). They formed 7 per cent of all elementary workers while constituting 9 per cent of the 
employed workforce (Table 4.5). Thus, all migrants together held 65 per cent of unskilled 
work but only made up 53 per cent of the population (Table 4.5). Therefore, essentially, there 
were 12 per cent more migrants working in low-wage, low-skill jobs than one would have 
expected from the population numbers alone. This is not a particularly large disparity, and 
arguably not of the magnitude many supporters of the polarisation hypothesis would 
anticipate.  
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     Table 4.3. Occupational distribution of migrants and natives, Johannesburg region, 1980, 2001 and 2007 (frequency distribution)* 
 
      Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001 10 per cent sample and Community Survey 2007 
      * Includes only the employed and those respondents whose migrant status could be ascertained, i.e. excludes those whose place of birth was missing.
 
 
 
 
Occupation Census 1980 Census 2001 10 per cent sample Community Survey 2007 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 35,854 35,606 25,211 96,671 113,037 67,224 28,443 208,704 214,149 159,211 50,698 424,058 
Professionals 65,638 59,159 24,098 148,895 143,206 99,205 32,769 275,180 235,197 180,896 39,820 455,913 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 54,530 42,856 20,994 118,380 165,704 95,175 21,872 282,751 141,654 108,178 23,659 273,491 
Clerks 176,439 133,901 34,330 344,670 230,310 128,963 21,073 380,346 182,564 118,357 15,534 316,455 
Service, shop and market sales 
workers 103,046 106,180 24,370 233,596 150,768 154,006 29,034 333,808 145,450 183,403 28,042 356,895 
Craft and related trades workers 163,664 240,192 107,068 510,924 144,606 167,561 49,235 361,402 145,908 207,433 52,168 405,509 
Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 131,437 164,759 28,819 325,015 96,247 122,880 17,438 236,565 98,047 155,421 16,336 269,804 
Elementary occupations 201,838 309,318 17,531 528,687 209,514 347,488 40,889 597,891 195,546 337,873 43,643 577,062 
Skilled Agriculture and 
Undetermined 49,052 75,651 10,412 135,115 123,207 96,475 22,011 241,693 271,591 275,222 50,263 597,076 
Total 981,498 1,167,622 292,833 2,441,953 1,376,599 1,278,977 262,764 2,918,340 1,630,106 1,725,994 320,163 3,676,263 
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Table 4.4. Occupational distribution of migrants and natives, Johannesburg region, 1980, 2001 and 2007 (percentage distribution, column 
totals)* 
 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001 10 per cent sample and Community Survey 2007 
* Includes only the employed and those respondents whose migrant status could be ascertained, i.e. excludes those whose place of birth was missing 
 
Occupation Census 1980 Census 2001 10 per cent sample Community Survey 2007 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 4 3 9 4 8 5 11 7 13 9 16     12 
Professionals 7 5 8 6 10 8 12 9 14 10 12     12 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 6 4 7 5 12 7 8 10 9 6 7       7 
(all high-skill occupations 17 12 24 15 30 20 31 26 36 25 35 31) 
Clerks 18 11 12 14 17 10 8 13 11 7 5       9 
Service, shop and market sales 
workers 10 9 8 10 11 12 11 11 9 11 9     10 
Craft and related trades workers 17 21 37 21 11 13 19 12 9 12 16     11 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 13 14 10 13 7 10 7 8 6 9 5       7 
Elementary occupations 21 26 6 22 15 27 16 20 12 20 14     16 
Skilled Agriculture and 
Undetermined 5 6 4 6 9 8 8 8 17 16 16 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   100 
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Table 4.5. Occupational distribution of migrants and natives, Johannesburg region, 1980, 2001 and 2007 (percentage distribution, row totals)* 
 
 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980, 2001 10 per cent sample and Community Survey 2007 
* Includes only the employed and those respondents whose migrant status could be ascertained, i.e. excludes those whose place of birth was missing
Occupation Census 1980 Census 2001 10 per cent sample Community Survey 2007 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers 37 37 26 100 54 32 14 100 50 38 12 100 
Professionals 44 40 16 100 52 36 12 100 52 40 9 100 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 46 36 18 100 59 34 8 100 52 40 9 100 
(all high-skill occupations 43 38 19 100 55 34 11 100 51 39 10 100) 
Clerks 51 39 10 100 61 34 6 100 58 37 5 100 
Service, shop and market sales 
workers 44 45 10 100 45 46 9 100 41 51 8 100 
Craft and related trades workers 32 47 21 100 40 46 14 100 36 51 13 100 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 40 51 9 100 41 52 7 100 36 58 6 100 
Elementary occupations 38 59 3 100 35 58 7 100 34 59 8 100 
Skilled Agriculture and 
Undetermined 36 56 8 100 51 40 9 100 45 46 8 100 
Total 40 48 12 100 47 44 9 100 44 47 9 100 
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By 2007, all migrants combined had increased their share of unskilled work to 67 per cent, 
but formed only 56 per cent of the working population (Table 4.5). Thus, migrants were over-
represented amongst elementary workers by 11 per cent, a similar percentage to 2001. 
Natives were again under-represented in unskilled work, with 12 per cent of natives holding 
elementary jobs versus 16 per cent of the employed workforce (Table 4.4). Therefore, 
migrants have historically been over-represented in low-skill, low-wage work in comparison 
to the region’s native residents. However, this over-representation is relatively small.20 For 
example, there is no more than a seven point difference between the percentage of elementary 
workers amongst internal migrants and the whole working population in 1980, 2001 and 2007 
(Table 4.4). Thus, migrants are by no means overwhelmingly concentrated in low-wage, low-
skill work in comparison to natives, a finding inconsistent with what many polarisation 
proponents would contend regarding migrants. 
 
In addition, while natives held a higher percentage of high-skilled jobs than migrants, this 
difference was also relatively small, and between 1980 and 2007, migrants experienced a 
similar increase in the percentage of high-skill jobs to that of natives. In 1980, 17 per cent of 
those native to the Johannesburg region held managerial, professional, associate professional 
or technical jobs, which increased to 30 per cent in 2001 and 36 per cent by 2007 (Table 4.4). 
The percentage of internal migrants employed in these same high-skill occupations was 12 
per cent in 1980, but had grown to 20 per cent in 2001 and 25 per cent by 2007 (Table 4.4). In 
contrast, foreign migrants have been consistently over-represented amongst high-skill, high-
pay workers. High-skill work constituted 24 per cent of foreign migrant jobs in 1980, versus 
the 15 per cent of the whole population that these jobs accounted for (Table 4.4). This grew to 
31 per cent for foreign migrants in 2001, when high-skill occupations constituted 26 per cent 
of all employment, and 35 per cent in 2007, when managerial, professional, associate 
professional and technical jobs combined formed 31 per cent of the occupations of the 
employed workforce of the Johannesburg region (Table 4.4). Natives have consistently had a 
higher percentage of managers, professionals, associate professionals and technicians than the 
total employed population, but by a relatively small margin. Between 1980 and 2007, these 
                                                 
20
 There were more undetermined occupations in 2007 than 1980, making the “Skilled agriculture and 
Undetermined” occupation category anywhere from 10 per cent to 12 per cent greater in the 2007 data in 
comparison to the 1980 data. There is a possibility then that any drop in the number of percentage points of a 
particular occupation between 1980 and 2007 is over-exaggerated and the increase in a particular occupation 
is under-estimated. Unfortunately, the extent to which this may have happened in any one occupation 
category cannot be determined. 
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high-skill, high-wage jobs constituted 2 per cent to 5 per cent more of the native respondents’ 
occupations than amongst the total employed workforce (Table 4.4). And while migrants have 
been under-represented in these jobs historically, it would again appear to be by a relatively 
small margin. Between 1980 and 2007, high-skill occupations constituted only 3 to 6 per cent 
fewer jobs amongst internal migrants than the total employed workforce (Table 4.4). Thus, by 
2007, all migrants constituted approximately 49 per cent of all high-skill workers, while 
accounting for 56 per cent of the employed workforce (Table 4.5). Therefore, the percentage 
of migrants in high-skill work was only slightly below that of the entire employed workforce 
between 1980 and 2007, and these jobs were not wholly dominated by natives to the 
detriment of migrants. 
 
 
Migrants and education 
 
Many supporters of the polarisation theory argue that part of the reason migrants are 
restricted to low-skill, low-wage work is a result of their lack of skills and education. These 
scholars portray most immigrants to world cities as lacking adequate education or skills 
training. Given the similarity (or lack of significantly large disparities) in the percentages of 
unskilled and high-skilled workers amongst natives and migrants in this study, it is perhaps 
not surprising that the educational credentials of these two groups are also quite similar. 
While 30 per cent of natives completed secondary education versus 26 per cent of the whole 
working population, 20 per cent of natives had some form of tertiary education versus 19 per 
cent of the employed workforce (Table 4.7). While natives constituted 44 per cent of the 
employed workforce of the Johannesburg region, they constituted 51 per cent of those who 
had at least completed secondary education, and 47 per cent of those with some form of 
tertiary education (Table 4.8). Thus, natives are slightly over-represented in terms of 
secondary and tertiary education in comparison to the whole population. 
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Table 4.6. Educational distribution of employed migrants and natives, Johannesburg region, 
2007 (frequency distribution) 
 
Level of Highest Education  Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total 
No schooling 25,956 70,690 18,110 114,756 
Some primary school 85,946 189,970 35,016 310,932 
Completed primary school 46,048 79,481 17,055 142,584 
Some secondary school 632,686 662,726 106,231 1,401,643 
Completed secondary school* 492,884 414,090 61,362 968,336 
Higher education† 324,558 284,026 78,802 687,386 
Unspecified 22,027 25,012 3,585 50,624 
Total 1,630,105 1,725,995 320,161 3,676,261 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
* includes certificates and diplomas with less than grade 12 
† includes certificates and diplomas with grade 12, all university and technicon degrees and diplomas 
 
Internal migrants tend to be under-represented in comparison to the whole population in 
terms of secondary and tertiary education, but, again, only to a marginal degree. Of all 
internal migrants, 24 per cent completed secondary education at least, versus 26 per cent of 
the whole working population, and 16 per cent of these internal migrants had some form of 
tertiary education versus 19 per cent of the total population (Table 4.7). Internal migrants 
comprised 47 per cent of the employed workforce, but 43 per cent of high school graduates 
and 41 per cent of those with higher education (Table 4.8). This under-representation is 
arguably relatively small. 
 
Table 4.7. Educational distribution of employed migrants and natives, Johannesburg region, 
2007 (percentage distribution, column totals) 
 
Level of Highest Education  Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
No schooling 2 4 6 3 
Some primary school 5 11 11 8 
Completed primary school 3 5 5 4 
Some secondary school 39 38 33 38 
Completed secondary school* 30 24 19 26 
Higher education† 20 16 25 19 
Unspecified 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
* includes certificates and diplomas with less than grade 12 
† includes certificates and diplomas with grade 12, all university and technicon degrees and diplomas 
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A lower percentage of foreign migrants completed secondary school (19 per cent versus 26 
per cent of the total employed population), but a higher percentage completed some form of 
tertiary education (25 per cent versus 19 per cent of the total employed population) (Table 
4.7).  
 
 
Table 4.8. Educational distribution of employed migrants and natives, Johannesburg region, 
2007 (percentage distribution, row totals) 
 
Level of Highest Education  Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
   Total 
No schooling 23 62 16 100 
Some primary school 28 61 11 100 
Completed primary school 32 56 12 100 
Some secondary school 45 47 8 100 
Completed secondary school* 51 43 6 100 
Higher education† 47 41 11 100 
Unspecified 44 49 7 100 
Total 44 47 9 100 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
* includes certificates and diplomas with less than grade 12 
† includes certificates and diplomas with grade 12, all university and technicon degrees and diplomas 
 
 
Thus, employed migrants and native residents of the Johannesburg region share similar 
educational profiles. One could argue that this is the result one would expect, as, in order to 
be employed, migrants would need similar credentials to those of natives in order to be able 
to compete in the labour market. What of the educational distribution of the entire adult 
population then, not just the employed? From the point of view of polarisation theory, one 
might presume that the adult migrant population taken as a group would be poorly educated 
in comparison to the native population, and that those migrants finding employment could be 
the small percentage with a similar educational profile to that of natives. 
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Table 4.9. Educational profile of all adult migrants and natives (employed, unemployed and 
economically inactive), Johannesburg region, 2007 (frequency distribution) 
 
Level of Highest Education  
(all adults) 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total 
No schooling 83,111 140,271 31,332 254,714 
Some primary school 249,161 354,479 55,542 659,182 
Completed primary school 145,245 163,620 26,551 335,416 
Some secondary school 1,752,009 1,382,685 175,097 3,309,791 
Completed secondary school* 883,893 717,182 92,062 1,693,137 
Higher education† 414,853 353,722 100,571 869,146 
Unspecified 47,081 46,691 5,770 99,542 
Total 3,575,353 3,158,650 486,925 7,220,928 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
* includes certificates and diplomas with less than grade 12 
† includes certificates and diplomas with grade 12, all university and technicon degrees and diplomas 
 
 
However, the data do not bear this argument out. All adult migrants, aged 15-65 (the average 
ages between which most people work), whether employed, unemployed or economically 
inactive have a similar educational distribution to that of natives in the Johannesburg region 
in 2007. Internal migrants were arguably only slightly under-represented amongst those with 
tertiary education, with 11 per cent of internal migrants versus 12 per cent of the whole adult 
population holding higher educational qualifications (Table 4.10). Also, while internal 
migrants represented 44 per cent of the adult population, they held 41 per cent of tertiary 
educational qualifications (Table 4.11). However, the same percentage of internal migrants as 
the whole population had “completed high school” as their highest educational qualification 
(Table 4.10). Foreign migrants were under-represented in terms of completing high school 
(19 per cent versus the 23 per cent of the whole population of working age adults). However, 
21 per cent of foreign migrants had tertiary degrees/ diplomas/ certificates as their highest 
level of education, versus just 12 per cent in the whole population, and represented 12 per 
cent of all higher educational qualifications while constituting only 7 per cent of the 
population in total (Tables 4.10 and 4.11).  
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Table 4.10. Educational profile of all adult migrants and natives (employed, unemployed and 
economically inactive), Johannesburg region, 2007 (percentage distribution, column totals) 
 
Level of Highest Education  
(all adults) 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total 
No schooling 2 4 6 4 
Some primary school 7 11 11 9 
Completed primary school 4 5 5 5 
Some secondary school 49 44 36 46 
Completed secondary school* 25 23 19 23 
Higher education† 12 11 21 12 
Unspecified 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
* includes certificates and diplomas with less than grade 12 
† includes certificates and diplomas with grade 12, all university and technicon degrees and diplomas 
 
Table 4.11. Educational profile of all adult migrants and natives (employed, unemployed and  
economically inactive), Johannesburg region, 2007 (percentage distribution, row totals) 
 
Level of Highest Education  
(all adults) 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
   Total 
No schooling 33 55 12 100 
Some primary school 38 54 8 100 
Completed primary school 43 49 8 100 
Some secondary school 53 42 5 100 
Completed secondary school* 52 42 5 100 
Higher education† 48 41 12 100 
Unspecified 47 47 6 100 
Total 50 44 7 100 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
* includes certificates and diplomas with less than grade 12 
† includes certificates and diplomas with grade 12, all university and technicon degrees and diplomas 
 
Adults of working age native to the Johannesburg region were only marginally over-
represented amongst those who had completed secondary education and were slightly under-
represented amongst those who had some form of tertiary education as their highest 
educational achievement. While 23 per cent of the total population completed high school, so 
too had 25 per cent of natives (Table 4.10). However, natives constituted 50 per cent of the 
population, while holding only 48 per cent of tertiary educational qualifications (Table 4.11). 
 
Thus, while there has been large-scale migration to the Johannesburg region, these 
immigrants have very similar levels of education in comparison to natives and are therefore, 
unsurprisingly, only marginally under-represented in managerial, professional, associate 
professional and technical occupations and only slightly over-represented in unskilled work. 
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These data therefore do not support the idea of a growing service sector generating myriad 
low-skill, low-wage service jobs to be filled by large numbers of uneducated, unskilled 
immigrants, as generally proposed by advocates of the polarisation hypothesis. 
 
 
The heterogeneity of immigrant populations and their varied employment outcomes 
 
Some scholars who oppose the polarisation hypothesis tend to focus on what they consider to 
be the unique make-up of the immigrant population where the theory has been developed 
most: the US. Thus, Chris Hamnett (1994a, 1996) concedes that cities such as New York and 
Los Angeles may be undergoing a process of social polarisation. However, he argues this can 
be attributed primarily to their large and ever growing population of unskilled Third World 
immigrants, which facilitates the expansion of the low-wage service sector. By contrast, he 
argues, European cities do not have this level of low-skill immigration. Another important 
difference he asserts is that migrants to European cities are not uniformly uneducated. 
Therefore European cities tend more towards professionalisation (Hamnett, 2003). Many 
other scholars would agree that the level of immigration to European cities is far below that 
to American cities. However, several also argue that the immigrant population even in 
American cities such as New York is not homogeneously unskilled and that these diverse 
immigrant communities have different outcomes in terms of employment.  
 
In 1970, foreign-born Hispanics were heavily over-represented in the industries that would 
suffer the greatest losses in the next decade, namely manufacturing, personal services and 
retail (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991). Hispanics constituted a third of manufacturing workers, 
while representing only a fifth of city residents. The personal services sector shrank by 30 per 
cent between 1970 and 1980. Despite this, employment levels amongst Hispanics still grew 
by 50 per cent during this period. Even though manufacturing was continuously losing jobs, 
with Whites leaving this sector, openings were created for Hispanic workers. Thus, by 
increasing their share of dwindling blue-collar occupations such as machine operators, 
labourers and craft workers, by 1980, Hispanics had become even more concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector than they had been in 1970. They remained under-represented amongst 
professional and clerical workers though. Thus, their representation in the top income 
quintiles dropped, especially amongst women. Add to this the fact that earnings in the bottom 
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quintiles did not keep pace with the gains made in the top quintiles (Bailey and Waldinger, 
1991). 
 
The Asian immigrant group in New York has a somewhat different employment history to 
that of Hispanics. Retail and manufacturing were historically the primary employers amongst 
Asians (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991). Strong representation in retail and manufacturing 
allowed Asians to withstand the economic hardships of the 1970’s when Whites were leaving 
these sectors. By the 1980’s though, Asians were beginning to reduce their dependency on the 
retail and manufacturing sectors, while making important occupational advances in them. 
They also started making employment gains in the finance, insurance and business services 
sector. Thus, their share of all white-collar work increased, especially amongst managers, 
sales and clerical workers. This led to a significant reduction in the proportion of Asians in 
the bottom income quintile, and gains in all other quintiles. At the same time though, there 
was growth in the number of very low-paid women (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991). 
 
As Bailey and Waldinger (1991) note, because retail (restaurants and food retail in particular) 
and manufacturing (especially garment production) have been and continue to be such 
strongholds of Asian business, the expansion of the Asian niche added jobs at all levels of the 
occupational ladder, not just the bottom. This is in contrast to Hispanics, who seemed to gain 
most of their jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Asians as a group also 
prospered in comparison to Hispanics because they moved out of their traditional sectors of 
the economy (retail and manufacturing) and into the new, growing economic sectors (the 
finance, insurance and business services sector). Thus, these two disparate ethnic immigrant 
groups have had different outcomes with regards to employment in New York. 
 
Therefore, while scholars discussing different world cities have argued that immigrants tend 
to be concentrated in the low-skill, low-wage service sector (Baum, 1997; Sassen, 1991; 
Wilson, 1996), the case of New York discussed here serves to show that migrants, even to the 
US, can have diverse outcomes in terms of employment. While I have shown earlier that 
migrants on the whole have a similar occupational distribution to natives of the Johannesburg 
region, could it be the case that individual immigrant communities have more varied 
occupational outcomes? 
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Migrants to the Johannesburg region and social polarisation 
 
As has been shown already, immigrants to the Johannesburg region do not appear to have 
significantly contributed to a trend of increasing social polarisation. Contrary to what many 
polarisation theorists argue, it does not appear that uneducated, unskilled immigrants are 
being attracted in large numbers to work in a burgeoning low-wage service sector. On the 
contrary, from an educational perspective, immigrants have a very similar profile to natives. 
Furthermore, the distribution of occupations amongst migrants is as diverse as amongst 
natives and they are not confined to low-skill work. Hamnett (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2003), in 
opposition to the polarisation hypothesis, argues that a large and ever growing population of 
unskilled Third World immigrants facilitates the expansion of the low-wage service sector, 
thereby leading to increasing polarisation. However, this process also does not appear to be 
happening in the Johannesburg region. There has always been and continues to be large-scale 
migration to the Johannesburg region. As the majority of these are internal migrants and 
therefore come from inside the borders of a country with many Third World characteristics 
itself, one would expect the migrants to be mostly uneducated and unskilled manual workers. 
However, as has been shown earlier, this also does not appear to be the case.  
 
While, on the whole, migrants to the Johannesburg region display a similar occupational 
distribution and educational profile to natives, this is not to say that at a finer level of 
disaggregation the diverse immigrant communities look the same. As has been discussed in 
chapter 1 and in the previous section of this chapter, distinct groups of immigrants perform 
differently in the urban environments to which they migrate and are absorbed into diverse 
occupations and industries to varying degrees. However, in the context of the social 
polarisation and professionalisation hypotheses there is a more pertinent question: even 
though overall the occupational profile of immigrants shows that their presence does not lead 
to increasing social polarisation, how have the individual groups of immigrants either 
contributed to or detracted from the trend towards professionalisation in the Johannesburg 
region over time? 
 
Briefly, although historically the vast majority of high-skill jobs were held by White men, and 
despite the greatest trend towards professionalisation occurring amongst Coloureds and 
Indians, it is in fact the increasing professionalisation of native and internal migrant African 
men and women and White women and that has significantly changed the distribution of 
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high-skill occupations and contributed most in absolute terms towards increasing 
professionalisation in the Johannesburg region between 1980 and 2007. 
 
The greatest absolute growth in managers, professionals, associate professionals and 
technicians occurred amongst African men. Native African men gained 90,041 high-skill 
jobs, while internal migrant African men made the biggest gains of all of the groups with an 
increase of 129,647 (Table 4.14). Therefore, combined, African native and internal migrant 
men accounted for 219,688 of the increase of over 700,000 high-skill occupations between 
1980 and 2007 (Table 4.14). The biggest percentage point increase also occurred amongst 
internal migrant African men, who went from holding 3 per cent of high-skill jobs in 1980 to 
12 per cent in 2007 (Tables 4.12 and 4.13).  
 
The second biggest contribution to the increasing numbers of high-skill occupations was by 
African women. Native African women added 96,565 high-skill occupations between 1980 
and 2007, and internal migrant African women added 86,218 (Table 4.14). Thus, combined, 
African native and internal migrant women accounted for 182,783 of the increase of over 
700,000 high-skill occupations between 1980 and 2007. 
 
Thus, some of the biggest contributions to the increase in the number of high-skill 
occupations between 1980 and 2007 in the Johannesburg region came from the “previously 
disadvantaged” groups of African men and women. Moreover, far from appearing to be 
hindered by their migrant status, internal African migrant men and women showed some of 
the greatest growth. Internal migrant Africans had comparable gains to all other groups in 
terms of high-skill managerial, professional, associate professional and technical occupations.
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High-skill occupations21 
 
Table 4.12. Percentage distribution of high-skill occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 
1980 
 
1980                African White Coloured                Indian 
High-skill 
 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 4 3 0 23 22 15 1 0 0 1 0 0 69 
Women 5 3 0 9 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13. Percentage distribution of high-skill occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 
2007 
 
2007                African White Coloured                Indian 
High-skill Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 9 12 2 14 8 4 1 1 0 1 2 0 55 
Women 10 8 1 13 6 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 45 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
 
 
                                                 
21
 The data from which these and the following tables were calculated can be found in Appendix B. 
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Table 4.14. Absolute change in high-skill occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 1980-
2007 
 
  African White Coloured Indian  
Absolute change 
between 1980 
and 2007 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 90,041 129,647 26,320 81,926 6,141 -12,161 13,386 7,114 610 12,502 18,237 4,002 377,765 
Women 96,565 86,218 8,314 117,624 40,353 14,591 14,647 7,148 432 8,287 15,809 1,766 411,754 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 and Community Survey 2007 
 
 
 
Unskilled occupations 
 
Table 4.15. Percentage distribution of unskilled occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 
1980 
 
Unskilled African White Coloured Indian  
1980 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 14 28 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 
Women 23 29 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 55 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
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Table 4.16. Percentage distribution of unskilled occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 
2007 
 
Unskilled African White Coloured Indian  
2007 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 9 19 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 
Women 22 37 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
 
 
 
Table 4.17. Absolute change in the numbers of unskilled occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg 
region, 1980-2007 
 
Unskilled African White Coloured Indian  
Absolute change 
between 1980 
and 2007 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men -18,516 -38,647 11,363 6,771 1,915 1,160 680 161 24 359 542 507 -33,681 
Women 1,292 64,344 12,112 2,791 1,362 569 -59 -1,356 145 388 236 233 82,057 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980 and Community Survey 2007 
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Semi-skilled, blue-collar occupations 
 
Table 4.18. Absolute change in the numbers of semi-skilled blue-collar occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the 
Johannesburg region, 1980-2007 
 
Semi-skilled, 
blue-collar 
African White Coloured Indian  
Absolute change 
between 1980 
and 2007 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men -21,818 -16,175 -42,680 -21,493 -41,213 -26,268 -2,090 -3,942 348 416 1,299 918 -172,698 
Women -5,938 18,760 1,611 3,198 19 -1,439 -3,293 -1,058 -21 -127 214 147 12,073 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980 and Community Survey 2007 
 
 
 
Semi-skilled, white-collar occupations 
 
Table 4.19. Absolute change in the numbers of semi-skilled white-collar occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in 
the Johannesburg region, 1980-2007 
 
Semi-skilled, 
white-collar 
African White Coloured Indian  
Absolute change 
between 1980 
and 2007 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 18,367 70,125 10,706 -15,255 -40,825 -12,217 3,581 910 17 -1,500 192 374 34,475 
Women 53,616 68,564 7,493 -18,395 -44,314 -22,028 5,614 2,617 231 2,502 4,409 298 60,607 
Sources: South African Population Census 1980 and Community Survey 2007 
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The next highest gains in high-skill work were amongst White native and internal migrant 
women. While they held the second highest percentages of high-skill work in 1980, this paled 
in comparison to that of White men (only 22 per cent for all White women versus 60 per cent 
for all White men) (Table 4.12). However, by 2007, the percentage of high-skill workers 
among native and internal migrant White women was comparable to that of white men (13 
per cent and 6 per cent respectively versus 14 per cent and 8 per cent amongst White men, 
Table 4.13). Internal migrant White women added 40,353 high-skill jobs between 1980 and 
2007 (Table 4.14). However, native White women added a considerable 117,624 high-skill 
jobs in the same period (Table 4.14). Thus, 157,977 of the high-skill positions gained 
between 1980 and 2007 were occupied by White native and internal migrant women. 
 
High-skill managerial, professional, associate professional and technical work was 
historically dominated by white men; however, by 2007, this was no longer the case. Almost 
a quarter (23 per cent) of all high-skill work was held by native white men in 1980, 22 per 
cent was held by internal migrants and 15 per cent by foreign migrants (Table 4.12). This is 
arguably not surprising, given the history of South Africa discussed elsewhere in this thesis 
and the fact that whites were the most privileged and afforded the best opportunities in terms 
of education and available jobs through measures such as job reservation. However, by 2007, 
while white men still had the greatest share of high-skill work, although only marginally so, 
the percentages had dropped to 14 per cent amongst native White men, 8 per cent amongst 
White internal migrants and 4 per cent amongst foreign migrants (Table 4.13). Of the 789,519 
high-skill jobs added to the occupational distribution of the Johannesburg region between 
1980 and 2007, only 81,926 were White native men and 6,141 were white internal migrants 
(Table 4.14). The number of high-skill positions amongst White foreign migrant men actually 
decreased by 12,161 jobs. Thus, the growth in high-skill positions was not largely driven by 
the employment of white men. 
 
That Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show that Coloureds and Indians have hardly any share of high-
skill work is perhaps misleading, as the percentage of high-skill jobs increased the most 
amongst Coloured and Indian workers between 1980 and 2007 (see Appendix B for detailed 
description and data from which these figures are derived). High-skill work represented just 8 
per cent and 10 per cent of all employment amongst Coloured men and women respectively 
in 1980 (Tables B3 and B7). By 2007, 36 per cent of Coloured men and 40 per cent of 
Coloured women held high-skill occupations (Tables B4 and B8). Thus, the percentage point 
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increase in high-skill work was between 28 per cent and 30 per cent. The relative growth in 
high-skill work was even greater amongst Indians. High-skill work represented 22 per cent 
and 16 per cent of all employment amongst Indian men and women respectively in 1980 
(Tables B3 and B7). By 2007, 56 per cent of Indian men and 53 per cent of Indian women 
held high-skill occupations (Tables B4 and B8). This represents a percentage point increase 
ranging from 34 per cent to 37 per cent, with by far the most growth occurring amongst 
internal migrant Indian men and women.  
 
What could account for this impressive growth? With the change in government, presumably, 
changes to legislation and the institution of affirmative action policies facilitated the 
increased employment of not only Africans in higher-skilled occupations, but Coloureds and 
Indians as well. The reason for their growth being higher relative to Africans though could be 
partly historical. While Whites were afforded the best opportunities and Africans arguably the 
worst, Coloureds and Indians were treated differently to both population groups. The 
Nationalist government, concerned at the prospect of a unified non-European resistance of 
Coloureds and Africans, felt it necessary for Coloureds to see themselves as distinct from 
Africans (Goldin, 1984; Marais, 1984; Pickel, 1997). Thus, various government initiatives 
such as development programmes and the Coloured Labour Preference Policy were designed 
to improve the standard of living of Coloureds (Pickel, 1997). In comparison to Africans, 
Coloureds were relatively better off in several areas, but one of the most important for this 
discussion is education. Also, the preferential treatment of Coloureds arguably led to a “better 
position” of Coloured workers at the expense of Africans (Goldin, 1984). However, 
Coloureds were still kept out of many of the skilled and higher-skilled positions and jobs 
reserved for Whites. With the removal of institutional barriers to their advancement, 
Coloureds and Indians were arguably better positioned than Africans, due to more 
comprehensive education and comparatively higher-skilled previous jobs, to seize the 
opportunities for advancement into managerial, professional, associate professional and 
technical occupations.  
 
However, these considerable gains are not reflected in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 because the 
absolute increases they represent are small in comparison to the overall increase in high-skill 
work. Of the 789,519 high-skill jobs gained between 1980 and 2007, only 103,940 are from 
all Coloureds and Indians combined. Therefore, even though arguably the most impressive 
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growth in high-skill work occurred amongst Coloureds and Indians, this represents only a 
relatively small amount of the total absolute growth in these occupations. 
 
Thus, it has been shown that migrants have clearly played just as important a part in the 
growth of high-skill jobs over time in this region as natives. What of unskilled/low-skill work 
though? First, it is important to keep in mind that unskilled work grew much less than high-
skill work between 1980 and 2007; hence, the argument that the absolute growth in both 
high-skill and low-skill occupations is heavily skewed towards high-skill jobs, thereby 
resulting in more of a professionalising trend in the Johannesburg region.22 Nonetheless, there 
was absolute growth in the number of low-skill workers between 1980 and 2007. 
 
There is arguably a similar effect here to studies done in other parts of the world that show 
that ethnic minorities, especially women, fill the majority of low-skilled jobs. The most 
significant increase in the percentage of unskilled workers was amongst African internal 
migrant women. They formed the greatest percentage of unskilled workers in 2007: 37 per 
cent (Table 4.16). More importantly, this percentage grew from 29 per cent in 1980 (Table 
4.15). There was an absolute increase of 64,344 unskilled workers amongst African internal 
migrant women, which represent the majority of the 82,057 unskilled jobs gained by all 
women between 1980 and 2007 (Table 4.17). Thus, the entry of increasing numbers of 
African native and internal migrant women into the labour market since 1980 contributed 
towards both high-skill and low-skill job growth. However, the greatest contribution by 
African native and internal migrant women was in high-skill occupations, as nearly 100,000 
more high-skill jobs than low-skill jobs were added. Thus, overall there is still more of a 
professionalising trend in terms of absolute differences in the numbers of high- and low-skill 
jobs added between 1980 and 2007. 
 
In contrast, African internal migrant and native men had substantial absolute decreases 
amongst unskilled workers of 38,647 and 18,516 respectively (Table 4.17). Considering that 
in total men lost 33,681 unskilled jobs between 1980 and 2007, this was entirely due to the 
losses amongst African internal migrant and native men. Furthermore, given the addition of 
219,688 high-skill jobs both of these groups contributed overall, African native and internal 
                                                 
22The potentially artificially low numbers of unskilled workers in 2007 aside (due to a greater number of 
undetermined occupations in 2007 - see previous footnote), the increase in numbers of low-skill occupations 
has been shown to be much lower than the increase in high-skill occupations between 1980 and 2010 in 
chapter 2. 
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migrant men arguably played an even more significant role than African women in the 
increasing professionalisation of the occupational distribution of the Johannesburg region 
(Table 4.14).  
 
Therefore, the Johannesburg region does not conform to the image painted by many 
polarisation theorists of large numbers of unskilled immigrants occupying a rapidly 
increasing number of low-skill, low-wage service jobs. Migrant women are over-represented 
in unskilled work; however, they are also well represented amongst high-skill, high-pay 
occupations, not to mention the other main occupational groups. Thus, the occupational 
distribution of the different immigrant groups is diverse, and they are not on the whole 
marginalised in low-skill, low-wage jobs. 
 
 
Increasing professionalisation with increasing unemployment? 
 
At first glance, one might interpret the reduction in the share of unskilled work held by 
internal migrant and native African men as a sign of their upward occupational mobility. As 
has been demonstrated, there is evidence of increasing professionalisation of these two 
groups between 1980 and 2007. The percentage of high-skill managerial, professional, 
associate professional and technical work amongst African internal migrants and native men 
increased by 15 percentage points and 18 percentage points respectively (see Tables B3 and 
B4 in Appendix B for the data from which this was derived). However, the percentage of 
African men employed in almost all other occupational groups dropped. In addition, the 
absolute number of semi-skilled, blue-collar workers also decreased amongst African men by 
80,673 workers (native, internal and foreign migrant men combined) in the same period 
(Table 4.18).  
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Table 4.20. Percentage distribution of employed workforce by race and gender, Johannesburg 
region, 1980 and 2007 
 
Race and Gender Percentage of employed workforce Percentage 
point difference 
per cent in 1980 per cent in 2007  
African men 45        40 -5 
African women 18        28 10 
White men 21        14 -7 
White women 12        12 0 
Source: South African  Population Census 1980 and Community Survey 2007 
(see Appendix B for data from which derived) 
 
 
Even though all African men combined (natives and migrants) gained 99,198 (Table 4.19) 
semi-skilled, white-collar jobs between 1980 and 2007, given the fact that their overall share 
of the employed population dropped 5 percentage points in this time (Table 4.20), it seems 
more likely that, far from being a positive sign, the large decreases in unskilled and semi-
skilled, blue-collar work are actually indications of increasing unemployment amongst 
African men in the Johannesburg region between 1980 and 2007. 
 
This idea of increasing professionalisation in the face of increasing unemployment in the 
Johannesburg region will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Unemployment and Social Polarisation 
 
 
As has already been shown in this thesis, the occupational structure of the Johannesburg 
region is tending towards increasing professionalisation rather than polarisation. This is 
consistent with Chris Hamnett’s argument of increasing numbers of high-skill, high-wage 
jobs with no simultaneous increase in low-skill, low-wage jobs, except in cities such as in the 
US where large-scale, unskilled immigration and a weak welfare state leads to the growth of 
an expanded low-wage service proletariat too. However, there are high levels of immigration 
to the Johannesburg region (shown in the last chapter) from within a country in which most 
people would agree there are many unskilled adults of working age. Why then is the increase 
in high-skill workers not paralleled in growth in low-wage service sector work, as in the US? 
Why does the occupational structure of the Johannesburg region not display a huge bias 
towards low-skill, low-wage service work? The answer is that rather than the unskilled being 
employed in low-skill service sector work, they are instead unemployed. According to the 
results of the Labour Force Survey 2010, approximately 25 per cent of the adult population of 
the Johannesburg region was unemployed.23  
 
However, while the outcome of increasing professionalisation alongside growing 
unemployment is consistent with Hamnett’s (1996b) argument for the pattern of occupational 
change in Europe, the reasons for this as well as the circumstances in which this has occurred 
in the Johannesburg region are very different. The lack of a large low-wage service 
proletariat in the Johannesburg region is not because welfare benefits are so substantial that 
working age adults can opt out of the employed workforce and survive on these benefits, as is 
the case in much of Europe. Essentially, all the conditions for substantial growth in low-skill, 
low-wage work are present. However, in South Africa, economic growth has not kept pace 
with population growth, thereby leading to a shortage of jobs for unskilled workers, and 
                                                 
23This is according to the strict/official definition of unemployment. “In South Africa, two different concepts of 
unemployment are used routinely: the strict (narrow) and the expanded (broad) definition. The narrow 
definition applies a job-search test, whereas the broad definition accepts as unemployed those who did not 
search for work in a 4-week reference period, but who report being available for work and say they would 
accept the offer of a suitable job. In 1998, the narrow concept was declared the ‘official’ definition of 
unemployment and it is now the one generally used.” (Kingdon and Knight, 2007:827).The expanded 
definition therefore includes discouraged work seekers, that is, those who are not currently employed but 
report that they would accept work if offered, but who are not actively searching (Casale and Posel, 2002; 
Statistics South Africa, 2007). 
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growing unemployment. Thus, while a large number of low-skill workers may be necessary 
for the growth of a low-wage service proletariat, as proposed by Hamnett (1994a), arguably, 
this is not a sufficient condition. Therefore, despite the fact that a large proportion of the 
South African population is unskilled, and welfare benefits are not substantial enough to keep 
these workers from seeking jobs, a large low-wage service proletariat has not developed 
because economic growth has not created enough jobs for the growing labour force. 
 
In this chapter, the history of growing unemployment in South Africa before and during the 
Apartheid period will be discussed. Some government strategies designed to encourage 
economic and employment growth will also be explored. It will be shown however that the 
employment growth resulting from these policies fell far short of expectations. The limits of 
state welfare provision and its minimal impact in discouraging low-wage employment will 
also be explored. Ultimately, it will be shown that the reasons for increasing unemployment 
lie in (a) job growth of a nature unsuited to the low skill-level of the population at large and 
(b) too little job growth in the face of far greater increases in the size of the labour force. 
 
Growing Unemployment 
 
The rate of unemployment in South Africa is one of the highest in the world (Rodrik, 2008). 
Official (strict) unemployment increased from 13 per cent in 1993 to 31 per cent in 2003, 
while broad (expanded) unemployment increased from 29 per cent to 42 per cent in this 
period (Seekings, Leibbrandt and Nattrass, 2004). Unemployment is highest for Africans, the 
young and the unskilled (Rodrik, 2008; Rogerson, 1996; Seekings, et al., 2004). 
Unemployment was greater amongst women than men between 1995 and 2003 (Kingdon and 
Knight, 2007). However, the percentage point difference in unemployment growth was 
slightly greater for men than women in this time (by 3 percentage points). In this same 
period, the most rapid increase in the unemployment rate occurred in the Johannesburg 
region. 
 
Scholars have argued that South Africa’s unemployment problem has its origins in Africans 
being forced out of subsistence farming into the cash economy (Portes, 1978). African 
peasant agricultural production was being undermined by coercion from the late 19th century 
already (Portes, 1978). Conditions in the reserves to which most African families moved, 
with their failing economies and little agriculture, necessitated participating in wage labour in 
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mining and manufacturing. Thus, early legislation was “designed to propel the African 
population into the white controlled economy” (Savage, 1986:200). These reserves provided 
a large pool of cheap, unskilled African labour, and, increasingly throughout the 20th century, 
this African labour was channelled into the white-owned mines, commercial farms and 
industries (Platzky and Walker, 1985; Thompson, 2000; Trapido, 1971).24 With only a 
limited number allowed to fully urbanise, many migrant African labourers returned to the 
reserves/Bantustans after their contracts to work in the city had expired.  However, the 
reserves did not only house workers between contract stints. Many in the reserves were 
increasingly underemployed. “Idle” Africans in towns seeking better-paying work and labour 
not used year-round on White farms (therefore, essentially, all unemployed), the old and the 
young were relocated to the reserves (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994; Trapido, 1971). As 
agriculture in the Bantustans gradually collapsed, and the populations in these areas 
continued to grow, greater numbers of workers became fully unemployed (Seekings and 
Nattrass, 2005). Moreover, the Bantustans were treated as holding areas for the unemployed 
where they could be geographically isolated and better controlled (Lewis, 1991). 
 
The changing labour needs of employers are another major factor in increasing 
unemployment amongst Africans. Initially, labour demand in South Africa in the mines and 
factories was predominantly for unskilled labour (Crankshaw, 1997). Capitalisation, 
including mechanisation, in construction, mining and manufacturing changed this demand to 
one for semi-skilled machine operative labour.25 Although these types of jobs had been 
reserved for Whites, there simply were not enough semi-skilled White workers to meet the 
needs of employers (Moll, 1991). Whites had also dominated the skilled trades by defending 
their market position though trade unions and government support to exclude Africans 
(Lipton, 1989). However, by lobbying government, employers were able to break White 
union control over production and began to advance African workers into the growing 
number of semi-skilled positions (Crankshaw, 1997). Thus, there was a shift from labour-
intensive production, which utilized a large number of cheap, unskilled African workers, to 
capital intensive production, which utilized a smaller number of semi-skilled, higher-wage 
African workers (Lipton, 1989). This of course meant that there were fewer job opportunities 
for unskilled African labourers and therefore growing unemployment.  
 
                                                 
24
 See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion. 
25
 See chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion. 
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Thus, the mid- to late-20th century was characterised by a period of labour demand followed 
by one of labour excess, particularly in unskilled labour (Lipton, 1989). From the 1940’s to 
the 1970’s, those seeking work could arguably quite easily find employment. Under these 
circumstances, rather than earning minimal pay for unpleasant work in the mines and on 
farms, many African workers could opt for higher-wage urban manufacturing jobs (Posel, 
1991). Farm wages were four times lower than those in manufacturing, and consequently the 
commercial farms suffered labour shortages (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). So too did the 
mines. There was even a shortage of labour for the more arduous poorly-paid hard manual 
jobs in the manufacturing sector itself. However, economic and employment growth slowed 
dramatically during the mid-1970’s and essentially did not recover (Hindson, 1991). In 
addition, the economic growth that did occur immediately after this did not produce enough 
jobs (Simkins, 1978). Thus, by approximately the late 1970’s, the period of labour shortages 
came to an end, giving way to increasing unemployment, especially amongst unskilled 
Africans (Bell and Padayachee, 1984; Simkins, 1981).  
 
Measures by government to promote economic and, consequently, employment growth to 
help alleviate unemployment have had limited success, if not been outright failures. The goal 
of the “High Productivity Now” strategy was to create a high-wage, high-value-added, high-
productivity economy that would promote economic growth (Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). 
This strategy involved raising minimum wages with the intention that this would encourage 
companies to shift from low-wage, low-value added activities towards more “high-tech”, 
high-productivity activities, in which they would utilise better trained workers earning higher 
wages. However, this led to a decline in employment, especially in manufacturing, which 
was, in theory, the sector that would drive the new economic growth (Seekings, et al., 2004). 
 
A later (though arguably no more effective) strategy to improve economic and employment 
growth was ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ (GEAR). The basic premise of GEAR 
was to encourage foreign investment by showing that South Africa had stable finances 
(Nattrass, 1996). One of the targets was an average annual growth rate of 2.9 per cent, or 
270,000 new jobs per year (Burger and Woolard, 2005). This was to be achieved through 
flexibility, productivity and the lowering of labour costs in order to encourage labour–
intensive growth. However, the investment received fell short of the amounts envisaged, as 
the GEAR strategy was not fully implemented (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Legislation 
making the labour market less flexible was enacted, while other promised labour market 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
149 
reforms were not. Trade liberalisation too was overlooked. Evidence from the OECD (1999) 
shows that, when policies towards macro-economic stabilisation are enacted without 
addressing such labour market issues, the result is higher unemployment.  In addition, some 
scholars have argued that GEAR substituted for what should have been greater state-
spending, which arguably would have advanced economic growth much more effectively 
(Burger and Woolard, 2004). 
 
Welfare and other state interventions 
 
It is clear from the history described above that the reasons for unemployment in South 
Africa are very different to the reasons proposed by Hamnett (1996b) for Europe. While 
increasing professionalisation alongside growing unemployment (rather than growing low-
wage service work) is consistent with Hamnett’s (1996b) argument for much of Europe, 
unlike his argument, this is not due to the provision of adequate welfare state benefits. On the 
contrary, I will argue here that in South Africa, welfare benefits do little to discourage the 
growth of a low-skill, low-wage service proletariat. The persistently high levels of 
unemployment are arguably also not addressed by most of the welfare policy either. 
 
Scholars have asserted that the South African social security system was, by middle-income 
country standards, already well-developed in 1994, and has expanded even more since then 
(Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent, 2009). Within the first years after 1994, government 
shifted social spending further towards the poor and disadvantaged, and social spending 
continued to increase throughout the 1990’s (Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). While fewer than 
three million people received government grants in the late 1990’s, this total had risen to 
nearly six million recipients by 2003. In 2009, social welfare was 4.4 per cent of GDP, which 
was three times greater than median spending on welfare in most developing economies (1.4 
per cent of GDP) (Leibbrandt, et al., 2009).   
 
While social security may be widely available in South Africa and accessed by a significant 
proportion of the population, arguably the actual value of welfare benefits is the most salient 
factor when considering whether or not the unemployed need to take low-skill, low-wage 
service work. 
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The old-age pension has the greatest uptake of all benefits and forms a significant proportion 
of income in the poorest households in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). It is a 
means-tested, monthly lump-sum cash transfer, to the value of “roughly twice the average per 
capita income in African households, to eligible women over the age of 60 and men over the 
age of 65” (Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller, 2003:28). The maximum amount payable is 
approximately 3.52 times the poverty line, and is granted regardless of prior contribution 
(Case and Deaton, 1998). Because this is considered to be a reasonably generous grant, some 
scholars have argued that the availability of an old-age pension acts as a disincentive to work 
for prime-age men and women in the same household as pensioners (Bertrand, et al., 2003). 
However, other findings based on the same data are that the female African members of 
households with at least one old-age pension recipient are significantly more likely to be 
labour migrants (Posel, Fairburn and Lund, 2006). Thus, it is theorised, the pension covers 
some of the costs incurred in migrating, or provides the means for family members to care for 
the children of the migrant worker (Posel, et al., 2006). Considering the widespread 
availability of and access to the old-age pension, it could be argued that this form of welfare 
sufficiently reduces the need for the elderly to seek low-wage, low-skill employment. 
However, it is unlikely that this is the case, given the value of the grant in comparison to the 
number of people it is generally used to support (often a large household including 
unemployed, prime-age children and their offspring and extended family). The old-age 
pension, because it is only available from 60 to 65 years of age onwards, does not play a role 
in early-retirement, and therefore does not act to remove workers from the labour force 
prematurely. Most importantly perhaps then, the pension does not necessarily remove the 
need for younger unskilled workers in the same household to seek low-skill, low-wage work 
(not to mention those who are members of households where there is no old age pension 
recipient). 
 
Child and foster care support grants may seem like an odd form of welfare to discuss under 
the rubric of unemployment. In South Africa, the Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced 
in 1998 and has been hailed as an important poverty alleviation measure (Triegaardt, 2005). It 
is a means-tested, cash benefit for children under the age of seven in poor families, to the 
value of approximately R170 in 2005, or US$26 per child per month (Triegaardt, 2005). 
Despite claims of young women having babies for the sake of accessing this grant, most 
studies have found no relationship between teenage pregnancy rates and the CSG (Makiwane, 
Desmond, Richter, and Udjo, 2006). However, theoretically it is possible that grants for 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
151 
children, if substantial enough, could act as disincentives for women, as the primary care-
givers, to enter the labour force. This is unlikely in the South African case, as these grants are 
not substantial enough to maintain a household. Thus, state child support arguably does not 
act to discourage the seeking of low-skill, low-wage service work. 
 
Also related to children is state expenditure on education. In theory, improved education 
could give learners greater skills and a better chance of attaining tertiary education and 
therefore higher-skilled work. Throughout the 1990’s there was increased spending on 
education in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). However, most of this went towards 
larger teachers’ salaries. Therefore, scholars argue that learners have not benefitted from this 
increased spending, as there is no indication of an improvement in the quality of education in 
South Africa, and in several poorer areas, evidence that it has remained substandard 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). Thus, while there has been increased investment in education, 
it appears that it has not resulted in a more educated populace. Therefore, the numbers of 
unskilled workers best suited to low-skill, low-wage work continues to grow. 
 
A more direct source of welfare for the unemployed comes from the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF). However, the payout from this fund has several substantial 
shortcomings. First, the value of the benefit is approximately R700, or less than half of the 
average unskilled worker’s monthly salary (Department of Labour, 2004). In addition, the 
UIF affords the unemployed a short-term payout only, and is only available to those who 
have contributed previously (Lewis, 1991). If a worker has contributed to the fund for four 
years or more, UIF payouts may be received for up to a maximum of 238 days after 
becoming unemployed (Leibbrandt, et al., 2009). Thus, this assistance is relatively short-
lived. Moreover, those who have never been employed are excluded. Taking into account the 
length of bouts of unemployment too, this means that there is no provision under the UIF for 
most of South Africa’s unemployed, 65 per cent of who report that they have never worked 
(Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 1996; Lewis, 1991). Furthermore, UIF payouts are also only 
available to those who have been retrenched (staff lay-off, usually to reduce the costs of the 
business), and are not available to those who have resigned or been dismissed (Lewis, 1991). 
With all these shortcomings, it is estimated that less than 10 per cent of the strictly 
unemployed are receiving unemployment benefits at any time (Leibbrandt, et al., 2009). 
Thus, the UIF is clearly not an effective deterrent to taking low-skill, low-wage work, as it is 
only a temporary measure available to relatively few in the workforce. 
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Perhaps the most direct way government can intervene in unemployment is through public 
works programmes. In South Africa, the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) was 
established in 2004 with the express goal of providing employment for unskilled, 
unemployed workers specifically (Leibbrandt, et al., 2009). The temporary, unskilled jobs 
created also incorporate job skills training, with the aim that on leaving the programme, 
participants will have a greater chance of finding subsequent employment (Department of 
Public Works, 2004). In terms of this programme, the unskilled individuals targeted are 
defined as the unemployed lacking secondary education (Hemson, 2007). However, studies 
have found that 33 per cent of participants had completed secondary education; a percentage 
comparable to the population at large (Leibbrandt, et al., 2009). Moreover, studies also show 
that the majority of South Africans are unaware of the programme, and that only small 
amounts of money are actually transferred to a few households through it.(Leibbrandt, et al., 
2009). Thus, while this may have some degree of impact on the depths of poverty, it is not a 
long-term solution to unemployment and arguably of limited utility in helping the 
unemployed find future employment (Kingdon and Knight, 2007). Again, all these 
shortcomings considered, it seems unlikely that a government intervention of this nature 
significantly reduces the demand amongst the unskilled for increased numbers of low-skill, 
low-wage service jobs. 
 
One final form of state intervention to be considered is that of labour laws. Many have 
blamed high minimum wages for the level of unemployment. Trade unions and collective 
bargaining have been blamed for high formal sector wages in comparison to other countries 
at similar income levels, thereby discouraging employers from hiring more workers (Seeking 
and Nattrass, 2005; Rodrik, 2008). However, real wages have not risen substantially since 
1994, and arguably unions have only succeeded in preventing the reduction of wages. Thus, 
high wages are arguably not the main cause of unemployment in South Africa. 
 
While one expects it hardly needs saying, the vast majority of unemployment is definitely not 
voluntary. Some scholars have argued that people choose to remain jobless while they seek a 
“good” job. But many others find very little evidence of this. The unemployed are 
considerably worse off in terms of income and other indicators of well-being than the 
informally employed (Kingdon and Knight, 2004). It has also been found that the 
unemployed are less happy than the informally employed. Studies of workers reservation 
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wages have also shown that the majority of unemployed people do not have unrealistically 
high expectations of their potential wages (Nattrass and Walker, 2005). Therefore, this is 
arguably not contributing to their unemployment. Thus, it is unlikely that the situation of the 
unemployed is voluntary (Kingdon and Knight, 2004). 
 
Mismatched economic and employment growth 
 
As has been shown, welfare and other state interventions in South Africa are generally not of 
the nature to limit entry into low-wage service work. In addition, South Africa has a large 
percentage of unskilled workers, many of whom migrate to cities to find work. Why then is 
there growing unemployment accompanying a tendency towards professionalisation in the 
employed workforce, and not an increase in low-skill, low-wage work, leading to 
polarisation? Why does the workforce of the Johannesburg region share, with many European 
cities, the trend of increasing unemployment, as proposed by Hamnett (1996b), but none of 
the characteristics that he refers to that could explain why this has occurred? The answer 
concerns both the type of economic and employment growth that has occurred in South 
Africa, as well as the scale of it in comparison to the population. 
 
Many scholars argue that low economic growth and increasing unemployment are due mainly 
to the decline in the manufacturing sector (Rodrik, 2008). As was discussed earlier in this 
thesis, employment in services has grown dramatically (FIRE and business services in 
particular, but also wholesale and retail trade and other service sectors) (Burger and Woolard, 
2005; Rodrik, 2008). This occurred at the expense of manufacturing, agricultural and mining 
employment (Rodrik, 2008, Hodge, 2009). Thus, rather than increasing their share of 
workers, the sectors with the highest labour productivity in the economy lost workers to the 
service sectors (Rodrik, 2008). However, the service sectors do not have the same 
concentration of low-skilled labour as sectors such as manufacturing, mining and agriculture. 
In addition, as was also shown earlier in this thesis, there has been skill upgrading in all 
sectors of the economy (Rodrik, 2008). Even in the manufacturing, mining and agricultural 
sectors, capital intensive production techniques utilising new technology-intensive methods 
have also reduced the demand for low-skilled labour (Burger and Woolard, 2005). Thus, the 
decline in employment in sectors such as manufacturing has resulted in a significant decline 
in the relative demand for low-skilled labour (Rodrik, 2008; Seekings and Nattrass, 2004). 
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Therefore, there was a simultaneous shift in the economy from unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour in manufacturing, mining and agriculture, to skilled service sector work, as well as 
general skill-upgrading across all sectors. This resulted in not only skilled, better-educated, 
urbanised Africans prospering in the growing number of higher-skill, higher-pay service 
sector occupations, but also, uneducated rural migrant Africans becoming increasingly 
unemployed due to the decline in unskilled work (Burger and Woolard, 2005; Crankshaw, 
1997; Hindson, 1991). 
 
Furthermore, what economic growth there has been has not kept pace with labour force 
growth.  Even though the post-apartheid economy grew at a rate of 2.7 per cent per annum 
between 1995 and 2002, this was not fast enough to provide employment for the rapidly 
increasing labour force (Burger and Woolard, 2005). Between 1995 and 2003, the labour 
force grew by at least 4.6 million people (Kingdon and Knight, 2007).26 This represents an 
annual growth rate of 4.2 per cent. Wage employment grew by only 1.8 per cent per annum 
(1.3 million people) in this time, and self-employment by 5.1 per cent per annum (0.7 million 
people) (Kingdon and Knight, 2007). Thus, while formal sector employment grew by 32 per 
cent between 1995 and 2007, the percentage of the working age population (between 15 and 
65 years) grew by 26 per cent, and the labour force grew by 48 per cent (Hodge, 2009). The 
amount of labour force growth therefore overshadowed employment growth, leading to 
increasing unemployment. 
 
Other than natural population increase, this labour force growth is partly attributable to a 
significantly greater rise in female participation rates than male participation rates, 
particularly amongst African women (Kingdon and Knight, 2007). Of the increase of 1.97 
million people in employed labour between 1995 and 2003, 1.43 million were women. The 
African female participation rate rose by fully 15 percentage points, while the male rate rose 
by 5 percentage points in the same period. This increase amongst women appears to be due to 
several factors (Kingdon and Knight, 2007): 
 
• Declining access to men’s incomes due to (ironically) increased unemployment. 
• HIV/AIDS epidemic creating more single parent households. 
                                                 
26
 This excludes the non-searching unemployed. 
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• An increasing number of female heads of household resulting from changing 
household structures. 
• The lifting of Apartheid restrictions on movement to urban areas and perceived new 
employment opportunities. 
• An expectation of improved occupational attainment for non-whites, women in 
particular, partly due to employment equity legislation. 
• Participation rates typically increase with educational level, especially for women.  
 
 
Another area in which many scholars believe there has not been enough growth is that of the 
informal sector (Rogerson, 1995). South Africa’s informal sector is smaller relative to the 
informal sectors in other countries at a similar level of development (Seekings, et al., 2004; 
Rodrik, 2008). In Latin America in particular, those without formal sector employment are 
often able to find work in the informal sector (Seekings, et al., 2004). However, in South 
Africa, there is only a small informal sector, and those who cannot find work in the formal 
sector become unemployed instead. Reasons offered for the informal sector not developing to 
its full potential are both historical and current. Because Africans were not allowed in urban 
areas in addition to restrictive zoning and licensing laws, arguably they were not able to 
develop the networks necessary for the maintenance of a large-scale informal sector (Rodrik, 
2008; Rogerson, 1996). Furthermore, this history of repression of informal activities amongst 
Africans has resulted in the underdevelopment of entrepreneurial skills (Kingdon and Knight, 
2007; Lipton, 1989; Rogerson, 2000). The dearth of infrastructure and access to credit in 
African townships are also obstacles to entering the informal sector (Burger and Woolard, 
2005; Rogerson, 2000). Therefore, the informal sector has not developed to the extent where 
it can provide enough employment to compensate for the short-fall in the formal sector.  
 
Thus, it is “the sheer speed of divergence between the growth of the labour force and the 
growth of formal sector employment (the divergence over the period 1997–2003 being nearly 
4 per cent per annum) that is the underlying cause” of growing unemployment (Kingdon and 
Knight, 2007:816). 
 
In summary, while the conditions for the growth of low-skill, low-wage service jobs exist in 
the Johannesburg region (a lack of adequate state welfare benefits and a large number of 
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unskilled adults), unemployment has grown instead, due to insufficient economic growth in 
comparison to population growth. Thus, the Johannesburg region has a large surplus outsider 
population of adults along with an increasingly professionalised employed workforce. This is 
consistent with the case, as Hamnett (1996b) argues, in many European cities. However, the 
reasons for the development of this same pattern are very different. The unskilled in the 
Johannesburg region arguably do not receive state welfare support to the degree that it 
discourages their seeking low-skill work. Moreover, the case that Hamnett (1994a) presents 
for the US, that is, the presence of large numbers of low-skilled workers in the absence of 
substantial welfare benefits resulting in the growth of low-wage jobs, also does not apply 
here: there are arguably large numbers of unskilled workers and low levels of welfare in the 
Johannesburg region, but not disproportionately large numbers of low-skill jobs. Rather, there 
simply are not enough low-skill jobs being generated by the economy for the large number of 
unskilled workers to occupy; hence, growing unemployment alongside an increasingly 
professionalised employed workforce.  
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to critically assess the social polarisation hypothesis using 
the case of the Johannesburg region of South Africa. The evidence does not support Sassen’s 
(1994) conceptualisation of the social polarisation hypothesis, namely, that changes in 
sectoral structure have led to equal increases in high- and low-skill work, at the expense of 
skilled middle-income, manual employment. Employment in the manufacturing sector did 
decline from the 1980’s as employment in all service sectors increased. However, this 
arguably did not lead to increased polarisation of the occupational structure. As Hamnett 
(1994a) contends, the dominant pattern is one of increasing numbers of high-skill, high-pay 
jobs. Thus, while the numbers of low-skill workers did increase in the Johannesburg region 
between 1980 and 2010, the absolute growth in the numbers of higher-skilled, higher-paid 
managerial, professional, associate professional and technical workers was two and a half 
times greater than that amongst low-skill workers. This led to a marked skewing of the 
occupational distribution towards high-skill work. 
 
Crucial to this conclusion is how one defines the major occupation groups. Many supporters 
of the polarisation hypothesis would arguably mistakenly classify all clerical and service and 
sales occupations as low-skill, low-wage service sector work, and therefore interpret the 
expansion of these occupations as contributing to increasing social polarisation. However, 
these occupations have been shown to have similar skill requirements and levels of 
remuneration to the typical, blue-collar, middle-income jobs of the manufacturing sector that 
are in decline. Following the method of Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2009) then, if clerical 
and service and sales work is classified as semi-skilled, white-collar, middle-income work, 
growth in the numbers of these occupations does not contribute towards increasing social 
polarisation and can even mitigate the effects of the decline of the semi-skilled, blue-collar, 
middle-income manufacturing jobs. Thus it has been shown that despite the characterisation 
of many polarisation theorists of jobs in the service sector as being either high-skill, high-pay 
or low-skill, low-wage, a large proportion of these jobs are actually semi-skilled, middle-
income occupations. In terms of social polarisation theory, this goes directly to the heart of 
the supposed cause of increasing social polarisation: the growth of the service sector and the 
decline of manufacturing employment. If the service sector in general (as the make-up of the 
various sub-sectors will vary) does not consist solely of high-skill, high-pay and low-skill, 
low-pay jobs, but also a significant proportion of semi-skilled, middle-income jobs, then 
growth in service sector employment and a decline in manufacturing employment cannot lead 
inexorably to increased social polarisation. 
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Another assumption of many polarisation theorists concerns the occupation structure of the 
manufacturing sector. Many authors have argued that the manufacturing sector is made up of 
predominantly skilled and semi-skilled, middle-income, blue-collar jobs. Thus, the growth of 
the high-skill, high-pay occupation group has been viewed as a result of employment growth 
in the service sector only. However, this study has shown that the increase in high-skill, high-
pay occupations occurred across all major employment sectors, not only the service sub-
sectors: this includes manufacturing. The manufacturing sector itself became more 
professionalised, with much more growth in high-skill occupations than any other types of 
jobs. Shift-share analysis was used to show that the increasing share of the occupational 
distribution held by managerial, professional, associate professional and technical work was 
due to increases in the numbers of these occupations across all industries (that is, the 
occupation shift effect was the most significant in general). Therefore, contrary to the 
argument of social polarisation theorists that the increase in high-skill, high-pay occupations 
is due to growth in service sector employment only, growth in the numbers of these jobs in 
fact occurred across all sectors. This in turn lead to increased professionalisation across all 
sectors, and the professionalisation of the occupational distribution of the Johannesburg 
region. 
The role of migrants in social polarisation was also considered. In much of the polarisation 
literature, migrants are portrayed as mostly poor, unskilled workers from Third World 
countries, unable to access anything but low-skill work in the cities to which they migrate. 
Many scholars allude to the role these migrants play in social polarisation, but do not state 
what they view this role to be. I would argue that these scholars are implying that migrants 
contribute to social polarisation by filling the low-skill, low-wage service jobs available that 
the natives do not want. Thus, with increasing levels of migration, there are more and more 
migrants to fill these low-wage jobs, while natives fill the growing number of high-skill 
positions, thereby leading to increasing social polarisation. However, other scholars contend 
that migrants do not only occupy low-skill, low-wage exclusively. The data for the 
Johannesburg region show that migrants have similar occupational distributions to natives, 
and that all migrants have contributed significantly in absolute terms to the growth of 
managerial, professional, associate professional and technical occupations, and therefore, the 
greater trend towards increasing professionalisation. Thus, in the case of Johannesburg, not 
only did large-scale migration not appear to lead to increasing social polarisation, but 
migrants in fact form a substantial proportion of the ever-growing numbers of high-skill, 
high-pay workers. Thus the presence of migrants in this case could be argued to be more 
relevant to the process of the skewing of the occupation distribution towards increasing 
professionalisation.  
However, as South Africa is a country with large numbers of unskilled adults, it would not be 
unreasonable to expect that the growth in high-skill occupations would be accompanied by a 
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concomitant growth in low-skill work. Hamnett (1994a) has argued that the presence of a 
large number of unskilled migrants makes an expanded low-wage service sector possible. As 
he argues, the case in many European countries is that only a relatively small migrant 
population is present, and there is sufficient welfare provision which negates the need for 
people to seek low-skill service sector worker. Thus, growing professionalisation is 
accompanied by growing unemployment and a large outsider surplus population. Arguably, 
this is also the case in the Johannesburg region, but not due to adequate welfare benefits 
making it unnecessary for workers to hold low-wage jobs and choose unemployment instead. 
Rather, there has simply not been sufficient economic growth and job creation in comparison 
to labour force growth in South Africa. Thus, this has also resulted in growing 
professionalisation accompanied by increasing unemployment and a large outsider surplus 
population. 
The above findings highlight two points: first, that professionalisation is not a process that 
occurs only in Western, developed economies, and second, that professionalisation can be 
accompanied by unemployment under quite different circumstances. These points are linked 
though. It is perhaps not surprising that the professionalisation observed in Johannesburg is 
occurring alongside very high levels of unemployment, much higher than that recorded in 
most developed countries. Arguably, welfare benefits in many developed countries are of a 
level that allows a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. In South Africa, even 
though this is not the case, the unemployment levels are much higher. Why are the 
unemployed not taking up low-skill, low-wage jobs? Because there simply are not enough 
low-skill, low-wage jobs for the large unskilled labour force. This perhaps underscores a 
fundamental difference between developed countries and developing countries: vastly 
different levels of wealth. Arguably, even though there are increasing numbers of high-skill, 
high-pay workers, the percentage of the total population they form, and the amount of money 
they earn, simply is not enough to generate the demand for the low-skill, low-pay service 
sector jobs necessary to create employment for the majority of unskilled workers. Thus, 
instead of the situation in a developed country of increasing professionalisation and 
increasing levels of wealth of the middle-classes alongside a smaller percentage of the 
economically inactive (those who are unemployed, but still able to live a reasonable quality 
of life due to adequate welfare benefits), a developing country may show increasing 
professionalisation alongside a growing mass of economically inactive, poor, unskilled 
workers. Thus, while professionalisation may occur in both developed and developing 
countries, the differing contexts in which the process takes place may lead to very different 
outcomes for those excluded from the economically active workforce.  
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Appendix A: 
 
Magisterial Districts that comprise Gauteng Province in the South African 
Population Censuses 
 
1996/2001 1970 1980 1985 1991 
Alberton 164 164 149 301 
Benoni 160 167 152 304 
Boksburg 161 165 151 303 
Brakpan 162 168 160 312 
Bronkhorstspruit 173 182 181 333 
Cullinan 174 181 167 319 
Germiston 165 163 150 302 
Heidelberg (GT) 212 172 170 322 
Johannesburg 159 161 148 300 
Kempton Park 166 166 153 305 
Krugersdorp 152 175 159 311 
Nigel 213 170 162 314 
Oberholzer 153 179 157 309 
Pretoria 167 159 164 316 
Randburg Part of Johannesburg 162 154 306 
Randfontein 154 178 158 310 
Roodepoort 155 176 155 307 
Soshanguve Not present* Part of Wonderboom 166 318 
Soweto Part of Johannesburg 
Springs 163 169 161 313 
Vanderbijlpark 157 184 168 320 
Vereeniging 158 183 169 321 
Westonaria 156 177 156 308 
Wonderboom Part of  Pretoria 160 165 317 
* Was Mabopane East, which was subsequently renamed Soshanguve and reincorporated into South Africa. 
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Appendix B: Immigrants to the Johannesburg region of South Africa, 1980-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Table B1. Occupational distribution of employed men by race in the Johannesburg region, 1980 (frequency distribution)  
 
Occupation             African           White 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
   Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 1,339 1,207 118 2,664 28,844 29,741 22,209 80,794 
Professionals 6,704 4,888 546 12,138 27,079 28,387 16,551 72,017 
Technicians and associate professionals 5,542 4,609 323 10,474 27,341 23,216 15,319 65,876 
Clerks 41,500 31,783 2,213 75,496 25,215 30,140 6,294 61,649 
Service, shop and market sales workers 25,914 52,652 5,226 83,792 23,453 24,708 10,445 58,606 
Craft and related trades workers 71,272 182,784 77,937 331,993 54,096 39,322 26,980 120,398 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 87,965 132,972 21,646 242,583 18,508 21,208 6,065 45,781 
Elementary occupations 72,072 148,391 11,042 231,505 1,587 2,157 511 4,255 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 29,752 62,125 7,146 99,023 5,412 5,399 2,219 13,030 
Total 342,060 621,411 126,197 1,089,668 211,535 204,278 106,593 522,406 
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               Table B1.continued 
 
Occupation         Coloured                                     Indian 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
 Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 311 202 12 525 1,065 531 350 1,946 
Professionals 878 466 19 1,363 1,227 643 198 2,068 
Technicians and associate professionals 660 365 14 1,039 865 544 183 1,592 
Clerks 3,226 1,476 12 4,714 3,863 2,282 419 6,564 
Service, shop and market sales workers 978 770 36 1,784 3,680 1,660 1,463 6,803 
Craft and related trades workers 8,700 6,153 183 15,036 1,572 1,107 468 3,147 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 5,052 2,992 23 8,067 750 497 64 1,311 
Elementary occupations 1,283 1,142 40 2,465 408 210 74 692 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 1,179 1,051 29 2,259 226 180 56 462 
Total 22,267 14,617 368 37,252 13,656 7,654 3,275 24,585 
                  Source: South African Population Census 1980 
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            Table B2. Occupational distribution of employed men by race in the Johannesburg region, 2007 (frequency distribution)  
 
Occupation        African          White 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 36,204 50,051 11,019 97,274 67,808 39,360 21,317 128,485 
Professionals 34,982 47,671 9,853 92,506 61,130 29,753 13,268 104,151 
Technicians and associate professionals 32,440 42,629 6,435 81,504 36,252 18,372 7,333 61,957 
Clerks 31,291 36,629 3,682 71,602 13,535 5,235 1,139 19,909 
Service, shop and market sales workers 54,490 117,931 14,463 186,884 19,878 8,788 3,383 32,049 
Craft and related trades workers 68,427 162,416 43,291 274,134 41,225 15,135 5,721 62,081 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 68,992 137,165 13,612 219,769 9,886 4,182 1,056 15,124 
Elementary occupations 53,556 109,744 22,405 185,705 8,358 4,072 1,671 14,101 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 86,351 141,005 25,755 253,111 46,917 18,303 8,300 73,520 
Total 466,733 845,241 150,515 1,462,489 304,989 143,200 63,188 511,377 
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            Table B2.continued 
 
Occupation         Coloured                                          Indian 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
 Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 5,830 3,223 182 9,235 7,021 8,546 2,501 18,068 
Professionals 5,220 3,118 266 8,604 5,458 7,320 1,791 14,569 
Technicians and associate professionals 4,185 1,806 207 6,198 3,180 4,089 441 7,710 
Clerks 4,229 1,324 0 5,553 2,626 1,801 433 4,860 
Service, shop and market sales workers 3,556 1,832 65 5,453 3,417 2,333 1,823 7,573 
Craft and related trades workers 7,931 3,628 500 12,059 1,997 1,781 980 4,758 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 3,731 1,575 54 5,360 741 1,122 470 2,333 
Elementary occupations 1,963 1,303 64 3,330 767 752 581 2,100 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 6,598 3,527 194 10,319 4,685 4,368 794 9,847 
Total 43,243 21,336 1,532 66,111 29,892 32,112 9,814 71,818 
              Source: Community Survey 2007 
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                   Table B3. Occupational distribution of employed men by race in the Johannesburg region, 1980 (percentage distribution, 
                   column totals) 
 
Occupation African White 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0 0 0 0 14 15 21 15 
Professionals 2 1 0 1 13 14 16 14 
Technicians and associate professionals 2 1 0 1 13 11 14 13 
Clerks 12 5 2 7 12 15 6 12 
Service, shop and market sales workers 8 8 4 8 11 12 10 11 
Craft and related trades workers 21 29 62 30 26 19 25 23 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 26 21 17 22 9 10 6 9 
Elementary occupations 21 24 9 21 1 1 0 1 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 9 10 6 9 3 3 2 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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                   Table B3. continued 
 
Occupation     Coloured      Indian 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 1 1 3 1 8 7 11 8 
Professionals 4 3 5 4 9 8 6 8 
Technicians and associate professionals 3 2 4 3 6 7 6 6 
Clerks 14 10 3 13 28 30 13 27 
Service, shop and market sales workers 4 5 10 5 27 22 45 28 
Craft and related trades workers 39 42 50 40 12 14 14 13 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 23 20 6 22 5 6 2 5 
Elementary occupations 6 8 11 7 3 3 2 3 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 5 7 8 6 2 2 2 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
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                    Table B4. Occupational distribution of employed men by race in the Johannesburg region, 2007 (percentage distribution,  
                    column totals) 
  
Occupation African White 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 8 6 7 7 22 27 34 25 
Professionals 7 6 7 6 20 21 21 20 
Technicians and associate professionals 7 5 4 6 12 13 12 12 
Clerks 7 4 2 5 4 4 2 4 
Service, shop and market sales workers 12 14 10 13 7 6 5 6 
Craft and related trades workers 15 19 29 19 14 11 9 12 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 15 16 9 15 3 3 2 3 
Elementary occupations 11 13 15 13 3 3 3 3 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 19 17 17 17 15 13 13 14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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                    Table B4. continued 
 
Occupation Coloured     Indian 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 13 15 12 14 23 27 25 25 
Professionals 12 15 17 13 18 23 18 20 
Technicians and associate professionals 10 8 14 9 11 13 4 11 
Clerks 10 6 0 8 9 6 4 7 
Service, shop and market sales workers 8 9 4 8 11 7 19 11 
Craft and related trades workers 18 17 33 18 7 6 10 7 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 9 7 4 8 2 3 5 3 
Elementary occupations 5 6 4 5 3 2 6 3 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 15 17 13 16 16 14 8 14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
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            Table B5. Occupational distribution of employed women by race in the Johannesburg region, 1980 (frequency distribution)  
 
Occupation          African            White 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 451 212 15 678 3,626 3,612 2,469 9,707 
Professionals 10,927 5,833 99 16,859 17,508 17,924 6,623 42,055 
Technicians and associate professionals 8,122 3,894 115 12,131 11,206 9,714 5,022 25,942 
Clerks 18,788 4,610 155 23,553 76,376 60,496 25,113 161,985 
Service, shop and market sales workers 35,780 14,451 486 50,717 10,674 10,485 6,509 27,668 
Craft and related trades workers 22,486 7,515 326 30,327 1,816 1,464 1,135 4,415 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 13,979 3,939 191 18,109 1,768 1,635 809 4,212 
Elementary occupations 123,432 151,414 5,482 280,328 985 1,720 351 3,056 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 10,055 5,007 254 15,316 1,456 1,322 696 3,474 
Total 244,020 196,875 7,123 448,018 125,415 108,372 48,727 282,514 
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              Table B5. continued 
 
Occupation         Coloured                                        Indian 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
 Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 103 48 3 154 115 53 35 203 
Professionals 843 711 17 1,571 472 307 45 824 
Technicians and associate professionals 520 352 11 883 274 162 7 443 
Clerks 4,520 1,844 34 6,398 2,951 1,270 90 4,311 
Service, shop and market sales workers 1,371 931 16 2,318 1,196 523 189 1,908 
Craft and related trades workers 3,259 1,694 11 4,964 463 153 28 644 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 3,070 1,433 10 4,513 345 83 11 439 
Elementary occupations 1,929 4,093 26 6,048 142 191 5 338 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 814 503 3 1,320 158 64 9 231 
Total 16,429 11,609 131 28,169 6,116 2,806 419 9,341 
                 Source: South African Population Census 1980 
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           Table B6. Occupational distribution of employed women by race in the Johannesburg region, 2007 (frequency distribution)  
 
Occupation         African          White 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 33,270 24,543 3,650 61,463 55,813 25,339 11,123 92,275 
Professionals 57,385 49,915 3,352 110,652 58,889 31,283 10,344 100,516 
Technicians and associate professionals 25,410 21,699 1,541 48,650 35,262 14,981 7,238 57,481 
Clerks 64,936 44,956 2,356 112,248 51,666 19,827 7,377 78,870 
Service, shop and market sales workers 43,248 42,669 5,778 91,695 16,989 6,840 2,217 26,046 
Craft and related trades workers 18,851 20,489 1,339 40,679 5,288 2,236 214 7,738 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 11,676 9,725 789 22,190 1,494 882 291 2,667 
Elementary occupations 124,724 215,758 17,594 358,076 3,776 3,082 920 7,778 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 78,231 83,031 8,620 169,882 38,934 17,829 6,162 62,925 
Total 457,731 512,785 45,019 1,015,535 268,111 122,299 45,886 436,296 
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           Table B6. continued 
 
Occupation          Coloured                                            Indian 
 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
  Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
 Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 4,914 2,476 53 7,443 3,290 5,674 853 9,817 
Professionals 8,246 3,901 310 12,457 3,886 7,936 636 12,458 
Technicians and associate professionals 2,953 1,882 100 4,935 1,972 2,721 364 5,057 
Clerks 8,999 3,817 214 13,030 5,282 4,767 333 10,382 
Service, shop and market sales workers 2,506 1,575 67 4,148 1,367 1,435 244 3,046 
Craft and related trades workers 1,686 1,411 0 3,097 503 337 123 963 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 1,350 658 0 2,008 178 113 63 354 
Elementary occupations 1,870 2,737 171 4,778 530 427 238 1,195 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 6,004 2,977 55 9,036 3,869 4,182 382 8,433 
Total 38,528 21,434 970 60,932 20,877 27,592 3,236 51,705 
              Source: Community Survey 2007 
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                    Table B7. Occupational distribution of employed women by race in the Johannesburg region, 1980 (percentage distribution,  
                    column totals) 
  
Occupation African   White 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 3 
Professionals 4 3 1 4 14 17 14 15 
Technicians and associate professionals 3 2 2 3 9 9 10 9 
Clerks 8 2 2 5 61 56 52 57 
Service, shop and market sales workers 15 7 7 11 9 10 13 10 
Craft and related trades workers 9 4 5 7 1 1 2 2 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 6 2 3 4 1 2 2 1 
Elementary occupations 51 77 77 63 1 2 1 1 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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                    Table B7. continued 
 
Occupation Coloured Indian 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 1 0 2 1 2 2 8 2 
Professionals 5 6 13 6 8 11 11 9 
Technicians and associate professionals 3 3 8 3 4 6 2 5 
Clerks 28 16 26 23 48 45 21 46 
Service, shop and market sales workers 8 8 12 8 20 19 45 20 
Craft and related trades workers 20 15 8 18 8 5 7 7 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 19 12 8 16 6 3 3 5 
Elementary occupations 12 35 20 21 2 7 1 4 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 5 4 2 5 3 2 2 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
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                    Table B8. Occupational distribution of employed women by race in the Johannesburg region, 2007 (percentage distribution,  
                    column totals) 
  
Occupation    African     White 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 7 5 8 6 21 21 24 21 
Professionals 13 10 7 11 22 26 23 23 
Technicians and associate professionals 6 4 3 5 13 12 16 13 
Clerks 14 9 5 11 19 16 16 18 
Service, shop and market sales workers 9 8 13 9 6 6 5 6 
Craft and related trades workers 4 4 3 4 2 2 0 2 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Elementary occupations 27 42 39 35 1 3 2 2 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 17 16 19 17 15 15 13 14 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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                    Table B8. continued 
 
Occupation    Coloured      Indian 
  
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Legislators, senior officials and managers 13 12 5 12 16 21 26 19 
Professionals 21 18 32 20 19 29 20 24 
Technicians and associate professionals 8 9 10 8 9 10 11 10 
Clerks 23 18 22 21 25 17 10 20 
Service, shop and market sales workers 7 7 7 7 7 5 8 6 
Craft and related trades workers 4 7 0 5 2 1 4 2 
Plant/machine operators and assemblers 4 3 0 3 1 0 2 1 
Elementary occupations 5 13 18 8 3 2 7 2 
Skilled Agriculture and Undetermined 16 14 6 15 19 15 12 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
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Table B9. High-skill occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 1980 (frequency 
distribution) 
 
High-skill African White                  Coloured Indian  
1980 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 13,585 10,704 987 83,264 81,344 54,079 1,849 1,033 45 3,157 1,718 731 252,496 
Women 19,500 9,939 229 32,340 31,250 14,114 1,466 1,111 31 861 522 87 111,450 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
 
Table B10. High-skill occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 2007 (frequency 
distribution) 
 
High-skill African White                  Coloured Indian  
2007 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 103,626 14,0351 27,307 165,190 87,485 41,918 15,235 8,147 655 15,659 19,955 4,733 63,0261 
Women 116,065 96,157 8,543 149,964 71,603 28,705 16,113 8,259 463 9,148 16,331 1,853 523,204 
Source: Community Survey 2007. 
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Table B11. Unskilled occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 1980 (frequency 
distribution) 
 
Unskilled African White                  Coloured Indian  
1980 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 72,072 148,391 11,042 1,587 2,157 511 1,283 1,142 40 408 210 74 238,917 
Women 123,432 151,414 5,482 985 1,720 351 1,929 4,093 26 142 191 5 289,770 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
 
 
Table B12. Unskilled occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 2007 (frequency 
distribution) 
 
Unskilled African White                  Coloured Indian  
2007 Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 53,556 109,744 22,405 8,358 4,072 1,671 1,963 1,303 64 767 752 581 205,236 
Women 124,724 215,758 17,594 3,776 3,082 920 1,870 2,737 171 530 427 238 371,827 
Source: Community Survey 2007. 
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Table B13. Semi-skilled Blue-collar occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 1980 
(frequency distribution) 
 
Semi-skilled African White                  Coloured Indian  
Blue-collar 
1980 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 159,237 315,756 99,583 72,604 60,530 33,045 13,752 9,145 206 2,322 1,604 532 768,316 
Women 36,465 11,454 517 3,584 3,099 1,944 6,329 3,127 21 808 236 39 67,623 
Source: South African Population Census 1980 
 
 
Table B14. Semi-skilled Blue-collar occupations across the four main race groups and men and women in the Johannesburg region, 2007 
(frequency distribution) 
 
Semi-skilled African White                  Coloured Indian  
Blue-collar 
2007 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Native Internal 
migrant 
Foreign 
migrant 
Total 
Men 137,419 299,581 56,903 51,111 19,317 6,777 11,662 5,203 554 2,738 2,903 1,450 595,618 
Women 30,527 30,214 2,128 6,782 3,118 505 3,036 2,069 0 681 450 186 79,696 
Source: Community Survey 2007 
 
